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L'ltroduction: Vllly study '1vlazovviecki's Poland'? 
The subject of this thesis is Poland_'s first post. eomIrnullst 
gOVtJ['fll!ltJflt (SepLelllLj(W 1989 - Decembec 1990), fUi'ilwd under> the 
premiership of tho veteran 'Solidarity' activist Tadousz 
TvTaxovv ieckil. Tile [;1) pealJ of el;onom [c collapse and social d isol'der 
llnil promptBcl tllp, (;omml1nist :l:utlloritiBs to grant the 
non-communist clements organised around the 'Solidarity' 
[nOVelIlenL2 limiLed aeeeHS Lo Lite POliHll paI'HamenL iJllrough 
partially freo elections. In Juno 1989 the results of these elections 
delivered a fatal blov,r to communist rule in Poland. 'Solidarity' 
triumphod in practically all the parliamentary seats the 
CODUIlULdsL aul.hOI'll.ies bad perIIlH.Led H. to cOI1LesL:~. Bel'efl. of 
ideological confidence and Soviet support, the Polish Communist 
Pal'Ly 4 l'apjeUy cUsiol.egl'at.ed and Lhe task of [OI'lning an 
administration foll to 'Solidarity'. 
The new government, led by 1vlazovriecki and dominated by 
eeIH'eseniJa.Lives of SoU<1a.l'iLy!s inLelleeLual eULeB, wa.s a.ppoinl.ed in 
September 1989. In the rnonths trLat followed., the new 
governnlCnt took advantage of strong social support and 
popularity to introduce comprehensive political and economic 
reforms. The reforms introduced irrevocably dismantled tllo 
GOUIltry's disastrous command econorny and introduced a radical 
shift to market based criteria. Although they entailed austerity 
for much of Polish society, at least initially, the personal prestige 
of the new elite and its promise of t:tw future benefits which 
would flow from the introduction of market rules seemed to 
guarantee an ongoing state of acquiescence. 
Tho political reform process was admittedly slovler but the 
removal of the last vestiges of cornmunist power from the system 
pI' egressed steadily. "VVithin nine months the government had 
taken great strides L'l. endL'l.g communist control of tho police and 
military and 'lvas tackling the continued influence of the 
nomenklatura in the state bureaucracy. State control of the 
media and previous prohibitions on freedom of conscience, 
association and speech were ended. Completely free parliamentary 
and presidential elections were planned for the near future. It 
seemed that for the duration of the transition Poland would bo 
led to a 'Westernstyle' liberal democratic polity and free market 
economy by a goverlli'Tlent composed of Solidarity's 'best and 
lwighLesL'c,. AvoliLieal iIliJelledu8.ls would VaiJl'ioLLeally Vu.L LIle 
higher noeds of the nation before the distractions of everyday 
political competitiveness. They would be supported in this by the 
Solidarity rnovement which would also act as a nursery for 
fledgling political parties. Over tirne these organisations vlould 
;::sather the societal support and organisational strength necessary 
to form a conventional, stable political system. 
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However by Deccrnber 1990 the situation had altered radically. 
The lit1azovviecki goverr.u'TIent, lUL."'11iliated by the defeat of its 
Premier in the Presidential elections, vvas in the process of 
resigning office. The personal prestige and social authority of the 
ne"\,'V elite ho,d been severely undermined. The Solid3.rity 
movement h3.d been torn 3.po,rt by deep splits. Polish tr3.nsition 
politics h3.d been muddied by 3. vicious interno,l struggle. A clutch 
of small, unstable pOlitical organisations appeared to challenge 
those organisations V'J"hich had emergod as a result of Solidarity's 
disintegration. Rather than tho cont.rolled., evolut.ionary transit.ion 
process envisaged by t.ho Mazowiecki administration at the 
beginning of 1990, Poland wa.s .sot to ondure 8J period of polit.ical 
fragmentation and volatility, party disorganisation, 
personalisation of the polit.ical spectrum, votor apathy and societal 
unrest. 
The t.ask of t.his thesis is t.o analyse the Mazowiecki govorrunent.'s 
cont.ribut.ion to t.he consolidat.ion of democracy in Poland. This 
issue remains import.ant. t.oday for a nu.mbor of reasons. First.ly, it. 
is still lLTlresolved. The fall of the Mazowiecki government was 
interpreted by many as a blo,N to the prospects of 
rlGmo(;T':l.tisation in Polanrl. l'Jl1m8T'0l1S aT't.i(;18s analys8rl tne 
conditioll of dcrnoeraey imrnedi8J.ely aft.er the 11!182ovvieeki period. 
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S""tunmarised "Lmder the slog8"n of 'c.ilril soc.iety', I:lI!ere applied to the 
Polish ease. 1-..1ost studies stressed the weakness of these 
insLILuLioIlS and ppoeesses7 . V{esLeI'Il analysLswho had ppevlously 
extolled the virtues of the 1-/[oJzo-v,Tieeki governIIlCnt reassessed 
On the other h8,nd, vvith the benefit of hL"'ld:nght, one Gan 
appreciate the momentous stops taken by the Mazowiecki 
government in moving Poland in tho direetion of libera.l 
democracy. Admittedly, the drama of the early transition period 
has sinee be on roplaeed by tho more prosaie proeess of long-term 
po1itical and economic development. The mixed political fortunes 
of the heroes of the old a.nti-eomrnunist opposition a.nd the 
reemergence of their cornmlJnist foes as an electoral force, under 
the banner of socia.] democraey, have t.ended to detract from the 
signjficance of that time. 
Nevertheless, Ma7.ow:iecki's tenure remains of praetical and 
symbolic significance to Poland. Vital decisions ,Afere taken 
conccrni:ng the rate of transition from a command to a free 
market economy, from a mono party to a multi party political 
airns to arrive at a tlalanced and ultimately favourable judgement 
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of the 1v1azovviecki government's contribution to the consolidation 
of democracy in POland. 
Secondly, recent events in Pola,nd haNe further focused attention 
on the 1v1azovlTiecki period. In September 1997 Solidarity Election 
A(~Liorl (AV:rS), a coaliLiorl 01 Hdvtwal tl'acldUrllorlH, aIld 'poJiLi(~al 
and social organisations groupod l..mder the 'Solidarity' banner, 
gained a surprise vietory over the yuJing former communists of 
Lile Demo<;['aLie Left AlHanee lO in the genepal eledion. TilLs llas 
prompted a reexa.mination of the 'Solidarity' legacy in POland. 
Parallels can immediately be drawn between September 1997 and 
September 1989 when a Solidarity-based government took. over 
offico from the communists. Indeed, some of the members of the 
first Solidarity government are to be found in the current 
a.dministration. Les7.ek. Balcerovvic7., Finance Minister under tho 
first Solida.rity governments and responsible for the initiation of 
the processes of eeonomie reform., returns to this office and is 
vice-premier in the new government. TIronislaltv Geremek, head of 
Solidarity's parliB.montary Ca1JCl..]S undor J\,ifa7.ovITiecki, is now 
l'vTini8tee of FOi'eign A ffail'Sll. 
Then as novv the prospects of democratic sta,bilit.y depend on the 
Solidarity movement's internal cohesion and it.s ability to build a 
la,st.ing coalit.ion with other orga,nisations. The disintegration of 
the Solidarity carnp dUTing the Mazowiecki period, one of the 
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central subjects of this thesis, can pro-vide useful L."'l..sights into the 
politics of contemporary Poland. A "INS has formod a coalition vrith 
1,lle Fpee<lnm UnhH)12 whose m8mbt-H'8fl ip inc;111<ie8 rni:1.ny of t.he 
intellectual luminaries of the old anti co:rn...rnunist opposition and 
shall sec, tensions betvreen Solidarity's trade l...illion and 
intellectual camps contributed to the fragmentation of the 
rnovemont l...mder Mazovvriocki. Ono of tho central tasks of the 
current government vrill be to overcome such strains. For 
instance, Geremek's appointment a.s Foreign Minister immediately 
prompted a vote of no confidence in the government by one of his 
adversaries lI'Oln t.he Ma:6owiecki period, Jaroslaw Kacz;ynski u5 . 
The journalist Janina Parado'i,'\Jska stressed the healing of 
Solidarity differences that stretch back to the Mazowiecki period 
as a fundamental and difficult objective for the cOl...mtry's new 
PI'elllier, t:Terz;y Buz;ek14. 
In April 199B Solidarity's internaJ tensions t,hreatened to 
undormine government l...illity. I3alcerovvricz's pregramme for 
restructuring the coal industry sparked protests from miners and 
brought the conflict over the movements party political and trade 
lJflinfl hlt·nd,iUHS riH/:k t.C) L11H sln'rac~p,lB. Tllis (~lasl1 li1ayecl a lni1Jof' 
part in the dovvnfall of t.he 1/Iaz01Niecki administration in 1990. 
Tll\J proc.ess of ridding the state bureaucracy of former 
Communist Pa,rt.y members, and bringir~ those guilty of the v\TOrst 
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'decornml...Ulisation' legislation through the Sejm is exacerbating 
arosp, in t.hp, l\/fa7:oi,v"inc;ki pp,riod clllring the Prp,f'jidBntial c;ampaign 
of 199017. Othe.r conLelnporary t.heIIleS, suc.h as the extent to 
which the Polish econorny should be opened up to the free market 
and ~-Ve{3tern firITIS, the public. role of the Catholic. Churc.h and 
attitudes to European integration emerged during the Maz01/\Tiecki 
period, Thus examination of the IJ[azowiec.ki administration's 
grappling with the problems of democratisation can provide 
useful inSights to the ongoing process of demoeratic. eonsolidation 
in Poland. 
Thirdly, from a wider perspeetivo, Poland's involvement in the 
process of European integration is inextricably bound to the 
polities of the early tranSition period, In 1991 GerorTIek noted the 
importance of East Central Europe's transition to the future of 
Union membership. Significant steps toward KU. membership are 
expected to tC1,ke place durin£ the tenure of the cl...ITrent 
conscqu<::nc.cs for 8,11 member cOl...Ultrics. The prospec.t of Poland's 
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tnE; Ma7.mNic;p,ki pc;rioc'l; politir.al Eltahility and an c;r.onomy 
basic criteria for inclusion. It is thus distinctly possible that 
development.s in Poland since 1989 will help shape t.he fut.ure of 
Finally, for polit.ical scient.ist.s in the West., the early transition 
period offers the opportunity t.o observe the construction of 
democrat.ic. politic.al systems almost from sc.ratc.h. The transition 
proc;eElEl in Po1and tnre1,'\T l.1p ql1estions vvnir.n are app]jc;able to all 
countries vv-hich aspire to be democ.rat.ic.. What is the role of 
intellec;tl1;l.ls in tne transit.1on to c'lemoc;rac;y? To 1,'\That extent 
Sh01JJd the state 'enforce' democ.ratic. principles? What 
combination of central institutions is most appropriate for 
fostering democracy? V'lhat type of party system is most 
representative of soc.ietal interests? Should broad-based 'social 
movements' be seen as the modern repla.cement of f::wtional, 
old fashioned politic.al organisations? All of these issues arc 
a.ddresscd in t.he CO"lu'se of the t.hesis. 
Gnp, [llllHL aeknowle<1ge LilaL Lhe Hlajof' Ll1ernes of L1113 work (Ll1e 
. ., 1 l'" . l 1 '\ lSSllP,S raISP,(llY .Jlt~ lJ10Ve ll'OHl COlIHIlUHlSHl .0 (E:Hll()(:l'aGY) were 
repeated t.o varying degrees t.hr011ghout. East Central Europe from 
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ffH-wiLs Ll)e aLLenLion of poliLical scieni;ists2.l. As in Poland, 
int.ellect.uals were prorninent in the Czech and Hungarian 
anti corrnm ... mist movements. These figures also played prominent 
public roles in t.he early transition period before experiencing 
[rusLraLion and pollLlcal rnai>gillali8aLlon~l2. s 
The common activity of East Central E"Lli'opean intellectuals was 
particularly noticeable in the late 1970s when anti communist 
intellect.uals formed broadly similar crit.iques of Party state 
system. In "V'V arsa IN, Budapest and Prague intellectuals such as 
Michnik ann Kupon., KOnT'3.n (3.no Kis and Havel and K1Jndera 
called for t.he peaceful organisation of groups in their societies 
ouL VII lLh the cOllLrol of Lhe COlIUIlUIlisL ParLy-sLaLe (labelled the 
'reconsLl'udlon of cIvil soeieLy'2~'j). However Poland deserves 
special study for a number of reasons. First.ly, in t.erms of size, 
Poland demands attention. With a population of almost forty 
JIlmiOll (arouLtd fifLy .1lel'c.:eL1L more Lll<Ul Lhe forrIldr 
CzecJlos1ovakia and Hungary combined) the argLUneuLs of Llljs 
work t.end to be 1,vrit larger in a Polish context. In addition, 
Poland's locat.ion me3,ns thcl,t. it can qualify as t.he eountry most. 
representative of the Ea.stCentral European eondition. If the 
region ean be defined as the cwe::l, bet.ltvccn Ea.stern and T.N cst.ern 
Europe, betwoen Russia and Gorm3,ny, t.hen Poland alone fit.s this 
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Poland's specific characteristies mean that it provides the elearest 
examples of the themes of this thesis. Although in communist 
Hl...1.Ilgary and Czechoslovakia intellectuals theorised about the 
reeonstruetion of civil soeiet.y they remaL.~ed largely isolated from 
their soeieties. In Poland the eirCl...Ullstances existed for theory to 
be put. int.o prEwtiec. The v8Jriety and durability of officially 
tolerated non Marxist. thought amongst the intelligentsia, the 
failure of the eOInmunists' eolleetivisat.ion of agrieult.-ure, the 
strength of the Catholie Ch1..ITch and the presence of a large, 
politicised workingelass were speeifie to Poland and laid the 
f01..mdations for a Lilli que attempt to organise social groups 
ou1,wlLh 1,he Pal'Ly-sLa1,e25. 
If the thesis is examining the eondition of demoeratie forces from 
comml...mist opposition to postcomm1..mist consolidation, then the 
Polish ease provides the elearest examples, Polish soeiety Wei,S 
suffiCiently mobilised behind the 'democratic opposition' to suggest 
thC1J, the ehances of democra.t.ic eonsolidat.ion \l\TOre best in this 
eOl...mtry. The faU of the Mazowiecki administration as it 
Chapter 1 V'Jill oxarnino tho thooretiealbaekgrol...md t.o t.ho 
democratisation procc;ss. ~"lestern style parliamentary democraeies 
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will be seen as t.he product. of a hist.oric process whereby t.he st.at.e 
becornes responsive t.o t.he int.erest.s of a loyal, consensual societ.y 
t.hrough t.he development. of 'civil societ.y' as a mediat.ory realm. 
Th8 Polish path is thAn c;ompn.T'AO [l.no c;ontJ'8,stAd wjth 
development.s in t.he V'Test.. The relative absence of a democratic 
political t.radit.ion is explained by reference to the host.ile 
relationship betweon state and socioty and t.he absence of civil 
society throughout Poland's modern history. A variety of 
approaches to the study of democrat.isat.ion are reviewed and t.he 
comparative historical approa.ch is chosen as the most a.ppropriate 
t.o the Polish case. This approach takes one factor in a given 
society and exa.mines its interaction with state and society over a 
given period of time. 
As t.he ]\,I[8,zowiecki government can be seen as a. 'government of 
the intelligentsia' t.he thesis takes t.he Polish int.elligentsia as a 
milie"ll in Poland whose relationship with politics is worthy of 
particular study. Tho Polish equivalent of the Western 
jntel1ect.-ual.. tho inte11igentsia is seen as a. mi1im] whjch, thOl.]gh it 
shared the democratic values of its ~V" estern counterpart, ,Nas 
inevit.ably slu.'),ped by count.ry's t.raumat.ic recent history. It. sought. 
to lead an "lmderdeveloped Poland t.o a modern, democratic future 
t.hrough t.he inst.rument. of the st.at.e. The elit.ist., et.atist. et.hos of 
the Polisl1 intelligentsia prevented it from performing a truly 
clnmO(',T'8.t.ic; J'oln in r,ivil sO(',inty. TnoAAo its politic;8.1 8.diviti8s .. 
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v/hich amo"lmt.ed t.o an 8,t.t,empt t.o impose it.s vision of a 
democrat.iG Poland., aet.ually cont.ribut.ed t.o t.he rise of 
"lmdemocratic forces. 
The t.hesis' choiee of the eomparat.ive hist.oriGal approaeh just.ifies 
the decision to elaborate the tlleoretiGal context of our study 
before est.ablishing t.he hist.oriGal b8Jckground. Usually t.he 
historiGal baGkground v,Jould be set out at tho beginning of tho 
thesis, However our study treats reGent Polish history in a 
"'-, .. _ .. 
particular and important '(,''lay: it uses it to trace the evolution of 
the intelligentsia and its relationship vv-ith state and society, This 
allovvs us to make connections between the development of the 
milieu's ethos and the Ol.ltlook of the MazowieGki government in 
1990. Thus., although some historical background emerges in 
Chapter 1, it is important to establish the theoretiGal implications 
of our examination of tho intelligentsia in modern Polish history 
'--_.-/ 
before em b8,rking on our st.-udy of that period, 
Chapter 2 will examine the relationship betvveen tllO intelligent.sia 
and t.he Gategories of st.at.e and_ sOGiety to show t.he historiGal 
Gontinuit.y of this ethos. Although massive Ghanges occurred 
during this period .. t.he intelligentsia's desire for state pOVier and 
iso18,t,ion from other social groups is presented as constant. Even 
LTl t.he late Gommunist. period.., t.11.e anti eommunist. int.elligent.sia's 
projGet of t,he 'reeoD....struct.ion of ci-v11 society' is seen more as a 
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state focussed strategy than an attempt to fully L.T).tegrate v.Jith 
sources. 
Chapters 3 3"nd !l '\>vill exarnine the influence of the ethos of the 
traditional Polish intelligentsia on the Mazovviecki government's 
programme of democratisation. Chapter 3 will study the 
relationship bet. ween the Mazo'\>viecki government and the state. It 
will contend that the intelligentsia's sense of superiority was 
reflected in an elitist approach to reform of the state-owned 
economy and the centralised political system. Although the 
long-term results of these reforms are generally commendable, in 
tho short-term they ran contrary to the process of 
democratisation. Polish society was pOlarised and radicalised in 
socio economic terms by the Da.lcerowicz Plan. :1,/[oroover the 
political sceno became an arena for internecine battles between 
intellectual elites for st3Jto power. The acrimonious fragment3Jtion 
of the Solidarity movement is seen as a direct result of those 
processes. 
Chapter !l will eX8,mine the relationship between the ]'v'[azowiec.ki 
government as 'the int.elligentsia in power' and society. It will 
s110w l,lla[. evtwy souta1 gf'Ollll (irll,e1HgellLsia,Vllof'ker's, veasardd'Y 
;.!,iHl Cc-l,LliOlk ClllJl\;{I) l1el\1 iI1lJLlJal1y lwsLi1e visions of 
post C.OIILLTL1Hust Poland. The soc.i8,l isolation 8"nd elitism of the 
intelligentsia merl.nt tnat tno Ma7.01;V"iecki gov8rnment 1;va8 11nanle 
to reconcile these differences. Not. only was this cont.rary t.o t.he 
development of a unified., democratic political culture, it also 
result.ed in the isolation of the 'intelligentsia in pov,rer' from the 
rest of Polish society. The campaigr.!.S and results of the 
presidential elections of winter 1990 arc presented as illust.rative 
of this process. Chapters 3 and 4 are based., first and foremost., on 
primary S01J..rces. Polish newspa.pers and periodicals from 1989 and 
1990(suell i:"~s "he 'SoUchwiLy' (legalls 'Ga:;;eLa vVyl)orGy,a' and 
'Tygod.nik SOlidarnosc' arc used. Articles from 'Polityka' are also 
l.lsed extensively. Although this 1;vas formerly an organ of the 
COffiffi'lmist Party, by 1989 it. was providing 8,n intelligent, 
independent commentary on the transition. Official Polish 
publicat.ions and the polit.ical memoirs of some of the leading 
figures (sueh as Mlellulk, KUrO[l and Gerernek) are also used to 
provide insights into the politics of the t.ime. 
The t.hesis wi11 conclude that t.he rule of the 'best and brightest' 
was not conducive to the est.a.blishment of a democratiC, civil 
society. The ethos of the traditional Polish inte11igentsia, though 
suffused with democ.rat.ic ideBJs, also cont.ained an etB,tist, elit.ist. 
model of political action v\Thic.h, -when given free reign in st.ate 
institutions, is not suitable to the development of democracy in 
the pluralist, T./vostern sense. IIov\Jever it -will identify the steps 
t.aken t)y the 'goverrnnent. of the int.elligent. siB, , in inst.it.ut.ing a 
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oc;moc;ratic; politic;al proc;eo11res ano a liberal 0c;onomic; system 
more in keeping v,rit.h developed, IN et.ern models. Moreover, the 
thesis vvill point to someome possible future contributions t.rw 
Polish int.elligent.sia can make to t.he consolidation of democracy. 
In the long term, in t.he context of relative economic prosperity 
[l.no politic;[l.l st!1.hility .. it (;an takA 1Jp positions in (;ivi1 SO(;jAty a.kin 
t.o those occupied by their Ilvest.ern cOl...mterparts. In the 
short. term, t.he prospect. of Poland's inclusion in the process of 
European integration perhaps offers one last project for the 
intelligentsia to play its role in leading Po13Jnd to the democratic 
West. 
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Chapter 1: The Theoretical Context of Democratisation 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the theoretical context 
of our examination of the Mazowiecki period. As stated 
previously, the challenges facing a government as it implements 
democratic reform in an unstable political context, provide 
scholars with an opportunity to test their theories against reality. 
In Mazowiecki's Poland a new political system was being built 
from scratch. The collapse of communism and the victory of the 
'democratic opposition' did not mean that political transition in 
Poland in the direction of a stable, democratic political system was 
an inevitable, preordained process. The uncertainty meant that 
the political system could develop in a variety of ways. 
The disintegration of the PZPR removed the basic repository of 
political power virtually overnight. The political institutions and 
procedures it left behind did not represent the freely expressed 
interests of Polish society. A return to the institutions and politics 
of pre-comm"llllist Poland was impossible due to the radical 
changes which ha.d taken place d'uring the comml.Jnist-imposed 
revolution (as "e'shall see, some forces in Polish society disagreed 
\ 
',,--... 
with this contention), Moreover, the old opposition's fundamental 
goal of dismantling the communist political system did not 
2] 
pI'eclude conflicts over how this was to be achieved and what 
eventual f01'J11 its replacernent would take. Econ01nic crisis and 
yotelltia.l social insta.bility, deepened by the initial l'esults of the 
~ _ • ~_ 1 • .... • ....... _ • ....... • ...... balCerowlCZ .t-'lan' meant tnat tnls ·grey area· at tne centre or 
Polis11 political life could be filled by a. range of, 'vbions', ideologies 
and systerns not all of which espoused dernocratl<; pOliti<.;s as 
accepted in the Vi[ est2 . 
Nevertheless, the generally accepted faults of cOlnrnW-list rule in 
Poland., identified by the representat;ives of the anti-corrUllunist; 
rnovernent who vvere nov-v in power, suggested tIle desired 
outcome of political change. In reacUon to the 'authoritarian' or 
'totalitarian' communist political system, it was generally agreed 
that the institutions of Polish state and society, and the 
relationship between them, had to be remodelled in accordance 
with liberal-democratic, political processes3 . When the Mazowiecki 
government took office on 12 September 1989 this agenda 
appeared to have priority 4. 
Chapter One will examine the theoretical context of this proposed 
shift from communist to liberal democratic political systems. It 
,-
yvill begin by examining the general characteristics of liberal 
~~_..--/ 
democracy as practised in the cO"Lmtries of Western Europe and 
North America. The historical and theoretical development of the 
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categories of Istate ', 'society' and 'civil society' are presented as 
central to the rise of democracy in the West. The absence of a 
democratic political tradition in modern Polish history will then 
be highlighted through comparison of these categories. Next, the 
various strategies forwarded by theorists of democratisation will 
be examined. Their app]jcabj]ity to the Polish case wm be 
evaluated before one approach is chosen for the thesis. 
The comparative historical approach to democratisation will be 
chosen as the maJn theoretical framework. This approach 
examines the evolution of categories (such as Istate ', 'society', 'civil 
society' or 'class') over a specific historical period. The thesis takes 
the Polish intelligentsia class as a vital factor in modern Polish 
history. As a milieu with a special relationship with the Polish 
state and a desire to be at the head of societal progress, the role of 
the intelligentsia in political change in Poland has always been 
prominent (Chapter 2 examines the experiences of the rnilieu in 
modern Polish history). In 1989 the incoming Mazowiecki 
government, charged with the task of democratisation, was 
dominated by the milieu5 . The influence of the intelligentsia on 
the process of democratisation in the Mazowiecki period is the 
central topic of the thesis and is dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4. 
lCa). Democracy in Poland and the West 
The term 'liberal democracy' covers a variety of systems with 
different types of political institutions and procedures. For 
instance, there are significant constitutional differences amongst 
the liberal parliamentary democracies of Western Europe and 
North America.6 Generally speakin.g, democracy means rule of the 
demos, the citizen body: the right of aU to decide what are matters 
of common concern. The size of modern nation states has meant 
that democracy is now indirect, i.e. achieved through the election 
of representatives. However, such a system ought to strive to 
respond to the wishes of its citizens as much as possible. Thus the 
basic aim of a Hberal democratjc system js the pOlitical 
empowerment (the ability to influence events that concern one) 
of all of its members, regardless of socio-economic, religious, ethnic 
or geographical differences. 
Liberal democratic systems are commonly associated with the 
countries of Western Europe and North America and here they 
emerged as the product of two sets of historical forces: reform of 
the state and political mobilisation of society. Together, these 
developments can be equated with the rise of 'civil society'. The 
following section will outline the historical and theoretical 




ei) The Development and Characteristics of Democracy in the 
West 
Historical Background 
The evolution of democracy in Western Europe can be 
summarised as the gradual recovery by society of some autonomy 
and the institution of a more balanced relationship with the state. 
Indeed several scholars have regarded the development of 
state/society relations towards equilibrium as a defining 
characteristic of the region. Many Central European writers 
regard the separation of state and society as a crucial factor in 
their quest to differentiate Eastern and Western Europe7 . 
The division of state and society in the West came about as a 
result of several historical processes. The collapse of centralised, 
authoritarian rule by Imperial Rome fragmented political 
sovereignty and placed power in several sets of hands. The process 
of disintegration was strengthened by the separation of the 
Roman Catholic Church from secular power. State power was 
thus weakened by the removal of religious authority and societal 
autonomy was consolidated by the arrival of another potential 
arena for non-state organisation. In this power vacuum various 
groups gradually emerged but none achieved real dominance. The 
rule of the monarchy was constrained by the nobility. Feudal 
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power in turn relied heavily on maintain.ing the loyalty of its 
vassals. To counter this the monarchy tended to encourage the 
development of autonomous urban centres with which alliances 
could be formed. As a result, a propertied urban stratum began to 
emerge which contributed to the general diffraction of power. 
For our purposes the major outcome of this period of 
decentralisation was the increasing awareness in the West of 
individual worth. This would eventually result in the notion of 
the Icitizenl who could freely enter or leave associations. The 
process included the development of Icontractuall relations 
amongst independent social interests and between society and the 
state in general. Of course this did not signify that different layers 
of society enjoyed equal rights and influence. The Lord still held 
power over his vassals and the King over his Lords, but these 
powers were accompanied by duties which, due to the absence of 
complete authority in the centre, had to be fUlfilled. For instance .. 
the need for finance in time of war led to the practice of calling 
assemblies of the Church, nobility and townsmen and a process of 
negotiation. From these assemblies came a codification of the 
Icontractual l relationships and the institution of Law which made 
states rule-bound. 
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the categories of 
state and society in the West embark in directions which brought 
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them into sharp conflict. On the one hand the period savv the 
expansion and centralisation of state apparatus usually through 
the rise of absolutist monarchies. Economic growth and 
urbanisation led to the centre developing larger, more powerful 
fiscal, administrative and military institutions which threatened 
the autonomy of society. At the same time urban areas found 
themselves at the forefront of an expanding economy which now 
operated on a larger scale than ever before. The nobility, 
Churchmen and artisans increased their wealth. The desire of 
these social groups for influence over the state was thus 
strengthened. 
As Western Europe embarked on the building of the modern 
nation-state, the contractual tradition countered the influence of 
absolutist tendencies. There were frequent rebellions by the 
no bility, bourgeoisie and peasantry against the state-builders. As 
a result the state included some elements of the nobility and 
bourgeoisie into the military/bureaucratic administration without 
altering the independent status of these societal groups. Posts in 
the civil service were often put on sale. Thus although parts of 
society became involved in th e state, these elements were 
transformed into interested parties. These could eventually build 
up capital and increase their independence from the centre. The 
monarchy had apparent sovereignty but its rights could easily be 
renlOved by invoki.r1.g Lhe 'conLractual' spiriL of Lhe staLe/socieLy 
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bond. Ba.sing the exercise of power on the al11ance of various 
interests had important consequences. It obviously encouraged 
tb e extension and consolidation of liberties. It also promoted a 
p08itive appra,j8al of pluralism and complexity. The tolerance of 
pluralism in the West can be contrasted to the absolutist 
tendencies in the Eastil. In 1990 the difference between the two 
traditions was evident. The thesis contends that, despite their 
commitment to Western-style democracy, the intellectuals of the 
Mazowiecki government, in keeping with past incumbents of the 
Polish state, tended to regard the development of genuine 
pluralism negatively". I 
The various revolutionary movements in the West in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reaffirmed societal 
autonomy and signalled the failure of the absolutist state to 
establish itself. By the twentieth century state and society had 
evolved into related but independent categories and this 
relationship provided the base for Western-style liberal democracy. 
Of course, the relationship between state and society in the West 
has varied through time and according to local conditions 
(Gaullist France and Thatcherite Britain can be cited as times 
when the balance between the two categories fluctuated 
considerably). However, generally speaking, the relationship has 
been marked by interdependence. The following sections will 
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outline the general characteristics and functions of state and 
society in the West. 
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The State 
The term Istate l is usually applied to the body of organisations 
which control the legitimate means of coercion (police, military, 
tax collectors and law courts) and the legislative and executive 
centres of government. This reflects the state's two functions of 
protection and representation of society. In liberal democracies 
the characteristics and functions of central state institutions have 
generally been arrived at through the gradual process of 
consensual political de bate involving representatives of the state 
with the input of independently organised groups in society. The 
balancing of power between the institutions of government, 
parliament and the judiciary and the ability of society to gain 
access to them and hold them to account is vital to the 
functioning of these systelnslO. Institutionalists thus stress the 
importance of democratic state institutions in moulding 
deInocratic values in the society they governll. We shall return to 
the institutionalist approach in our application of democratisation 
theories to post-collllnunist Poland12. 
Based on this ethos, the characteristics of the representative side 
of a liberal democratic state ought to include the following: free, 
fair, competitive elections held at regular intervals, guaranteed 
individual freedOlns (of association, free speech, conscience etc.), 
the universal rule of law, separation of powers in central state 
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institutions, independence of the judiciary, equitable distribution 
of political power between the centre and periphery and a 
general atmosphere of interaction between the rulers and ruled13. 
Frequently this contract or consensus is codified in a constitution 




Democratic state institutions are only democratic if the society 
they serve is able and ready to participate in them in an 
appropriate way. In other words, for democracy to truly function 
a society must have a democratic 'political culture'. The term 
'political culture' is taken to refer to a shared system of values, 
based on common historical experiences and current status, 
which informs the political life of societies or groups within 
~" 
society 14 ~ This arguJnent reverses the contention of 
institutionalists that democratic structures are central to the 
development of democracy. Culturalists argue that for democratic 
institutions to develop the political culture of a society must 
acquire democratic tendencies15• 
A democratic society adheres to the rights and duties of 
citizenship. This means that the individual assumes that state 
institutions are there to serve him or her. Individual or group 
interests are articulated to the state. Within society these 
interests can be associated with socio-economic or cultural 
criteria. Individuals and groups are bound to be affected by state 
institutions and poUcies in different ways according to their 
socio-economic or cultural backgrounds. This introduces the 
theory of class conilJct where clashes between different societal 
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interests are played out through competttion between poUtical 
parties which represent them. For liberal democracy, the 
important thing is that a citizens pOlitical actions (for instance 
through voting for a party or membership of a political, economic 
or cultural association) are based on the premise that, 'win or 
lose', he or she will abide by the democratic rules of the political 
game. A defeat for one's political representatives does not remove 
the legitimacy of the political system. This tolerance of difference 
amongst different social groups can be contrasted with the 'all or 
nothing' or 'winner takes all' approach to pOlitical power in 
Poland16. For societies to bellave in a democratic, tolerant way it is 
obviously important that the differences between different social 
forces in terms of economic status, political aims and access to 
pOlitical power are not too great17. 
Civil society 
Within the siInplistic state/society relationship described above 
one can observe a basic tension between the notions of liberty 
and equality, both of which are central to democratic values. 
Liberalism stresses the freedom of an individual to achieve his or 
her potential in society free from state intervention. State 
activities should therefore be limited to the guaranteeing of 
individual freedoms. Equality is concerned with guaranteeing 
equal opportunities for individuals and groups in society to fulfil 
their potential. Accordingly, advocates of increased equality, 
known as communitarians, stress that it is the state's 
responsibHjty to ensure that each citizen has the same chance to 
realise his or her potential18• 
Debate continues in Western democracies between liberals and 
cOlIllnunitarians19 but in these systerns the principles of liberalisrn 
and equality are both recognised as vital and the tension between 
thern is creative20. The arena where the tensions between state 
and society, equality and liberalism are eased is 'civil society'. 
'Civil society' has a notoriously vague pedigree, encompassing 
economic, political or social emphases according to the orientation 
of the work that employs it. It is composed of a multitude of civic 
orgaI'.isations (local and national, professional and social) which 
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interact and articulate the interests of society to the state. The 
state in turn responds to these interests through the activities of 
balanced, elected central organs of government, an independent 
judiciary and constitutional procedures. Most observers describe 
the functioning of civil society in terms of the legally protected 
interaction between a representative, responsive state and an 
articulate, loyal societT1. A civil society, legally guaranteed by 
the 'social contract' reached between state and society, is thus 
seen as vital to the development of democracy. Liberal 
parliamentary democracies are based on the mediatory function 
of civil society between society and the state22. 
In general there are three potential bases for civil society: the 
economy, the state, and societT3 . Each centre has different 
functions, structures and values. Crudely put, there is a difference 
between a citizen's affiliation to a professional or trade association 
and his membership of religious or cultural organisations. The 
Polish sociologist Wlodimierz Wesolwski introduces three 
classifications of social ties which correspond approximately to 
these differences24. The 'econOlnistic' strand of civil society theory 
corresponds with Wesolowski's first category: "associative groups". 
These organisat.ions are fOl_mded and run in a pragmatic manner, 
according to rational market criteria. Members of such groups are 
free t.o ent.er and leave as t.hey wish. The aims of the group are 
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set by the members and there is a respect for competitor 
organisations. In this way a framework is established where 
conflicting interests can be resolved independently of the state. 
Tho'ugh an idea] construct, associative groups are usually 
identified with professional associations and economic interests. 
The existence of a free market economy is thus a prerequisite of a 
democratic, civil society. Non-state economic activities in the 
private sector where individuals and firms freely compete against 
each other counters the concentration of economic and therefore 
political power in the state. N ot,e that this is in keeping with the 
arguments of advocates of the liberal aspect of democracy. 
The state forms the second potential arena for the functioning of 
civil society. Civil society, while still distinct from the state, must 
articulate its values and interests in this arena. After all, the 
state sets the framework within which a civil society can operate. 
This vision of civil society corresponds with Wesolowski's 
"cornrnunitarian" category which combines societal freedom of 
access to groups and associations with the surrendering of certain 
freedoms in the name of universal principles. It thus supports the 
egalitarian aspect of democracy. Some theorists make a distinction 
between civil society and political society25. For theln political 
society consists of pOlitical parties, elections and parliaments. This 
distinction enables observers to identify when an authoritarian 
state may allow the economic freedoms of civil society to exist 
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without granting democratic political freedoms. Although this is a 
useful distinction I argue that political society is equivalent to the 
state-centred aspect of civil society26. 
Another base for civil society is society itself. This emphasises the 
necessity of truly autonomous, representative social organisations 
acting as a counter-balance to the state. De Tocqueville's 011 
Democracy In .ArI:1cE:!~ica deals with this theme. The book sees in 
the concentration of powers in the central state administration 
the potential for a new type of absolutism, even if it is exercised 
in 'the name of the people'. Taking into account the rapid rates of 
industrialisation and urbanisation, de Tocqueville predicts 
increased state intervention. The construction of the welfare state 
and nationalised industries concentrate powers in the centre and 
breeds societal dependence on the state, threatening the 
autonomy of society. 
The antidote to this new despotism lies in the dispersal of political 
power into many centres. This refers not only to the division of 
powers among state institutions (executive, legislative and judicial 
branches) but to the developlnent of civil associations such as 
local scientific and literary groups, schools, publishers, private 
industries, m-lJnicipal associations and re1igtous organisattons, 
which lie beyond the control of the state. Such groups not only 
represent an institutional barrier to state oespotism but educate 
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society in the ways of peaceful competition and articulation of 
int.erest.s which t.hen could be applied to citizens' democratic 
activity in state institutions. These types of organisation can 
correspond approximately with what Wesolowski terms 
"communal" groups. They are characterised by a higher degree of 
loyalty t.o a certain set. of values and beliefs. Groups in t.his 
category may have a benign, inherently democratic nature in 
accordance with the view of Paine and de Tocqueville. 
However there is also a tendency for anti-state, defensive outlooks 
to develop, particularly in those based on ethnic, religious or 
nationalist criteria. Extreme popuUsm, which portrays the 
supposed will of society, or certain groups in society, as the sole 
source of political authority, is contrary to the spirit of liberal 
democracy27. As we shall see, the Mazowiecki government found to 
its cost that these types of social ties within civil society were the 
first to be developed in post-cornnlunist Poland28. The purpose of 
this brief examination of the concept of 'civil society' is to present 
it as a framework for a mutually beneficial relationship between 
state and society and a prerequisite for liberal democratic 
polities29. It is the glue which binds state and society, 
institutionalist and cult ur alist, elite and mass-based views of 
democracy_ The following section will trace the very different 
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path followed by the categories of state, society and civil society in 
Po]and. 
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(ii) The Polish Path 
Historical background 
A Polish geographer, Waclaw Nalkowski, described Poland in 1915 
as a 'land in-between' Western and Eastern Europe; a transition 
belt carrying the influences of Western Europe eastward and vice 
versa30. Poland had close econOlnic and cultural links with the 
West through, for instance, the Baltic trade route. However 
expansionist Russian influences also played a significant part in 
shaping the categories of 'state', 'society' and 'civil society' in the 
country. 
While the Western tradition can be summarised as the gradual 
separation of state and society through society's achievement of 
autonomy, in the East there was an ongoing fusion of both 
categories with the unbroken dominance of the state. The 
divergence of the Eastern and Western models began with the 
Kievan 'Rus' principality's deliberate choice of the Orthodox 
rAJigjoD. 1'he dAcisjon was taken to distinguish some 8]avic 
speaking peoples from the Catholic Poles and Hungarians and the 
Muslims to the South and East. This had the intended effect of 
setting the East on a different course from that of Western 
Rurope. 
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The invasion and dominance of the Mongols from the 13th to late 
15th century furthered the separation of Eastern and Western 
traditions and the processes of centralisation in the East . The 
Mongols did not destroy Russian culture and tradition but Mongol 
influence replaced Western influence and cut Eastern Europe off 
from the West. Trade routes with the West collapsed and the 
division was signified by the decline of Kiev and the rise of the 
more northerly city of Moscow as Russia's capital. Mongol rule in 
Russia caused the religious and intellectual upheavals and 
reawakening of the Renaissance and Reformation in Western 
Europe to pass Russia by. Instead the experience of Tartar rule 
instituted the practice of Oriental despotism with a central 
political ruler exerting supreme authority over all groups and 
individuals. The collapse of empire and the appearance of a 
vacuum in the centre which heralded the development of 
feudalism and the roots of the social contract was filled in the 
East with processes of centralisation. 
For instance, while this stage of development in the West included 
the separation of Church and state, in the East the process was 
reversed. Following the fall of Constantinople in 1453 Russia saw 
herself as the most important repository and guardian of the 
Orthodox faith. Orthodoxy was established as a basic 
characteristic of 'Russianness'. The association of national identity 
and religion reinforced the distinction of language and alphabet 
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which separated Russia from Western Europe. The conception of 
Orthodoxy as a national characteristic to be defended also 
precluded the separation of Church and state which proved so 
useful to the West in terms of the development of societal 
autonomy. Instead the tsar commanded the secular and religious 
devotion of Russian society. As the divinely ordained leader of the 
Russian nation and its national Church, the tsar in effect was the 
'Pope' of the 'Third Rome'. The union of throne and altar in the 
East was mirrored, to a certain extent, in Poland where the 
Catholic Church has always sought to playa prominent public 
role31• 
Similarly, the Eastern model of the state retained far greater 
control of the economy. The concentration of authority in the 
centre included domination of the economic sphere. While in the 
West economic expansion took place through the activities of a 
capitalist economy organised under state protectionism, the 
Russian economy grew through the expansion of the tsarist 
monopoly of commerce and manufacturing. In this context, the 
differences between the experience of the Russian boyars and the 
Western nobility during the construction of absolutist states are 
striking. In the West society was subordinated to the absolutist 
state through transforming the nobility into interested parties. In 
the East society was 'nationalised' by the absolutist state through 
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the transformation of the boyars into Pomeshchicki. Boyars had 
owned land and property independently but Pomeshchicki held 
their lands on condition of service to the expansionist state 
bureaucracy. Societal autonomy in the East could therefore not 
be gained through the division of property and wealth amongst 
different social groups. 
In general there was an absence of a 'contractual' arrangement 
amongst social groups and between state and society because 
there was no need for one. The authority of the Eastern model of 
the state was such that it could 'nationalise' rather than 
'subordinate' society. The lack of an independent nobility and 
middle class precluded the formation of a social contract which, in 
the West, led to the acceptance of plurality and diversity within 
society. Instead all liberties were subordinated to the 'freedom of 
the state'32. 
Poland exhibited a peculiar mix of the Eastern and Western 
traditions. For instance, up to the eighteenth century it had links 
with the developing capitalist economy of the West. The Baltic 
trade route connected Poland with processes in the West and led 
to the formation of fledgling industrial bases and a rudimentary 
urban middle class. Paradoxically, Poland's links with early 
Western capitalism contributed to the long-term entrenchment of 
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its Eastern characteristics. The fact that Poland was on the 
periphery of the Western economy weakened the pace of economic 
development. The West tended to regard the region primarily as 
a source of agricultural produce to meet the growing demand 
caused by urbanisation and industrialisation. Poland was 
encouraged to intensify its agricultural basis and this confirmed 
the power of the landed gentry in the region at the expense of 
the urban middle-class. 
At the same time the influence of Eastern practices brought 
about by Russian expansion in Eastern/Central Europe was 
strong. The decisive element in Russian expansion was the 
agrarian colonisation and the westward exporting of serfdom. The 
Russian nobility was forced under the authority of the state to 
intensify its domination of the peasantry and this practice was 
matched by the nobility of East/Central Europe. TI1US tIle 
Western ideas of democracy and individual freedom were confined 
largely to the ruling class in Poland. The social conditions which 
had given rise to contractual state/society relations and 
eventually to civil society in the West were absent. 
The Polish Republic of the Gentry ( - 1795) provides a good 
example of the paradoxical mixture of Eastern and Western 
models jn Poland. The Polish nobility had been the prime 
benefactors of the grain trade with the West. Under the influence 
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of the West1s anti-absolutist, contractual tendencies the nobility1s 
republic was imbued with a deeply held, idealistic concept of the 
Igolden libertyl. This laid primary importance on the freedom of 
each individual nobleman. Under the Republic1s law any 
nobleman could be elected king and any new legislation was 
subject to a law of individual veto in the legislative body (the 
Sejm). 
However, unlike its equivalents in the West, these democratic 
freedoms did not refer to wider Polish society. Though largely 
polonised the Polish nobility was ethnically heterogeneous with 
Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian elements so Polish 
Inationhoodl was not regarded in ethnic terms. It was rather 
shared social privilege that provided the bond uniting members of 
the Ipolitical nationl. Thus the gentry1s idea of the Polish nation 
did not refer to Polish or non-Polish masses under their dominion. 
These classes were not considered as countrymen. The peasantry 
remained enserfed with its concept of the nation limited to local 
aUegiances and devotion to the land it worked. The middle class, 
which was weak, with unassimilated Germa.n and Jewish 
elements, was also discriminated a.gainst by the nobility. The 
gentry1s I anti-mercantilist I outlook which barred Polish merchants 
from marketing Polish produce, giving the business to Western 
merchants, illustrated the exclusion of this group from citizenship 
in the Polish Republic. Representatives of both peasantry and 
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middle class were always excluded from the Sejm33. Poland's 
history shaped the characteristics of state and society in the 
country. 
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Tbe Polisb State 
A legacy of Poland1s bistory of invasion and domination by foreign 
powers was the absence of agreement between state and society 
concerning the balance of central institutions. For nearly two 
centuries Polish society has been ruled by authoritarian states 
which rejected the notion of a Icontractl with society. Three of the 
six constitutions in Polish history (1807, 1815 and 1915) were 
unposed by alien force (usually with the active participation of a 
section of the Polish political elite) rather than arrived at 
through the functiOning of the social contract34• 
The two constitutions introduced during the period of Polish 
sovereignty between the wars were shaped by the fears and 
exigencies of the time rather than by political consensus. In 1921 
the Sejm, fearing a strong President in the person of Pilsudski, 
chose a model of parliamentary supremacy. This strictly limited 
the government1s executive functions. When the Parliament 
fragmented into many bickering parties the weak government 
and President were unable to act effectively. This prompted 
Pilsudski1s coup d1etat. The legacy of this period of party pOlitical 
fragmentation could be detected in transition Poland. 
Consciousness of POland1s traditional fractious political scene 
contributed to the debate over the country1s post-communist 
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political institutions. Some called for systemic safeguards to 
prevent a repeat of the experience of the 1920s while others 
regarded fractiousness to be inherent in the countries political 
culture and thus unavoidable35. Some political scientists argued 
that the country's tradition of political diffusion undermined the 
prospects of attaining stability through a parliarnentary mode136. 
In the aftermath of the 1926 coup the constitution veered from 
extreme parliamentarism to concentrating inordinate power in 
the hands of the President. Although the revised constitution of 
1926 appeared to balance the 1921 version by giving the 
President the role of arbiter of parliamentary conflicts, in practice 
the Presidency under Pilsudski undermined the Sejm and limited 
the rights of opposition parties. In 1935 the shift from a 
democratic to authoritarian system was formalised by 
amendments to the constitution. This authoritarian system was 
characterised by the state's control over a wide range of social 
activities and the exercise of political power in an authoritarian, 
arbitrary way rather than through the rule of la~7. 
With the arrival of the People's Republic the absence of an 
institutional arrangement arrived at by consensus was 
symbolised and codified by the communists' arbitrary imposition 
of a new Constitution. State control of society is a tenet of 
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communism which can be traced as far back as Hegel, a leading 
influence on Marx. For Hegel the state represented the highest 
expression of society1s rational development. At once part of and 
removed from society, it was in the best position to judge what 
was best for society1s further progress. Only a supreme public 
authority could effectively interpret society1s conflicts and 
inequalities to articulate the basic interests of the community as 
a whole. Society was to be subjected to its control and scrutiny. 
Marxism also subscribes to the view of the dominant state. The 
ICommunist Manifesto I identifies the state as a force which 
enables the rul:ing class to dominate the rest of society. The object 
of class and therefore political struggle revolves around the state. 
According to Marxism the proletariat must seize state power in 
order to destroy its bourgeoisie apparatus, then in later phases set 
in motion a radical process which will lead to the destruction of 
the state itself. Lenin1s interpretation of Marxist thought stressed 
the leading role of the communist party in the seiz:ing state 
power. State control of society thus became the subject and the 
object of Marxist-Leninist thought38. The Marxist-Leninist 
approach to state power was evident in the development of the 
Party-state system in Poland39. 
The communist Party-state system dominated all organisations of 
state and society. It inculcated on Polish political leaders an 
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absolutist approach to power. Responsiveness to feedback from 
society, the ethos of compromise amongst competing interests and 
toleration of political opponents - all central to liberal democracy -
were devalued. To a degree this lack of toleration was part of 
pre-cornrnunist Poland's political culture. It was manifested in the 
authoritarian regime of the 1930s. It was also observable in the 
absolute moral categories of the anti-cornrnunist opposition in the 
1970s and 1980s. As we shall see, in the early transition period 
the Mazowiecki government also found it difficult to lose this 
dogrnatic approach to exercising state authority ~~lnajOr 
wl ~ \ 
contention of this thesis is that the Polish intelligentsia's 
traditional intolerance of the interests of other social groups, 
while simultaneously espousing democratic values, informed the 
politics of the transition period} 
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Polish society 
Polish society has experienced, in the course of the twentieth 
century, the substantial changes which accompany modernity: 
industrialisation and urbanisation. IIowever, the development of a 
democratic political culture associated with the rise of industrial 
societies in the West has been stunted. The processes of 
modernisation were led and controlled by a dominant state over a 
largely helpless and alienated society. 
For most of recent Polish history the prevalent political culture 
in society was that of the peasantry (the numerically dominant 
stratUln in society up to the late communist period). This culture 
included alienation from central state institutions and hostility to 
pOlitical authority4D. It tended towards radical populist political 
activity which runs contrary to the processes associated with 
liberal deInocracies41. Despite deep hostility to the state peasants 
tended to accept arbitrary rule and authoritarian leadership. 
Polish society's countenance of an authoritarian state was 
manifested in the dominating role played by figures such as 
Pilsudski during the inter-war period42. Such leaders' hands were 
not to be tied too much by constitutional regulations43. 
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Poland's history of foreign domination and the presence of 
significant ethnic minorities within the borders of the Second 
Republic meant that an ethnic form of nationalism was developed 
across all sectors of Polish society. After decades of exploitation by 
alien interests the prevailing opinion was that the development of 
Poland should be carried out in the name of Itrue Poles'. The 
stress on rule by a single, ethnic community obviously 
undermines the individualist aspect of democratic values and 
threatens the rights of minorities. Ethnic nationalism 
contributed to the collapse of democracy during Poland's brief 
experience of independence between the two world wars44• It also 
emerged as a threat to the Mazowiecki government IS project of 
democratisation in 199045. 
The strength of the Catholic Church as a social institution in 
Poland did not favour the formation of a democratic, 'pluralist ' 
culture. According to the Catholic Church, Polish society had a 
spiritual, I organic I unity which could not tolerate divisions and 
conflicts. Poland's status as a bulwark of Catholicism against the 
East and the presence of substantial religious minorities within 
Polish borders up to the Second World War obviously contributed 
to this version of Catholicism. Those who did not partake in the 
nation's Catholic identity were regarded as aliens46. Polish 
Catholicism thus tended towards an exclusive vision of Polishness. 
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This allied it with ethnic nationalism which also saw the nation 
as an organic entity. The Pole,-Catholic equation can be seen as 
contrary to the development of a democratic political culture and 
civil society because it does not tolerate the interaction of a 
plurality of social, religious or ethnic interests. The Catholic 
Church's association with the authoritarian regime in the 
inter-war perlod47 demonstrates the point. The t;hesis argues that 
its lilnited vision of Polish denlocracy was apparent in 199048. 
Communist rule strengthened the passive, authoritarian strand in 
the political culture of Polish society. The Party-state's desire to 
completelY subjugate the private life of citizens and restrict or 
eliminate organisations between the level of state and individual 
consolidated the culture of dependency on a paternalistic regime.49 
Communism produced dramatic social changes. Under the 
communist-led process of industrialisation and urbanisation the 
urban working class grew in number and significance. However, 
it would be a mistake to equate this with the modernisation 
process in the West. The whole process of urbanisation and 
industrialisation was controlled by the communist state. The 
formation of a democrat.ic pOlitical culture was prevent.ed by 
several, obvious factors. Firstly the state aimed to intervene in all 
aspects of Polish life. Poles were not granted t.he areas of personal 
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and group autonomy associated with Western liberal democracy. 
This encouraged normlessness in society with individuals 
mo bilised only in the name of self-preservation. Again this is not 
in keeping with the participative aspect of liberal democracy. The 
alternative to normlessness was continued subscription to the 
value systems of the inter-war period, such as peasant populism 
or Catholicism. As we have seen, in the Polish context, these had 
undemocratic tendencies. The decline of the communist economy 
meant that social mobility declined an inter-class resentments 
intensified. The situation was exacerbated by the uneven spatial 
distribution of industrialisation and urbanisation under 
COllllnunisrn. The urban/rural divide, which underrnined the 
formation of a unified culture in the inter-war period, was 
rnaintained50. 
The late cOlmnunist period (1968-1989) could be presented as a 
time of relative social unity. However from the late 1970s onward 
Polish society had only been able to identify what it was not (Le. 
communist). The opposition movernent concentrated on the 
organisation of social groups independently of the communist 
state. Political and economic questions which are vital to the 
articulation of a democratic political culture were deliberately 
avoided in the name of anti-communist unity. No consensus was 
reached over what !political community! Polish society wanted .. 
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Were the political cultures of the peasantry, urban workers and 
Catholic Church compatible? Could they be unified under the 
banner of democracy? Even at the height of opposition activity 
when Solidarity movement achieved legalisation .theorists inside 
j 
and outside the movement noted its 'negative unity' 51. Thus, up to 
the present period, Polish society's commitment to 
liberal-democratic values has been weak. Throughout recent 
history Polish society has been marked by antagonism to the state 
and deep, hostile cleavages. Both of these characteristics run 
contrary to the development of a democratic, civil society. 
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Civil Society in Poland 
In Poland civil society has traditionally been circumscribed by the 
state1s desire to control all aspects of society and society1s inability 
to counter this desire and assert its independence. In partition 
times the Imperial states denied Polish SOCiety any forms of 
autonomous expression. In the inter-war period the Second 
Republic1s drift towards authoritarianism limited societal 
freedoms. After the advent of communist rule, the tenet of the 
Ileading role of the Partyl rejected the notion Icontractl between 
state and society and thus the need for a civil society. If the will 
of the Party united the interests of state and SOCiety what need 
was there for a realm of mediation between the two categories. 
The Party represented society and any groups in Polish society 
organised outwith its aegis were deemed illegal. Thus the absence 
of a IWestern-typel democratic political system in Poland can be 
equated with the weakness of civil society in the face of state 
force. Citizens regarded themselves as passive subjects of the 
dominant state rather than a collection of participating 
individuals52. 
Consequently, for many observers and participants, the project of 
democratisation in Poland was linked to the construction of a 
Western-style civil society; to create the conditions where the 
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state would be willing to represent the independently structured 
interests and values of Polish society and Polish society would be 
willing to articUlate these interests in a peacefUl, tolerant way'53. 
The anti-communist Polish intelligentsia, which formed the core of 
the Mazowiecki administration had a particular conception of 
civil society. An examination of this notion and its effects on 
denl0cratisation is at the heart of this thesi~'{)~. 
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The following section will examine the various theories submitted 
by contemporary political scientist for analysing and supporting 
political systems moving towards liberal democracy. Some of these 
theories stress the modernisation of the economy as a factor in 
this process, others focus on institutional reform of the state, or 
democratic mobilisation of society. The thesis' chosen approach to 
the challenge of democratisation is the comparative historical 
approach. 
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(iii) Theories of Democratisation 
As stated the thesis is conc$rned with examining the consolidation 
of democracy in post-communist Poland. In terms of methodology 
it incorporates elements of four theoretical models of 
democratisation which are currently applied to East-Central 
Europe: modernisation theories, comparative historical analyses, 
elite contestation theories and institutional configuration 
theories5\ :: 
Modernisation Theories 
The basic contention of modernisation theories is that societal 
development in the direction of capitalism is a prerequisite for 
the establishment of democratic practices. Social scientists such as 
Seymour Martin Lipset contend that countries with modern 
societal structill'es (a strong middle class and ill'ban industrial 
base, provision of forInal education etc.) are Inore likely to be 
democratic than others. Conversely, countries outside the group of 
Western European and North American capitalist economies have 
experienced democratic politics fleetingly, if at aU56. Proponents of 
modernisation theory claim that liberty and equality, as" we have 
Been, fundamental components of democratic politics, are 
encouraged when a society progresses toward capitalism. Ltberty 
is created primarily through the diffusion of economic power in 
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capitalism. Economic development relies on the promotion of 
wealth, health and education. Modern, capitalist economies also 
require the development of a complex infrastructure and system 
of communication. All of these processes encourage the diffusion 
of economic power. With economic power spread throughout 
society a larger proportion of the population will press for 
political influence and equality in terms of political power will be 
encouraged. It becomes much more difficult to concentrate 
political power in the centre as the pressure for democracy 
increases. 
However the link between equality and capitalist development is 
problematic. Capitalist economic development, based on a 
'laissez-faire' ethos, has an intrinsiC, anti-egalitarian character. 
Economic winners and losers are polarised. To employ the logic of 
modernisation theory one would conclude that in such a society 
the more economically developed parts of society would be far 
better placed to influence politics than their poorer fellow 
citizens. If the polarisation is so deep, can such a society claim to 
be democratic? In respon..se modernisatjon theorists stress the 
importance of a healthy middle class. This stratum, composed of 
workers and professionals, if large enough, can playa stabilistng 
role. It spans the gap between the rich and the poor. With its 
r ~ 
ethos of tolerance, moderation, hard work etc. it contributes to 
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the development of democratic tendencies in a society1s Ipolitical 
culture l . 
Following on from this is the modernisation theorists I contention 
that a society1s political culture can change in the direction of 
democracy as it advances toward capitalism. It is accepted that a 
given society1s predisposition to democratic politics is decided 
primarily by its specific history and characteristics. However, as it 
experiences industrialisation and urbanisation new patterns of 
economic life heighten peoples l pOlitical expectations57. 
Critics of modernisation theories question the assumption that the 
relationship between socio-economic development and political 
change. They point to the emergence of regimes in Europe and 
South America which, though committed to this type of economic 
progress, are just as likely to modernise through authoritarian, 
rnilitaristic rnethods58. Nevertheless, rnodernisation theories 
remain influential and provide a useful tool for analysing the 
Polish transition to democracy. 
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Application to Thesis 
Modernisation theories are applied in the thesis at different 
points. Firstly, it is used to explain the weakness of the Polish 
democratic tradition. The stifling of capitalist development and 
the frailty of Poland's native middle-class in modern Polish 
history will be presented as a major factor behind the weakness· 
of democratic values in Polish society's political culture. The 
failure of democratic politics and the rise of authoritarianism in 
the inter-war period is presented in this context59. The critique of 
this theory's conflation of economic modernisation and 
democratisation is supported by Poland's experience of communist 
rule. On the one hand it could be contended that the 
communist-led programmes of industrialisation and urbanisation 
raised expectations and economic ambitions in Polish society. The 
frustration caused by the blockage of upward social mobility and 
the disparity between economic status and political freedom in 
Poland from the 1970s onward can be seen as a contributory 
factor in the developrnent of the anti-comrnunist movement 60. 
However, this was not comparable with processes which Jed to the 
development of liberal democracies in the West. Any aspirations to 
democratic rights, as understood in the West, were blocked by the 
communist state. Polish society's aspirations thus tended toward 
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the material benefits of capitalism and not necessarily the rights 
and obligations of democratic political cultures61 . 
In the post-communist period the theory holds in so far as Poland, 
one of the most economically developed countries in communist 
East-Central Europe was the first country to establish democratic 
opposition groups and it was here that these groups first made 
the breakthrough against communist rule. However, the 
experiences of the Mazowiecki government pose serious questions 
for modernisation theory. One of the main justifications of the 
Balcerowicz Plan was to encourage the development of a 
propertied middle class. The elite of the Mazowiecki government 
attempted to create a market economy and a liberal democracy at 
the same time. However the immediate introduction of modern, 
market values caused widespread austerity which exacerbated the 
tension between liberty and equality62. Poland's weakly developed 
democratic political culture meant that society's economic 
frustrations were taken out on the new elite and the central 
state institutions. The threat posed to democratic consolidation by 
radical populism and authoritarianism was heightened by 
econonlic reforrll during the Mazowiecki period63. Thus 
modernisation theory provides a useful but inconsistent 
framework for my examination of the Mazowiecki period. 
62 
Intra-Elite Bargaining 
Advocates of this approach stress the importance of pOlitical 
processes at the time of the transition to the consolidation of 
democracy rather than long-term structural developments. 
Following on from the model of the origins of democracy produced 
by Dankwart Rustow in 197064. This approach divides the process 
into three stages - preparatory, decision and habituation. The 
emphasis here is on members of political elites arriving at a 
compromise where a democratic political system is favoured by all 
sides. The interaction of radical and conservative elements in both 
regime and opposition calnps are seen as centra165• Consensus can 
come about amongst these elite elements through pressures on 
the authoritarian power (econOlnic, political or military). In such 
a situation members of the authoritarian regime may see the 
institution of democracy as an attractive alternative. A benefit of 
this approach is that it provides a framework for study of the 
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catalyst of the delnocratisation process. While other theories (e;g~ 
lllodernisation theory and historical analysis) stress long-term 
structural processes the focus of intra-elite interaction is on the 
events of the transition itself. This is useful as it questions the 
structuralists tendency to see in hindsight an inevitability in the 
process of democratisation (re:meIf1ber,~t:hat as late as the 
mid-1980s few theorists predicted the timing and characteristics of 
transition in East-Central Europe). 
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Critics of intra--elite barga:ining theory contend that it does not 
pay enough attention to how elite-level processes are shaped by 
larger parts of the society in which they occur. This criticism is 
particularly salient in the 'consolidation' phase of democratisation. 
Intra--elite compromise can only involve the institutional 
framework of democracy. The design of institutions rather than 
the representation and settlement of substantive issues is the 
main goal66 . By definition a democracy cannot form policies ahead 
of time, even if there is elite-level consensus on given issues. Thus 
the question remains whether society will engage in the 
democratic institutions. This is particularly the case when an 
authoritarian elite manipulates the institutional agreement in 
order to guarantee its continued influence in the new, democratic 
order. Institutions where the old regime still enjoys influence can 
be tarnished in the eyes of society at large, regardless of how 
democratic they appear. 
Application to Thesis 
Intra-elite barga:ining theories of democratisation offer some 
insights into the Polish transition. The serious of talks held 
between the reformist elite of the PZPR and the intellectual elite 
of the Solidarity movement prior to the formal Round Table 
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agreement can be seen as a classic example of the theory in 
practice. These negotiations (known as the 'Magdalenka' talks) 
illustrate how elite-level negotiations led directly to the creation 
of more democratic political institutions and procedures. At the 
same time the 'Magdalenka' case highlights the weaknesses of this 
theory. Representatives of the communist side managed to 
guarantee their continued influence in the new institutions and 
this brought the legitimacy of the new system into question 
during the Mazowiecki period and beyond. Populist forces 
questioned how representative these institutions were and 
rnobilised forces against the new, dernocratic order67. Moreover, 
the passage of time, the disintegration of the Communist Party 
and fresh parliamentary and presidential elections has eroded the 
remnants of the Magdalenka talks68• Thus, again intra-elite 
bargaining theory provides a useful but limited insight into the 




This approach contends that the successful consolidation of 
democracy relies on the design of political institutions and 
processes. Features such as the relationship between executive 
and legislature and the type of electoral system must balance 
representation of society with effectiveness of government if 
democracy is to function properly69. As with intra-elite bargaining 
theory, institutionalists can be criticised for assuming that 
democratic bodies will encourage democratic values in society. If 
society fails to engage in these processes their democratic 
credentials will be rendered meaningless70. 
Application to Thesis 
Institutional design was a central issue of the Mazowiecki period. 
As we have seen, it was a major part of the 'Magdalenka' and 
'Round Table' negotiations between the Communist Party and 
Solidarity. However the powers of the President and electoral law 
became salient features of the 'War at the Top' between elite 
factions of Solidarity, including Mazowiecki and his supporters. 
The case of presidential powers provides an interesting example of 
how short-term pOlitical ambitions can clash with the attempt to 
construct a truly democratic institution. The results of the 
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presidential elections in 1990 , where turn-out was low and the 
'maverick' candidate Stan Tyminski received a high proportion of 
the vote, illustrates how elite level debates over the features of a 
democratic institution can alienate the society it is supposed to 
serve and actually weaken delllocracy71. 
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Comparative Historical Analysis 
The thesis relies most heavily on this approach to studying 
democratisation. This school of thought concentrates on the 
interaction of factors (state, society, socio-econornic classes etc.) 
over a period of time within a given society. It thus has obvious 
affinities with the historical materialist elements of Marxism. 
Works such as Ruschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephensl Capitalist 
Development and Democracy Chicag0;- Univr:ersltyof Chicago Press 
1992 have brought comparative historical analysis to a range of 
countries undergoing democratisation. In each case these works 
set out to examine the balance of power between state and 
society: what socio-economic classes exist within society and what 
kind of relationship do they have with the state? What is the type 
of economic change under way during the period of study and 
how is this affecting these relationships? 
Critics of this approach note the danger of relying too much on 
concepts which are not very well defined. Terms such as Istatel, 
Isocietyl and Iclassl encompass a variety of conceptual variations 
which could threaten the integrity of the work. However by 
exalnining state/society and intra-society relations the 
comparative historical approach combines both mass and elite 
perspectives (unlike elite-focussed linstitutionalistsl and 
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Illass-focussed 'culturalists')72. Moreover the study of the historical 
journey of one particular country is appropriate for examining 
the continuities and discontinuities of the democratisation process. 
Thus the thesis contends that it is possible to see in the historical 
framework the emergence of forces in Poland which coalesced in 
the project of the 'reconstruction of civil society' and undermined 
the communist regime. These same elements were prominent in 
the Mazowiecki period. and many of the successes and failures of 
the 'democratisation' programme can be explained through 
reference to them. 
Although we have already noted the significance of the 
experiences of other social groups in Poland (namely the 
peasantry, Catholic Church and ill'ban workers) to the project of 
democratisation the thesis concentrates on one of these forces 
within Polish society in particular: the Polish intelligentsia. This is 
because it is a milieu which throughout modern Polish history 
has had a special and influential relationship with state and 
society. It has always been at the forefront of pOlitical events, for 
instance, at the head of revolutionary or insurrectionary 
movements. During the Mazowiecki period observers noted that 
the intellectual leaders of the Polish intelligentsia had once again 
corne to the fore73. Representatives of the intelligentsia weI'e 
therefore at the helm of the Polish state as it faced the task of 
69 
democratisation. For this reason the milieu is worthy of 
particular attention. 
The following section will outline the characteristics of the 
intelligentsia. Its relationship vvith the categories of state, society 
and civil society are presented, partly through comparison with 
the equivalent relationships involving intellectuals in Western 
parliamentary democracies. The influence of the ethos of the 
Polish intelligentsia on the Mazowiecki government's 
democratisation project can then be evaluated. 
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l(b) Intellectuals and Intelligentsia 
(i) The Mazowiecki Government as a 'Goverl11llent of the 
Intelligentsia' 
In the late 1960s and 1970s a group of Warsaw-based journalists, 
lawyers and academics began to form a critique of communist 
rule. Disillusioned with the regime's lL.liitation of personal 
freedoms, they claimed that an essentially Western, 
democratically-inclined society was being repressed by an alien, 
authoritarian state. These intellectuals, including Adam Michrrik, 
Jacek Kuron and Bronislaw Geremek, became known as the 'Lay 
Left'l. This group formed the core of the intelligentsia's efforts to 
contribute to the anti-communist movement in Poland. In 1976 it 
was prominent in the founding of KOR2, an organisation which 
sought to forge links between the dissident intelligentsia and 
urban workers persecuted by the regime3 . Throughout the 1980s 
it exercised significant influence in the underground Solidarity 
movement. It was also prominent at the Round Table discussions 
between the regime and the Solidarity movement. 
As a result the cadre of the Mazowiecki government and the first 
post-communist legislature was dominated by representatives of 
the intelligentsia milieu. A survey of the social origins of the Sejm, 
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Senate and government under Mazowiecki produced the following 
results: 
Social Origins of Sejm Deputies and Senators 
Sejm: Peasant - 37% Senate: 
Intelligentsia - 37% 
Workers - 26% 
Peasant - 28% 
Intellig. - 60% 
Workers - 12% 
81 % of deputies had higher education (an increase of 21% from 
the previous Sejln) and 83% of Senators had achieved this level. 
The Sejm was dominated by occupations traditionally associated 
with the intelligentsia milieu with 77 engineers and technicians, 
41 scientists and academics and 36 teachers. Over one quarter of 
Senators held scientific and academic posts. Seven of the 
Mazowiecki Cabinet IS posts were occupied by academics, three by 
economists, two by communist generals, three by enterprise 
managers and one apiece by a theatre director and an 
independent farmer4 . According to the weekly newspaper 
Polityka, of Solidarityls 261 Parlialnentary In61nbers (161 MPs and 
100 Senators) only 10 were working-class and 35 were individual 
farmers. In contrast, there were 22 professors, 50 engineers, 35 
lawyers, 20 journalists or columnists, 16 economists, 14 teachers, 
13 health care employees, and one religion teacher. All of these 
professions were considered part of the intelligentsia fl. George 
Schopflin refers to the Mazowiecki government as lithe nearest to 
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a government of philosopher kings witnessed in Europe since the 
One can see that the intelligentsia was a particularly influential 
force in Polish society during the first stages of the 
democratisation process. It follows that the particular 
characteristics of the milieu were bound to make their mark on 
that process. Therefore, for those interested in the democratisation 
process in Poland, it is essential to examine the ethos of the Polish 
intelligentsia. What is its relationship with the categories of state, 
society and civil society? Does it subscribe to Western-style 
democratic values? What impact does Polish nationalism have on 
its outlook? The following section will answer these questions by 
outlining the defining features of the milieu. 
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(li) Definition of 'Class' 
The thesis regards the Polish intelligentsia. as a distinct social class 
or stratum. The term 'intellectual' is applied to someone involved 
in the creation of ideas, values and critiques. 'Intelligentsia' is 
applied to the bearers of the knowledge, expertise and motivation 
necessary to acirnin..istrate Lhese values7 . For reasons explained 
below, the intelligentsia is more 0 bserva ble as a distinct social 
milieu in Poland than in the West. Therefore, before turning to a 
closer examination of the intelligentsia it is necessary to give a 
clearer definition of 'class'. 
We have noted the importance of interaction between groups 
within society to democratisation. Class can be categorised 
according to economic or social criteria. Marxism firmly equates 
class with an individual's relationship to the means of production. 
A person's place in the econOIny (as a representative of capitalist 
owners of the means of production or the proletariat whose 
labour they exploit) defines their class and thus their political 
behaviour. Political conflict along class lines becomes inevitable 
because different classes are likely to be treated in different ways 
by state institutions and policies. 
Writers in the Marxist tradition such as Georg Lukacs see the 
point at which an oppressed class attains 'consciousness' or 
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understanding of its real condition as the moment when such a 
political struggle can begin/). Usually this struggle is based on 
competing systems of values and ideas associated with certain 
classes (in Marxist thought the conservatism of the ruling 
bourgeoisie is often contrasted with the radicalism of the working 
class). 
However, other theorists see weaknesses in Marx's purely 
economistic notion of class. How can it be applied to those who 
stand outside production such as those involved in services, 
communication etc.? In addition., the outlook of classes can 
incorporate elements drawn from other groups in society. Values 
such as religion and nationalism can cut across different classes. 
In the Polish case peasants, workers and intelligentsia shared 
some elements of these ideological themes. The populist 
nationalism and Catholic piety of the Polish industrial worker 
owes much to the fact that he or she tends to hail from a family 
with a recent peasant past. The point is that differences between 
these groups in society were not settled only according to 
economic criteria. Thus social class can be seen as a much more 
complex category which includes socio-economic status, 
non-economic issues and family background. 
86 
The category of 'class' is losing its relevance when applied to 
Western liberal democracies which have increasing social mobility 
and modern notions of universal citizenship9. However it is useful 
when examining transition Poland. Under communist rule the 
country became an industrial society with relatively clearly 
defined divisions of labour and ruling and subordinate classes. The 
importance of the Solidarity Trade Union and the threat of 
strikes points to the importance of class consciousness and class 
conflicts in the lead up to the transitions. In 1989 these classes 
emerged with different visions of post-communist Poland which 
were informed by different value systems. For instance the 
industrial workers hoped for a 'workers' democracy' with strong 
trade unions and workers' councils enjoying significant pOlitical 
influence 10. The Polish peasantry's demand for speCial treatment 
and espousal of conservative social values informed its activities 
during tIle transition periodll. The Oatholic Ohurch, though not 
representative of a particular social milieu in Poland, merits 
separate consideration as a very powerful force in Polish society. 
Likewise its approach to the transition period reflected its own 
world-outlook12. As stated previously, the resolution of these 
visions into a unified political culture was vital for 
democratisation. 
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(iii) Western Intellectuals 
The conceptual roots of the Polish intelligentsia can be traced 
back to the rise of the 'intellectual' in the West, although the 
category was adapted substantially in the Polish case. An 
examination of the development and characteristics of the 
'intellectual' in the West is thus a necessity when considering the 
ideological sources of the intelligentsia stratum in Poland. 
Moreover, such a study enables us to compare both cases and 
highlight the specificity of the Polish version. The comparison will 
be based on the relationship of these types with the categories of 
state, society and civil society which have already been established 
as vital to the project of democratisation. The unique relationship 
of the Polish intelligentsia with these categories and the effect this 
had on democratisation in post-communist Poland will be 
established. 
Historical Roots 
The term 'intellectual' demands careful consideration because it 
rernains a controversial subject13: The roots of the intellectual 
idiom lie in the emancipation of the scientific sphere from Church 
control, part of the diffusion of power in the West described 
previously. Intellectuals were freed from obligations to state and 
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Church authorities and could build strong links with the 
emerging middle class. This created autonomous centres of 
learning which aimed at the investigation of the world and the 
promotion of rational thought, progress and innovation. 
Rationalism dictated that each individual was born equal. 
Differences between individuals could be explained through 
reference to different environments rather than one's niche in 
the 'divine plan'. The posseSSion of knowledge gave intellectuals 
the belief that these environments could be altered. The notion 
that knowledge can be used for the betterment of humanity 
became a central tenet of the Enlightenment and the intellectual 
idiom. Thus the initial desire of those concerned with knowledge 
to defend their autonomy from state or Church was transformed 
into a universal or total quest for the freedom and progress of all 
people. 
SOCiologists and historians, thus, commonly ascribe two distinct 
Ineanings to the terln 'intellectual'14. The first refers to their role 
as possessors of specialised knowledge and producers of culture. 
This is the role of the 'expert', 'professional' or 'adviser' who 
contributes to the system within the limits of his or her 
specialised field. The second meaning relates to the intellectual's 
public activity outside his or her area of expertise. Here the 
intellectual uses the authority, autonomy and expertise associated 
with his or her profession to influence public opinion or make 
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judgements on issues and events at a system-wide leveL By its 
nature this second function is teleological: it asks questions of the 
general pace and direction of systemic change and elucidates 
different visions of the future 1 5. The 'bi--dimensionality' of the 
idiom produces a particular pattern of relations between the 
intellectual and the categories of Istate l and 'society'. 
Western intellectuals and the state 
As far as the state is concerned intellectuals can be crucial allies 
or dangerous adversaries. The state relies on intellectuals in their 
role as professionals or experts for their technical expertise and 
knowledge. This is particularly the case in an increasingly 
technological age when policies are made with reference to 
technical rather than political criteria. On the other hand., as 
producers and disseminators of cultural values and framers of 
public opinion intellectuals can be important in providing the 
state with legitimacy in the eyes of society This is particularly the 
case where state/society relations are tense. Conununist Poland., as 
with other East-Central European countries, can be seen as an 
example of how intellectuals are valued as 'legitimisers' of the 
state16. 
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On the other hand the intellectual and the state can come into 
conflict. As a group concerned with the condition and direction of 
the system as a whole, the role of the intellectual can overlap into 
the territory of those who wield political power17. Both claim 
supreme authority, one through reference to the divine right of 
royalty and/or political control of the legitirnate Ineans of violence 
and the other through superior knowledge. 
In their role as critics of state power intellectuals may appear 
weak. The examples of the US during the period of McCarthyism 
or the suppression of the Tianneman Square protests in China 
illustrate the apparent weakness of intellectuals when faced with 
an aggressive state. However, if the intellectual is dissatisfied with 
the state's leadership of systemic change he or she can employ 
their attributes to oppose it. They can threaten to deny the state 
their services. This can leave the state bereft of technical 
expertise and (given the high prestige often accorded 
intellectuals) legitilnacy in the eyes of society. Secondly, as 
producers of ideas and values, they can formulate ideologies which 
rnay foster anti-state forces ill society 18. One of the earliest 
examples of the tension between intellectual and state was t,he 
French Revolution where the attempt was made by intellectuals 
to transform t,he relationship between state and society through 
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reference to an idealised future utopia (i.e. through the force of 
ideasY". 
Generally speaking, the political intervention of Western 
intellectuals is not designed to win state power, but to redefine it; 
to secure for themselves and society the autonomy necessary for 
progress. It is important to stress this separation of intellectual 
from state in the West because, as we shall see, the relationship 
between the Polish intelligentsia and the state was very different. 
In the West, the universal, or 'total' perspective of intellectual 
work was incompatible with the factionalism associated with the 
pursuit of political power. Intellectuals refer to 'universal', moral 
categories which they deal with in their scholarly pursuits and 
which transcend particular economic or pOlitical divisions. Direct 
political activity threatens the intellectual's identity as a 
disinterested critic of the status quo20. The intellectualsI altruistic, 
disinterested engagement in politics can be referred to as lithe 
politics of antipolitics" - a phrase which has significant 
connotations in the activities of dissident intellectuals in 
communist East-Central EuropeP,\. 
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Western intellectuals and society 
As far as society is concerned, the intellectuals are seen as 
standing apart from society providing a critique of the present 
and a vision of the future which ought to be aspired to. As 
producers of culture and ideas they have the potential to 
elaborate value systems which stimulate and explain societal and 
systemic change22. According to Karl Mannheim the intellectual 
was distinguished by his or her empathy for circles to which he 
or she does not belong. The intellectual is vital in articulatin.g the 
values of different classes and synthesisin.g them into a greater, 
system-wide totality. With its 'universal' or 'total' perspective the 
intellectual idiom could overcome the fragmented experiences of 
different social groups and elaborate an overall, system-wide 
explanation of societal change23• The intellectual's role in society is 
therefore teleological: he or she formulates systems of ideas which 
explain social phenomena in terms of a historic journey towards 
some future utopia. This function is particularly noticeable and 
vital in times of acute societal transition. 
For instance, durin.g the Industrial Revolution in the West 
intellectuals mobilised their societies behind the project of 
modernisation. The traumas of transformation from agrarian to 
mass, industrial practices, from the old culture of insular, 
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village-level communities to cosmopolitan, rational structures 
demanded the elaboration of a new way of looking at the world84. 
The transformation of the peasant into a modern citizen is 
fraught with dangers because the difference between both 
categories in terms of life-style and value-systems is so great. 
Peasant societies can be characterised by three basic criteria: 
attachment to the land, the importance of the patriarchal family 
unit and tendency for the village to form the limits of 
expectations and perception25. The farln and the village represent 
the limit of the peasants social, economic and political ambitions. 
The farm is regarded by the peasant as God-given property, even 
if it legally belongs to the landowner or the state. Family 
structures are closely interwoven with work on the farm. One's 
position in the family hierarchy tends to decide one's working 
role. Producing mainly for their own consumption and striving 
for self-sufficiency makes the family an insular economic 
structure. The family unit operates, therefore, as an integrative 
structure in economic as well as a social terms. Con.sequently 
individuals are inclined to defer to family norms. 
Beyond the family the village serves as an important source of 
peasant organisation. The appropriation and division of land, 
marriages and social and religious needs are generally dea]t, with 
at village level. A consequence of highly integrated village life is 
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the perpetuation of a conformist culture where all actions are 
scrutinised with reference to traditional customs and the will of 
the community. Events beyond the limits of their village are of 
little concern to the peasantry. 
All of these factors produce a communal, insular and defensive 
attitude amongst the peasantry. Isolation from the outside world, 
including the centres of state power, combined with economic 
exploitation through taxes, rents, interest and unfavourable 
terms of trade breed a strong sense of injustice and resentment 
toward urban areas of the country. Despite its numerical 
importance, in terms of political organisation the peasantry can 
be generally characterised by its basic weakness. Local loyalties to 
family, farm and village discourage the formation of nation-wide 
organisations and leaderships. Rather than concerted political 
effort to represent their interests at a national level, peasant 
action tended to take the forIn of either passive protests (e.g. 
tllrough restriction of production) or unco-ordinated and often 
violent rebellions. 
Thus the transformation of the peasant with his or her 
attachment to specific locales and ritualised, communal way of life ~ 
to a citizen of a complex and occupationally mobile, industrial 
society is potentially destabilising for the system as a whole. 
Dislocated rural emigrants can become nostalgic for the 
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certainties of their rural roots, ill time developing an unrealistic 
image of their qualitiesP'f). 
The roots of nationalism and socialism can be found in the 
intellectualsl attempts to explain and consolidate the changes 
associated with the onset of Modernity. The Inationl can provide a 
surrogate identity for societies undergoing the dislocation of 
lnodernisation and democratisation27. In the early nineteenth 
century the work of philosophers such as Herder, Fichte and 
Mazzini established the idea of nations as organic, cultural 
communities rooted in tradition. Nationalism, particularly in 
times of extreme trauma, tended to stress its communal aspect 
while modernity was increasingly concerned with the category of 
the individual. It may seem that the collective aspect of 
nationalism and its stressing of difference would conflict with the 
intellectualsl commitment to universal values and the rights of 
Everyman. However, initially, both perspectives were compatible. 
Herder and Mazzini stressed that every nation, constituted by a 
special combination of politicaL cultural and historic forces, was 
equal under Godp.s. Thus, initially at least, nationalism was an 
essential part of the creation of a modern, democratic society. 
Indeed national sentiment continues to be a binding force in 
Western liberal democracies today. The liberal demand for 
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individual freedoms from the absolutist state included a call for 
recognition of national cUltures29. 
Marxism is another example of the intellectuals attempt to 
provide an ideology for a rapidly modernising society. Historical 
materialism explains the class origins of industrialisation and 
urbanisation and points to a future, communist utopia. IndeecL in 
its Leninist variant Marxism explicitly gives the intellectual the 
responsibility of raising the consciousness of the proletariat to his 
or her universal perspective through the leading role of the 
Communist partTo. As with nationalisln, the development of 
Marxist ideology in the twentieth century should not divert us 
from its original attentions to enlighten and develop a 
transforming society. By emphasising the worth of the growing 
stratum of industrial workers it contributed to the spread of 
democratic rights to all parts of society. 
The relationship between the intellectual and society raises 
several important issues. Firstly, there is the question of how far 
intellectuals should act to ensure that their idea.s are put into 
practice. The autonomy intellectuals won from the state in the 
West leaves them isolated and marginalisecL without the most 
obvious means of directly implementing their programmes. If they 
seek to exercise political pOv"Ver through parties, social movements 
etc/" do intellectual's not threaten the idiom's 'apolitical', 
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disinterested perspective? This was the theme of Benda's_The 
Betrayal of the Intellectuals . Benda divided society into 'lay' 
.-.. -~--------
people (involved in the practical running of society and the 
application of thought and science to it) and intellectuals who 
stood aside from society and were not active in the pursuit of 
practical, political objectives, but argued for non-immediate, 
non-material values. The betrayal of the intellectuals came when 
they participated in everyday pOlitical life and sought to link 
their intellectual activity to political movements. 
A tension thus exists between the 'cultural' or Imoral' facet of the 
intellectuals identity, which is content to issue opinions from 
outside the pOlitical cut and thrust of the day and 'political 
intellectualsI who attach themselves to various causes and 
political groups. This tension exists within and between 
intellectuals31. 
This tension was particularly apparent in the West in the 1960s 
and 1970s when the post-war euphoria of patriotism, 
reconstruction and modernisation had been replaced with the 
consolidation of state power. Leftist intellectuals in GaUllist 
France such as Sartre, Althusser and Foucault recognised a crisis 
of identity in the intellectual idiom. In the post-modern age the 
universal intellectual, distinguished by a commitment to moral 
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absolutes and a system-wide perspective, had been replaced by 
specialists, concerned only with their narrow fields of expertise 
and tied to the state, industry or academia32. The status of 
concepts like 'truth', 'morality' and 'values' was questioned by 
relativism. 
For these intellectuals the loss of true intellectual autonomy had 
serious consequences for the condition of civil society. For 
instance, Althusser argued that the capitalist system in France 
and world-wide was exercising dominance through control of 
what he termed Ideological State Apparatuses. These included 
trade unions, pOlitical parties, religious and educational 
institutions, the media etc. i:e. what this thesis terms civil 
society33. The state imbued civil society with its own values and 
used them to dominate society. 
To counter this trend toward the absorption and/or 
marginalisation of intellectuals in the face of state power these 
figures claimed that an alliance directed against the coercive 
powers of the state could be struck between intellectuals and 
society. This new political engagement would stress grass-roots 
involvement rather than elitist, hierarchical, state-focussed 
procedures of traditional party politics. The traditional distinction 
between left and right and Marxism's preoccupation with the 
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basis of economic relations were replaced by a variety of issues: 
environmentalism, feminism, anti-racism and so. This 'coalition 
politics I was in keepi:ng with the post-war recognition of the 
importance of non-class social interests and the challenge posed to 
Marxists by the example of the Soviet Union. However all issues 
were connected through reference to their universal, moral and 
ethical relevance. These new types of social movements tended to 
articulate interests with a strong moral and ethical content 
which raises them above the usual level of political debate. They 
presented themselves as concerned with universal questions. In 
this, I would argue, they manifested their pedigree as intellectual 
projects. 
Interest in non-Western revolutionary movements such as the 
Vietnamese FNL was rooted in the sense that such struggles 
renewed for intellectuals their contact with real and effective 
social, revolutionary movements. Vigorous efforts were made to 
break down the existing division between the intellectual and the 
Imasses'. French Maoists called on all intellectuals to 'dismount 
from their steeds' and go forth to 'the people': truth and therefore 
democracy lay with the masses, not with elitist, academic circles 
or the state34. 
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Intellectuals who decide to become active in the political sphere, 
whether through traditional political parties or at the head of 
'new social movements' face further dilemmas: how to leave the 
'ivory tower' of academia and enter the public sphere, how to 
bridge the gap between theory and practice. After all, the 
intellectual cannot rely on his own power. By definition he or she 
is an outsider without a substantial natural constituency. 
Moreover as an idiom associated with progress and 'futurology' 
the intellectual carmot refer to long-standing political traditions. 
The question remains: why should an intellectual be accorded 
political prestige above, for example, the clergy, army or 
professional politicians? Political intellectuals thus require an 
instrument through which ideas can be charmelled into concrete, 
political programrnes35. 
The intellectual attracts such agents by claiming to hold special 
knowledge and a system-wide perspective which they will share 
with social groups in order to raise their level of awareness and 
make them politically stronger. In other words intellectuals 
demand political authority by clailning to 'k.now better,36. The 
intellectual designs ideologies which refer to the current situation 
of a prospective agent (e.g. the workers, the peasants, 
envil"Olllnentalists, the 'nation', the 'people'etc.) in tlle systern and 
how this can be improved. 
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In terms of instituting liberal democracy there is an obvious 
danger in the acLiv lLy of poliLical intellecL uals in society 37. Is the 
patronage of a social category the result of genuine commitment 
to the furtherment of that category or the instrumental use of it 
to raise the marginal intellectual to the head of pOlitical parties or 
social movements? An unelecteci, intellectual telling 'the people' 
what is good for them and how to 'get to utopia' is not democratic 
in the modern sense of the term, regardless of the altruism of the 
milieu. One can question whether the political intellectual's 
system-wide perspective, his or her desire to 'synthesise' or 
'totalise' the fragmentary consciousness of SOCial groups and the 
complex of social issues, is not just a reflection of the interests of 
the intellectuals as a social milieu38. 
The idea of exercising political power on account of 'knowing 
better', if successful, can lead to the development of undemocratic 
polities. Politics made according to the elite's belief in its own 
superiority rather than through the competition of various social 
interests is contrary to the development of a democratic system 
and a healthy civil society. In times of revolution and systemic 
change the intellectual's universal, moral perspective can grant 
him or her an important role in pointing out the failures of the 
present and elucidating a complete vision of the future. However, 
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if pOlitical intellectuals achieve power, the intellectualsl universal 
perspective and reference to a future utopia can be used to 
justify policies which in a liberal, democratic society would be 
subject to lengthy debate (for instance, could the stringent 
economic policies of the Balcerowicz Plan have been passed in any 
conditions but the rule of the lintelligentsia in power?} 
Jean-Paul Sartre, a prime example of the politically engaged 
intellectual, described how the universal perspective of the 
intellectual, the ability to Istep outside I the competing agendas and 
sectional interests of society and see the Ibig picture I , is 
indispensable for a changing society. Yet he too recognised the 
potential consequences for democracy when the same, totall 
perspective is employed dogmatically to build a new, Itotalitarianl 
system39. 
Nationalism and Marxism provide examples of how authoritarian 
or totalitarian polities can be developed under the management of 
alienated intellectuals. One of the starkest illustrations of the 
consequences when intellectuals apply their totalistic perspective 
to political power is provided by Cambodia under the Khmer 
Rouge. Pol Pot, educated first in a privileged Cambodian school 
and then in Paris attempted to radically transform the country1s 
political system and socio-economic structure according to his own 
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vision. The country was forced back to a rural existence. Though 
a communist group the programme of the Khmer Rouge was 
designed to rid the country of corrupting foreign influences and 
return to the ideal of the peasant-type. Money and private 
property was abolished., the entire urban population was forcibly 
removed to the countryside, intellectuals and the middle-classes 
were wiped out through mass ext errnillat ions. The doleful 
consequences of the Leninist variant of Marxism, where 
intellectuals granted pOlitical authority through their superior 
knowledge of the class struggle are obvious. Communist countries 
have experienced authoritarian rule, massive social dislocations 
and recurrent economic crises in the name of a future utopia as 
delineated by communist intellectuals. The characteristics of 
Polish communism in practice are dealt with in the course of the 
thesis. However it is important to stress that, despite Marxism's 
essential humanism it can be used by intellectuals to justify the 
imposition of a coercive ideological tyranny. 
Yet another threat to the development of liberal democratic 
politics when intellectuals aspire to pOlitical power is the threat of 
populism. The rule of intellectuals during a period of systemic 
trauma can prompt a reaction against the elite and a lurch from 
authoritarian rule based on the competence of pOlitical 
intellectuals to authoritarian rule based on the supposed will of 
'the masses'. Paradoxically, this populist backlash can be led by 
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other, alienated intellectuals. The following section will briefly 
outline the characteristics of populism. This is important because 
in the Polish context populism is anti-intellectual. As we shall see, 
populist forces emerged with an anti-intellectual agenda during 
the Mazowiecki govermnent40. 
Populism 
Populism is a difficult concept to categorise. It can be both a vital 
element of liberal democracy and one of its most potent enemies. 
On the one hand populism understood as the influence of popular 
forces into the political process is essential to the functiOning of 
democracy. Only popular participation in politics make a polity 
truly democratic. On the other hand, radical populism, which 
rejects the authority of state institutions and seeks to exercise 
power through the 'will of the people' is contrary to the 
functioning of democracies in the modern, liberal sense. The thesis 
is concerned with the latter version of populism. Radical populism 
generally arises in conditions of extreme socio-economic flux 
where the middle strata of society are either missing or too weak. 
Processes of industrialisation, modernisation and urbanisation 
lead to an atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion between 
different sectors of society over who the main beneficiaries will 
be. Such a climate may lead to a desperate struggle between 
105 
groups for pOlitical power41. Analogies with the situation in 
Poland immediately after the collapse of communist political 
authority and the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan are 
obvious42. 
Although it can be founded on a range of political strands 
populism expresses itself in a particular way. Those social groups 
which feel excluded from the benefits of socio-econornic change 
make reference to the supremacy of the 'will of the people' over 
every other criteria and particularly over the ruling elite or 
milieu. The merits of the uncorrupted and straightforward 
common people are lauded against the sophisticated and 
self-centred politics practised by professional politicians and their 
intellectual advisers. The latter are suspected of leading the 
process of modernisation for their own benefit or for the benefit 
of interests indifferent to the fate of the 'people'. Thus the theory 
of a 'conspiracy' against the people is common to populism. The 
object of this suspicion varies according to the attributes of the 
ruling elite but anti-intellectual, anti-capitalistic, anti-urban, 
xenophobic and anti-Semitic sentiments are common. Thus under 
populism, society is mobilised as a single entity rather than a 
plethora of conlpeting but tolerant interests (as in a denlocratic, 
civil society). This is usually done through reference to 'basic' 
categories such as race, class or religion. Members of society who 
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fall outside these categories are regarded with hostility. It is 
important to note that intellectuals alienated from the ruling 
elite can contribute anti-intellectual ideologies to populist 
lnovements in order to gain political power for themselves43. 
Populism can transform the liberaL or civic nationalism described 
previously into a more exclusive, intolerant variation. The 
trauma of modernisation can be described as the result of the 
nation's domination and exploitation by external forces. The 
historic characteristics of the nation usually defined in ethnic or 
religious terms become equated with the 'good society' while the 
cosmopolitan :individualist attributes of modernity are regarded 
with hostility. The intellectual with his or her cosmopolitan 
background and universal perspective is thus portrayed as an 
enemy of the 'true' nation. The intolerance of social pluralism 
inherent in this type of nationalism is obviously anathema to the 
developlnent of a democratiC, civil society 44. 
In pOlitical terms populism stresses the desirability of a 'direct' 
relationship between people and leadership, unmediated by the 
secondary institutions (such as a representative party political 
spectrUln) associated with liberal deInocracy. According to 
populism the self-evident will of the majority is better served by 
this simple relationship between the leader and his or her people. 
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As such it is generally anti-parliamentary: the legislative branch 
of government is regarded as a 'talki.n.g shop' which obfuscates the 
basic homogeneity of the 'people' and serves to perpetuate the 
dominance of corrupt politicians. Instead, an authoritarian 
relationship between the people and a leader (dictator or 
President) who can protect common values is preferred. Thus, 
whereas under democracy society is mobilised to articulate its 
interests to a responsive state populism mobilises the people 
against the state which is seen as a centre of authoritarian rule. 
In economic terms populism inCluded the paradoxical desire to 
modernise but avoid the negative consequences of that process. 
The social dislocation and economic uncertainties of 
industrialisation and marketisation are to be bypassed and society 
is to arrive in a modern, prosperous condition unscathed .. Stewart 
refers to this IJanus quality I which combined the need for 
economic progress with the desire to preserve the basic values of 
the traditional culture of society 45. TI1US populisln, by wishi.n.g to 
reverse the processes of Modernity, including the establishment of 
liberal democracy, can be seen as an enemy of progressive 
intellectuals. Table 1.1 lists the opposi.n.g attributes of the populist 
and modern, intellectual agendas: 
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Homogenisation Plur alisat ion 
State Market 
Central distribution Laissez-faire 
As we shall see the specific characteristics of Polish populism were 
evident in early transition period and its emergence threatened 
the process of democratisation. 
109 
Conclusion: the Western intellectual and democratic, civil society 
Despite the aforementioned reservations, the separation of 
intellectual from politician in the West was an important factor 
in the foundi.ng of civil SOCiety and the development of democracy. 
Civil society, as the space where ideas and values were developed, 
became the realm of free-th:inking intellectuals. Disinterested 
critiques of the exercise of state power could be freely developed 
there. The state, separate from but connected to civil society, was 
the realm of politicians. The writings of Antonio Gramsci are 
instructive in this context. Civil society is separated from the 
state through Gramsci's distinction between political and ethical 
values. The exercise of pure political power by the state is 
regarded as a negative, restricting force. On the other hand the 
articulation of moral values in civil society can order the exercise 
of power in a positive way. Gramsci emphasises the distinction 
between the state and civil society by includi.ng them in a series 
of opposites: force and consent; coercion and persuasion; state and 
church; political and civil society; politics and morality; law and 
freedom; order and discipline46 . 
Vital in Gramsci's system was the leadi.ng role of the intellectual 
in civil society. In his writing on hegemony he widens Marx's 
definition of it as purely political leadership and refers to cultural 
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authority. Gramsci makes a distinction between the formation of 
collective will as the goal of political leadership and Imoral and 
intellectual reforml which is the goal of cultural leadership. While 
the pOliticians aim at the formation of a collective will capable of 
justifymg the existing state apparatus, intellectuals attempt, 
through the elaboration and diffusion of culture, to create social 
consent prior to the formation of political power. Thus, ideally, 
intellectuals have a crucial role in a democratic civil society. They 
shape and guide the diverse interests of society. They also ensure 
that these are represented at state level without actively seeking 
control of the state. As we shall see there are significant 
differences between this model of the Western intellectual idiom 
and the Polish intelligentsia1s relationship with the categories of 
Istate\ Isocietyl and Icivil societyl. 
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(iv) The Polish Intelligentsia 
Historical Roots 
There are strong historical links between Western intellectuals 
and Lheir cowlLerpaI'Ls in Poland.47. Arnold Toy nbee described the 
intelligentsia developing along the limen which runs between East 
and West, between their own societies and the societies they 
coveted48. The Polish Enlightenment in the second half of the 
18th Century established a connection between Polish culture and 
the contemporary intellectual life of Western Europe -
particularly France. As a result names such as Descartes, Newton 
and Galileo came into cultural circulation and Polish readers 
became familiar with the writing of Montesque, Voltaire, Rousseau 
and Diderot. Links between Polish intellectuals and the West were 
strengthened by the waves of emigration prompted by the 
oppressive atmosphere of the partition period. Political emigres 
included a high proportion of intellectuals. The Great Emigration 
of the 1830s included almost the entire pOlitical and intellectual 
elite of the Congress Kingdom of Poland49. 
These emigres maintained constant links with intellectuals in 
Poland and exerted strong influence over the direction of Polish 
affairs. Davies indicates the importance of this group in forging 
and preserving the Polish identity 50. Caught up in the intellectual 
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and political tumult of the French and American revolutions, the 
emigration's vision of what Poland represented inevitably adopted 
Western intellectual characteristics. In the 1840s the emigre 
Polish Democratic Society (TDP) provided an example of an 
intelligentsia-led organisation espousing the intellectual cause of 
democracy and individual freedom from the state. The majority of 
the group's members were intellectuals51 . The TDP spoke of a 
"calling of Poland and its duty toward mankind to carry to the 
East genuine enlightenment and an understanding of human 
rights"52. In its manifesto, written in 1836, it expressed tIle belief 
that only an independent and democratic Poland could fulfil its 
mission "to break the alliance of absolutism, to destroy its 
pernicious impact on Western civilisation., to spread democratic 
ideas among the Slavs and unite them through it 1153. The thesis 
argues that the Mazowiecki government's belief that it could 
construct a parliamentary democracy and free-market system can 
be at least partially explained as an example of the Polish 
intelligentsia's idealistic infatuation with Western models54. 
However, several specific conditions of the Polish situation 
ensured that the intellectual category developed in a very 
different way from the Western case. To begin with, at the time of 
the Polish intelligentsia's emergence in the nineteenth century, 
the Polish lands were partitioned between the Russian., Pruss ian 
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and Austro-Ilungarian empires. Moreover, the structure of society 
in the Polish lands was very different from Western countries. 
The underdevelopment of the East in comparison with the West 
was manifested in the persistence of a dominant, peasant society 
in Poland. The model of the strong state outlined previously 
concentrated political and economtc power in the centre and 
stilted the development of a robust middle-class. As a result the 
Polish lands maintained an essentially peasant society up to and 
beyond the First World War. The peasantry was presided over by 
a landowning class of Polish nobles who in turn were dominated 
by the Imperial states which had partitioned POland. 
The intelligentsia was derived from the Polish nobility. The decline 
of this class during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
coincided with the first wave of urbanisation in the country. 
Agricultural modernisation and persecution from Imperial forces 
threatened the privileged social position of the Polish gentry. 
No bles pressed the authorities to establish universities and other 
centres of learning as a way of preserving its unique social 
status55. Sons of the landless gentry moved to the towns and cities 
and together with some German and cJewish merchants comprised 
a new urban stratum. In a study of the social composition of the 
PoJish intellectuals in the nineteenth and early twentieth 







Bourgeoisie: 9.2 % 
Petty Bourgeoisie: 6.2 % 
Peasantry: 4.1 % 
(J. Szczepanski, 'Materialy do characterystyki ludzi swiata 
naukowego w XIX i poczatkach XXI Qs:l:!Il~9-J:l.YQ:z;~s~J~_~:r_Cl,~:qj,ej§_:z;eg() 
1971 pp50-51). The conditions attendant at the birth of the Polisll 
intelligentsia deeply influenced its ethos and its relationship with 
the categories of Istate ', 'society' and 'civil society'. 
115 
The Polish Intelligentsia and the State 
The absence of a native middle-class deeply influenced the 
character of the POlish intelligentsia. Firstly, it became more 
politically engaged than its Western counterpart56. The nobility 
was losing its economic strength and the native bourgeoisie was 
too weak to foster organisations which represented Polish 
interests. In the absence of these forces the intelligentsia became 
the stateless nation's informal political leaders. Moreover, in a 
situation where POlish identity was under mortal threat from 
Russification and Prussification the importance of culture as a 
political agent was magnified. The intelligentsia, particularly its 
intellectual core of writers, artists and philosophers performed the 
important task of preserving national consciousness. It shaped 
public opinion through newspapers, literary reviews and formed 
the leadership of various native political organisations. As such 
the intelligentsia constituted a Igovernment of souls' in 
partitioned Poland57. 
The Polish intelligentsia differed from its Western counterpart not 
only in its level of political activity but in the aims of this 
activity. In short, the Polish intelligentsia did not want to reform 
state power. It wanted to exercise state power. There were several 
reasons for this etatism. Firstly, there was no POlish state for the 
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intelligentsia to reform. Rule was exercised by the foreign, 
Imperial forces which had partitioned the country. If the milieu 
wanted to transform Poland it would have to form the state 
itsel.fl8. 
In the Polish context the intelligentsia's desire for state power 
included control of the economy. As we have seen, in Eastern 
Europe economic power, as with political power was concentrated 
in the hands of the state. The intelligentsia's attitude to the 
economy was also decided by prejudices and fears inherited from 
its noble forebears. The Polish nobility had always treated 
cornrnercial enterprise with disdain The economic activities of the 
middle-class which played a fundamental role in the development 
of civil society in the West, were looked down upon by the upper 
class in Poland as "below the dignity of a gentleman"59. There was 
no strong middle-class through which property could be diffused 
and the peasantry was neither willing nor able to accept such 
responsibility. The state, rather than society was regarded by the 
intelligentsia as the best instrument to modernise the POlish 
economy. 
Above all, control of the economy was important for intellectuals 
given the uncertain economic foundations of the milieu. We have 
noted that the liberalisation of the economy and the development 
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of a healthy middle class are prerequisites for the development of 
Western-style liberal democracies. In this context intellectuals are 
free to perform their role as critics of state power and 
articulators of different societal interests. However, in Poland this 
conviction was tempered by a fear that the privileges and status 
of the intelligentsia would be threatened by economic 
liberalisation. The experience of material insecurity had been 
inherited from their forbears in the declasse nobility. The new 
milieu was aware that the economic value of culture was 
precarious. Polish intellectuals anxiously looked to the West 
where the livelihood of their counterparts was increasingly 
determined by the vagaries of the market 60. 
The thesis contends that the Polish intelligentsia's attitude to the 
economy was apparent in the communist and Mazowiecki periods. 
The desire to control the economic sphere in the party-state is a 
basic tenet of communism, but it was not opposed, even by the 
dissident intelligentsia, until the last stages of cOlnmunist rule61. 
Although the neo-liberal aspect of the Balcerowicz Plan introduced 
by the 'intelligentsia in power' in 1990 instituted elements of the 
free market, it also reflected the desire of the 'intelligentsia in 
power' to maintain control of the economy in the state. Although 
in theory, the economy was opened up from state control, in 
practice the majority of Polish society was unable to take 
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advantage of liberalisation and the state continued to exercise 
power over the economic sphere62. The Mazowiecki government's 
controversial policy of 'quasi-privatisation', which gave overall 
power to state agencies, is illustrative of this approach to 
econOlnic reforrn63. 
The second reason for the etatism of the Polish intelligentsia was 
that it could not build political links with Polish society in the 
way its counterparts had in the West. While in the West 
intellectuals integrated with the growing middle class and based 
its programmes on a shared desire for political and economic 
autonomy from the state, in Poland the values of the 
Enlightenment and modern notions of citizenship were confined 
to smail urban areas and the intelligentsia milieu. In the 
countryside the peasantry existed in the economic and pOlitical 
subjugation and backwardness of serfdom. There was little or no 
tradition of individual freedom in the political or economic 
spheres. The intelligentsia could not rely on the support of the 
peasantry in its quest for modernisation and societal progress. It 
needed the instrument of the state to haul Polish society into the 
rnodern era of enlightened citizenship64. The Polish intelligentsia 
thus sought to exercise political power through the state. 
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As a result of the etatism of the intelligentsia, the dangers to 
democracy when intellectuals covet political power, outlined 
previously, have repeatedly been demonstrated in POland. The 
dogmatism and Itotal l perspective of the idiom can run contrary 
to the aims of liberal democracy. As we shall see, elements of the 
Polish intelligentsia were attracted to the chauvinistic, nationalist 
model of an authoritarian state in the inter-war period and then 
to the communist model of a Itotalitarian l state. The limitation of 
individual freedoms could be justified with reference to the 
intelligentsia1s vision of a utopian future where Poland was a 
strong, independent country or a Iworkers l paradise l . This was the 
Idespotism of the enlightened l : the self-belief of the milieu that it 
Iknew best l was apparent65. 
The Mazowiecki government1s project of democratisation was 
likewise etatist. The thesis will argue that there were several 
opportunities to include non-intelligentsia elements in the 
transition process e.g. giving Walesa a prominent political role, 
tolerating the development of political parties outside the 
Solidarity movement, including workers representatives in 
privatisation process, limiting the worst side-effects of the 
Balcerowicz Plan for the peasantry etc .. The fact that these 
possibilities were not pursued can be at least partially explained 
by the etatism of the intelligentsia milieu. Thus we have the 
paradox of an intelligentsia committed to Idemocratisation l but 
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unwilling to institute the individual political freedoms associated 
with democracy in practice. The political and economic strictures 
of the early transition period were justified with reference to a 
future, democratic utopia66. 
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The Polish Intelligentsia and Society 
From the preceding examination of the Polish intelligentsia's 
relationship with the state, it follows that the milieu's attitude to 
society was patronising. The masses lacked the competence or 
'civilisation' to be trusted with a leading role. Admitting elements 
from outside the milieu to its leading pOlitical role would be folly. 
In an edition of the patriotiC journal Przeglad N arodowy writers 
claimed that if the "golden horn" - the symbol of the spiritual 
leadership of Poland - was placed in the hands of the peasantry 
the results would be disastrous67• Instead, political leadership had 
to be filled by the enlightened intelligentsia: "the possessors of 
"aristocratic competence", answering morally for the current and 
future state of Polish identity68. As we shall see, the intelligentsia's 
disparagement of POlish society's potential to secure democracy 
was extended to the urban workers when they emerged as an 
influential stratum69 . 
The ideologies developed by the intelligentsia to attract the 
support of Polish society reflected the intelligentsia's desire to use 
groups in Polish society instrumentally to gain state power. 
Nationalist and socialist intellectuals competed, often fiercely with 
each other throughout modern POlish history but each 
concentrated totally on the attainment of state power rather 
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than the genuine representation of wider social interests. For 
nationalist intellectuals the demand for pOlitical emancipation 
was inseparable from the demand for a sovereign state. For 
socialist intellectuals control of the state was a prerequisite for 
socio-econOlnlc ~I>aIlSfOl>Ina~lon'lO. The ~hesls contends ~hat this 
patronising attitude was also apparent in the Mazowiecki period. 
Chapter 4 examines the deteriorating relationship between the 
intellectuals of the Mazowiecki government and society from this 
standpoint. 
The intellectual idiom's self-appointed task of easing the onset of 
modernity was onerous given the underdevelopment of Polish 
society in relation to the West. Urban development was sparse 
and fragmented and much of Polish society remained agrarian up 
to the cOIlllnunist period71• This type of weak development 
exacerbated the tensions between rural and urban spheres and 
ensured that the urban/rw-'al divide becanle a salient fault line in 
Polish politics up to the Mazowiecki period72. The elitisln and 
etatism of the Polish intelligentsia, combined with the 
socio-economic backwardness of Polish society meant that 
populism, associated with society's reaction against 
intelligentsia-led modernisation, was more of a threat in Poland 
than in the West. 
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Populism in Poland 
Eastern European populism combines the general attributes 
ou~lined previously73 wi~h Cel'~aill specific characteristics. Firs~ly 
the dominance of the 'peasant-type' in Eastern European populism 
is apparent. This reflects not only the numerical preponderance of 
peasants in East European societies but also the traditional 
equation of the peasant figure with innate spiritual and national 
values74. Emphasis on the peasantry has resulted in the 
dominance of anti-urban, anti-capitalistic and, most importantly, 
anti-intellectual currents within populism. In a situation where 
national sovereignty has been absent for long periods it is 
understandable that populism refers not only to socio-economic 
doctrine but also concerns the emancipation of the 'true people' 
from foreign domination. The place of foreign or 'alien' interests 
in the conspirational theories of populism is thus strong in 
Eastern Europe. 
Again, Poland shared the general attributes of East European 
populism with some particular emphases. Polish populism could be 
traced to the thinking of Roman Dmowski and the National 
DeIIlocl>a~ic pal'~Y (endecja) during ~he ill~el)-Wal' period75. As a 
traditionally peasant-dominated society its version of populism 
included anti-capitalist, anti-urban sentiments. As a 
predominantly Catholic society with an influential, modernising 
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Jewish minority it included Jews in its list of enemies of the 
'people'. As a nation which had experienced long periods of foreign 
domination it also saw foreign interests as potentially hostile and 
thus subscribed to a defensive, 'ethnic' version of nationalism. 
Finally, as a society whose surrogate pOlitical elite and main 
forces of progress and modernity had been drawn from the 
narrow, urban-based intelligentsia milieu Polish populism was 
anLi-intellectua176. Most of tlwse types were blarned by Polish 
populists for the degeneration of the Second Republic between the 
wars. The fragmentation of the party system during these years 
increased the populist assessment of the parliament as an elitist, 
gentleman's club. 
Populist stereotypes were also used to divert criticism from the 
communist Party-state. At regular intervals during the 
communist period intellectuals, Jews and foreign agents were 
presented as the enernies of the 'people177• In this context it is not 
surprising that the Warsaw-based 'Judaeo Communist-intellectual I 
with shady Western ties was a prominent stereotype in the 1990 
version of Polish populism. As we shall see, populist parties such 
as PC78 and ZChW9 and intellectuals such as Jaroslaw Kaczynski80 
opposed to the Mazowiecki government frequently referred to 
these attributes in their attacks on the 'intelligentsia in powerl81. 
In 1990 the attributes of populism in its Polish variation were 
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listed as follows: "a tendency to unrealistic economic slogans, 
anti-Semitism, belief in a conspirational version of history and 
fear of conspiracies, anti-intellectualism and xenophobia"82. 
The etatism and elitism of the Polish intelligentsia left its 
ideologies susceptible to populist manipulation by disgruntled 
intellectuals. For instance the progressive, civic version of 
nationalism devised by Western intellectuals has constantlY been 
threatened in Poland by its regressive, ethnic variation. In the 
West nationalism., initiallY at least, was used as a tool for binding 
state and society. However, in partitioned and inter-war Poland a 
patchwork of ethnic minorities struggled against a state whose 
culture was often at odds with their own. Polish nationalism was 
used by the intelligentsia to emphasise the differences between 
the values of Polish society and the values of the state83. 
This process was obviously not conducive to democratisation. We 
have noted how liberal nationalism can be transformed into an 
anti-democratic, ethnic nationalism. Inter-war Poland provides an 
example of how ethnic, chauvinistic nationalism can halt the 
denlocratisation process84. In a sinlilar way, the clailns of Marxist 
ideology to protect the people from the ravages of modernisation 
also fell prey to populism in Poland. The radical, leftist critique of 
modernisation founded in anti-capitalist ideas of egalitarianism 
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and mass participation was transformed into communist 
totalitarianism in Poland. In Mazowiecki's Poland the appeal of 
left-wing populism was lost in the immediate aftermath of the 
demise of the reviled communist regime. However, as we shall see, 
right-wing, ethnic nationalism provided a viable means for 
populist parties and intellectuals to build a critique of the 
Mazowiecki govermnent85. 
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Conclusion: The Polish Intelligentsia and Civil Society 
The specific characteristics of the Polish intelligentsia produced a 
model quite unlike the Western intellectual idiom. The former had 
an absolutist, fundamentalist approach to politics which saw no 
contradiction in the roles of political and cultural leadership. The 
creative tension between the intellectual and the politician in the 
West, which helped to strengthen democratic, civil societies, was 
absent86. 
Ideological differences have always existed within the 
intelligentsia. There have been frequent clashes between 
traditionalists and modernists, nationalists and socialists, lay and 
Catholic intellectuals et_c .. However, whereas in the West these 
conflicts, based on established social groups, contributed to the 
plurality of civil society, in Poland they invariablY amounted to 
an "all or nothing" game amongst the intelligentsia where the 
prize was state power. Despite its credentials, the Polish 
intelligentsia1s intolerance of opposition did not equate their 
vision of democracy with the consensual, modern version 
prevalent in the West. In this context it is useful to study the 
development of a democratic, civil society in three stages: 
pre-Mazowiecki, Mazowiecki and post-Mazowiecki. 
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(1) Pre-Mazowiecki 
To deal with the first application, we have already noted that in 
Poland civil society has traditionally been circumscribed by the 
state's desire to control all aspects of society. In partition times 
the Imperial states denied Polish society any forms of autonomous 
expression. In the inter-war period the Second Republic's drift 
towards authoritarianism limited societal freedoms. Under 
Communism no forms of social association or activity were 
permitted outwith the control of the state. Thus the absence of a 
'Western-type' democratic pOlitical system in Poland can be 
equated with the weakness of civil society in the face of state 
force87. 
However 'civil society' in the pre-Mazowiecki period was also a 
'leitmotiv' of the anti-communist intelligentsia. Adam Michnik and 
Jacek Kuron, intellectuals prominent in the anti-communist 
organisation KOR set up in the mid-1970s outlined their aim to 
'regenerate civil society'. In a 1976 article on opposition strategy 
~Tacek Kuron called for the reconstruction of civil society through 
the re-establishment of the rule of law, an independent public 
spllere and freedOlll of association88 . .Any association or initiative 
organised outside the control of the Communist Party-state was 
deemed part of Polish 'civil society'. In the short-term this strategy 
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was designed to 'fence off' areas of Polish society from the 
intrusive Communist state. It was hoped that the gradual 
development of such organisations in an autonomous civil society 
would offer a practical and ideological challenge to a supposedly 
totalitarian regime. The zenith of this 'civil society' project was 
the Solidarity Trade Union's brief experience of autonomy 
(1980-81)89. In the long-term the theoreticians of the concept saw 
this anti-Communist civil society as a prototype for a future 
post-conununist POland90. 
The espousal of 'civil society' by the intellectual leaders of the 
anti-communist organisations during the late communist period 
can be seen as the turning point in the Polish intelligentsia's 
tradition of social isolation. The communist Party-state succeeded 
in alienating broad sections of POlish society. Political and cultural 
repression, coupled with the decline of the Polish economy under 
the tutelage of the 'command system' generated opposition to the 
regime amongst the peasantry, workers, Catholics and a 
significant part of the intelligentSia. This paved the way for a 
unique alliance between previously distant social forces. The 
banner of 'civil society' overcame traditional barriers and unified 
Polish society against the communist state. Links were 
successfully forged between the intelligentSia and the working 
class and Roman Catholic Church. These unprecedented alliances 
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paved the way for the emergence of the ISolidarityl movement as 
a genuinely cross-class organisation which proved indestructible 
to the regime. 
It is important to stress that in the context of Poland in the 
1970s and 1980s, civil society did not correspond with Western 
models held up by the Polish intelligentsia. The political, social and 
economic institutions of civil society had evolved in the West 
through a long term process involving the decentralisation of 
authority. It was the resUlt of the contract between the State and 
SOCiety, guaranteeing loyalty to the former and legally guaranteed 
freedoms to the latter. Neither side of the contract was being 
honoured in late communist Poland. Rather, the Polish 
intelligentsia borrowed the concept and adapted its language to 
suit its own anti-communist aims. Unshackled from ties to the 
state, dissident intellectuals coUld freely demonise the communist 
regime. In the West intellectuals had been vital to the formation 
of the social contract between state and SOCiety on which the 
institutions of civil society were based. Intellectualsl role as 
I guardians I of civil society was instrumentaL However in Poland 
intellectuals championed the cause of civil society as a means of 
organising society against the state91 . Thus civil society was not a 
mediatory realm between the state and society; it referred to 
society1s ability to oppose the communist state. Crucially, the 
institutions of civil society, made up of a myriad of legal processes, 
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political groups, social organisations and economic interests whose 
existence was legally guaranteed by the state, did not exist. 
Beyond its efficacy as an opposition strategy civil society was a 
myth, a blueprint for the future92. By delineating a utopian 
vision of a democratic future the 'civil society' project can be seen 
as a product of the Polish intelligentsia's traditional teleological 
function93. 
(2) Mazowiecki Period 
This is the thesis' main period of study. With the collapse of 
communism and the elevation of Solidarity's dissident 
intellectuals to pOlitical power 'civil society' remained prominent, 
though in a different form. From being a byword of anti-statist 
opposition it became a justification for the new incumbents of 
state office who had delineated the idea in opposition times. 'Civil 
society' was in power94. For the first post-comrnunist leaders of 
Poland the regime had been overthrown by the democratic 
instincts of their societies, channelled through the 'reconstruction 
of civil society'. The aim of their government was the creation of 
economic and political institutions which would allow the free 
play of those forces. The features of civil society which had been 
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organised against the regime in the late communist period had to 
be granted representation in the state if the democratic project 
was to be realised. Thus, according to the intellectuals of the 
Mazowiecki government the 'civil society' project of the 
anti-communist opposition had created a unified, democratic 
political culture of the type expected in liberal democracies. The 
deep social cleavages of the pre-communist and communist period 
described previously had been overcome. 
This attitude is symptomatic of the ethos of the traditional Polish 
intelligentsia outlined previously. In Autumn 1989 the 
'intelligentsia in power l seemed to assume that the links forged 
between the intelligentsia and the rest of Polish society during the 
late communist period were lasting. Solidarity's triumph in the 
partially free elections of 1989 was not regarded by its 
intelligentsia leaders purely as Polish society's unequivocal 
rejection of the communist regime. Rather, it was seen as the 
ratification of some form of social contract between Polish society 
and the intelligentsia, which had for so long been an unofficial 
Igovernment of souls I but which was now exercising real state 
power. The intelligentsia was convinced that the informal 
understanding achieved in opposition times would suffice9R• 
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The Mazowiecki government and its supporters assumed that it 
could open up space in society and that this space would be filled 
with individuals wiJling and able to fOllow its lead and exercise 
the rights and responsibilities of modern citizenship. The freedoms 
and liberties associated with 'civil society' in the West were to be 
introduced immediately. The state was to be 'rolled back'. It was 
to give up its control of economic, social and political spheres and 
civil society, was to assert its autonomy and fill the gap in a 
supportive way. The economy was freed from state control by the 
Balcerowicz Plan's immediate introduction of market conditions. 
Citizens would now be able to pursue their economic interests 
without undue state interference. In reality, the economic 
backwardness of the majority of Polish society in 1990 meant that 
the state would continue to control the economic sphere, suiting 
the etatism of the 'intelligentsia in power'. 
The Solidarity movement was central to this vision of civil 
society. To the Polish intelligentsia it represented Polish society's 
willingness to get behind the intelligentsia's project of 
democratisation. It was to be a source of consensus and 
non-confrontationqf). For the duration of the transition period at 
least the important role of party politics in civil society was to be 
subsumed by the 'Solidarity ethos' of cross-class, nation-wide 
alliances. From this idealistic point of view Polish society was 
undivided, consensus C0111d be reached over the most important 
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matters. If there was no significant ideological differences between 
sectors of Polish society then there was little need for a 
traditional party political spectrum. The Solidarity social 
movement could instead express the unity of Polish civil society 
in a non-political way. It is worth noting that this approach had 
much in common with post-Marxist writers such as Habermas. 
They also perceive civil society as an arena where overarching 
unity could be expressed on the bases of morality and ethics 
rather than the site of conflict between different social interests. 
Critiques of the post-Marxist conception of civil society stress its 
tendency to conceive society as a single entity97. It could be 
argued that this vision of a unified, civil society where broad 
social movements could replace traditional, partisan politics is 
applicable to developed western democracies where economic and 
cultural cleavages are not deep. However, I believe that this takes 
an idealistic vision of Western societies. 
What is certain is that such a vision clashed with the realities of 
early transition Deep cleavages existed within society and 
between society and the state. Industrial workers and peasants 
were neither willing nor able to exist without the level of state 
support they had become accustomed to during the communist 
period. The Balcerowicz Plan which opened up the economy 
immediately left these classes in a state of austerity and 
uncertainty. These parts of Polish society were in no position to 
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take advantage of the liberalised sector of the economy and it was 
idealistic to expect them to passively accept this situation. The 
balance between the democratic values of equality and liberty 
was firmly weighted in favour of the latter. 
This battle of endangered social classes and institutions for 
political and economic influence in the new Poland meant that 
the Mazowiecki government inherited a potential social and 
political explosion in 1989. The future character of the Polish 
nation was being shaped and these groups" though bereft of 
specific programmes, had their own visions of an independent 
Poland. They stressed their own histories of anti-communist 
activity and demanded a place at the nation's helm at this crucial 
time98. 
Each social group emerged with different visions of Polish civil 
society and the basic values which should be enshrined in the 
new constitution. These divergent and competing cultures had to 
be integrated into a democratic pOlitical culture before the 
creation of nation-wide social movements could be contemplated99. 
The Solidarity movement, valued so highly by the Mazowiecki 
government as an expression of the unity of Polish society, was in 
fact a bone of contention between its constituent parts. As we 
shall see, the Solidarity tradition meant different things to the 
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intelligentsia, industrial workers and the Catholic Church. Their 
versions of the role the organisation should play in the transition 
period varied accordingly] 00. 
The intelligentsia won political authority by becoming 
spokespersons for its unique version of 'civil society' which 
contained several possible meanings, and excluded many 
significant questions from its conceptualisation. The development 
of post-cornrnunist civil society was affected by the way the 
intelligentsia in power attempted to define and control it. The 
renewal of traditional prejudices between the intelligentsia and 
other social groups was particularly salient in this context. The 
intelligentsia's essentially negative assessment of Polish society's 
democratic tendencies convinced it that its vision of a democratic, 
civil society was the best, indeed the only, one for the country to 
follow. The Mazowiecki government's refusal to tolerate the 
different pOlitical cultures of other sections of Polish society, 
explained by the aforementioned characteristics of the Polish 
intelligentsia, spurred the development of radical populism and 
political instabilitylOl. 
During the Mazowiecki period 'civil society' can thus be seen as 
the 'totallsing' instrument of the intelligentsia in power: as the 
last hope for intellectuals to play the heroic Enlightenment role of 
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agents of universal values 102. Diversity, the essence of civil society, 
was seen as threatening to social solidarity and the 'intelligentsia 
in power' referred instead to the fragile, artificial consensus 
created by a common communist enemy which was no longer 
there. This approach simultaneously represents the desire of the 
Polish intelligentsia to lead Polish society to utopia and the elitism 
and social alienation of the milieu103. 
The Mazowiecki government's version of 'civil society' was 
condemned with some justification in Poland and beyond as a 
project designed to elevate a narrow social group to pOlitical 
power 104. The rise of populism (fed by the frustrations of the social 
forces mentioned above and encouraged by disgruntled 
intellectuals who also held an etatist agenda), the subsequent fall 
of the Mazowiecki government, and the advent of a period of 
political instability and public apathy were equated with the 
defeat of the forces of 'civil society' and 'democracy'. The blame for 
all of this was placed firmly at the feet of the 'intelligentsia in 
power'. The depth of the conflicts which plagued the Mazowiecki 
period and undermined the process of democratisation could have 
been avoided if it had been sympathetic to the condition of other 
parts of society 105. The Mazowiecki adlninistration's haughty 
treatment of the industrial workers in general and their main 
representative Lech Walesa in particular demonstrated this 
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indifferenceJ06 . Polish intellectuals were thus criticised for their 
elitist version of civil society 107. The apparent abandomnent of 
the 'uncultured masses' on whom they had relied in communist 
times was decried as a new betrayal of the intellectuals108• 
Thus the second application of 'civil society', understood in the 
narrow sense as a project of the dissident Polish intelligentsia, is 
essential to understanding the politics of the early transition 
period. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the increasin.gly fraught 
relations of the Mazowiecki government and society and 
differences between the intelligentsia and other classes within 
society itself in this context. The diSintegration of Solidarity and 
the defeat of Mazowiecki in the presidential elections of 1990 can 
be seen as the inevitable unravelling of the myth of civil society 
created by the 'intelligentsia in power'. 
(3) Post-Mazowiecki 
As we have seen, the elitist ethos of the 'intelligentsia in power', 
demonstrated by its attachment to its particular version of 'civil 
society', unnecessarily deepened the polarisation of Polish society 
durin.g 1990 and hampered the emergence of a unified, democratic 
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pOlitical culture. However, in terms of establishing the 
institutional framework for the gradual development of civil 
society the Mazowiecki government accomplished much. While 
institutional liberalisation of the state and market arenas of civil 
society could be achieved relatively quickly, inculcating 
democratic values in the political culture of Polish society was 
more problematic. The depth of societal cleavages bequeathed by 
communist rule was apparent. The trauma of transition to a 
market economy immediately deepened economic disequilibria in 
Polish society 109 and made it impossible to balance the values of 
liberty and equality in the short term at least 110. All of this 
prevented the formation of a unified, democratic political culture 
in Mazowiecki's Poland. However, according to Dahrendorf, the 
crucial period of institutional politics was the first six months of 
the transitionlll. During this period the social prestige of the 
Mazowiecki government allowed it to set in place the fundaments 
of Poland's transition and these were shaped by the intelligentsia's 
admiration of Western systems. The development of a 
Western-style parliamentary democracy and an efficient 
free-market economy are difficult, long-term process but they 
were set in motion at a time when the 'intelligentsia in power' 
enjoyed sufficient social support or 'capital'1l2. POland's current 
political and economic stability can thus be traced back to the 
Polish intelligentsia's influence in the Mazowiecki government. 
Only with the passage of time have the benefits of the Mazowiecki 
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government's initiatives become apparent. After all, it is only 
through time that the institutions and procedures of a democratic 
polity develop. 
After the fall of Mazowiecki, intellectuals associated with the 
anti-communist civil society project appeared to acknowledge this 
fact and the consequences this held for them as would-be 
politicians. As a traditionally revolutionary milieu the 
intelligentsia rose to prominence in the heat of the 
anti-communist struggle and their version of 'civil society' 
provided an effective ideology to unify Polish society against the 
communist state. However their elitist, utopian ethos is not suited 
to the prosaic process of every day politics and the ongoing 
competition of various interests within a democratic civil 
society 1l3. It is arguable that the return of intellectuals to their 
traditional role as autonomous critics of the status quo is 
conducive, indeed necessary to the further development of civil 
society. The idealism and zeal of the ethos of the Polish 
intelligentsia and its 'totalising' perspective marks it as a 
revolutionary political force. In a situation where Polish society 
needed to be mobilised against the state the characteristics of the 
milieu were vital. However for the consolidation of liberal 
democracy (understood as the conflation of the interests of a 
responsive state and articulate society in a 'civil society') these 
attributes become disadvantageous. For the long term 
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development of civil society it is perhaps more appropriate for the 
milieu to revert to a more oblique, critical role. 
As stated previously, the chosen methodology of the thesis is the 
comparative historical approach. The contention of this thesis is 
that the historical journey of the Polish intelligentsia provides a 
useful framework for evaluating the Mazowiecki government's 
project of democratisation. Therefore a general examination of the 
development of the milieu in twentieth century Poland is a 
necessary prelude to an examination of the Mazowiecki period. 
Chapter 2 will argue that, although the intelligentsia underwent 
massive changes along with the rest of Polish society in the 
inter-war and communist periods, the main attributes of the 
milieu outlined in this chapter were still evident. The ethos of the 
traditional Polish intelligentsia; its attitude to state, society, civil 
society and democracy was carried over into the Mazowiecki 
period. 
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Vol.l No.2 Spring 1987 p167, henceforth Bauman (a). 
20 IIWriters, artists and scholars asserted themselves as 
intellectuals with a specific kind of authority based on 
belon.gin.g to the relatively autonomous worlds of art, 
science and literature, and of virtue, disinterest and 
compAtAncA aBBociatAd with thiEl a11tonomy" (B011rdiA11 p99) 
21 see 'The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' 
Chapter 2 p254. 
22 "intellectuals have the potential for the "restructur:in.gll of 
man'El concAption of himElAlf and hiEl ElOCiAty" (RAym011r 
lvlar~in Lipse~ and J:licllard Dobson 'The ln~ellecLual as Critic 
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denlOcratic interest: the institutionalization of parties and 
interests in Eastern Europe' in Bryant and Mokrzycki p53). 
102 see <:J ohn Michael, 'The Intellectual in Uncivil Society' Telos 
No.8 Summer 1991 p144 
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haR come t.o an eno ll ("1'he 'T'hree CaroR Game: An Tnt.erview 
with Adam Michnik' in Polityka 1/6/91). 
159 
Chapter 2: The Intelligentsia in Modern Polish History 
Introduction 
The purpose of the following chapter is to illustrate the 
continuity of the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia in 
recent Polish history. The chapter contends that the attitude of 
the milieu to state, society and the development of a democratic, 
civil society remained quite constant up to the Mazowiecki period. 
This will demonstrate that seeing the Mazowiecki administration 
as a Igovernment of the intelligentsia' is a useful way of 
evaluating its project of democratisation in 1990. 
The chapter is split into examinations of the historical journey of 
the milieu through the inter-war and communist periods. These 
two episodes witnessed far-reaching national and social 
transformations in which the intelligentsia was inevitably caught 
up. Both periods saw the expansion of the state bureaucracy, 
industrialisation and urbanisation. In the inter-war period 
(1918-1939) the ex-nobilty intelligentsia, grounded in the 
humanities at odds with but reliant on the Imperialist state was 
joined by a more professional, technical cadre of 'white-collar 
workers' (bureaucrats, engineers, managers etc.) which included 
mem bers with peasant or working-class origins. This new 
]60 
intelligentsia was professionally committed to the state 
bureaucracy. These developments increased the confusion and 
controversy surrounding the term lintelligentsial. 
In the early communist period (1946-68) the size, composition and 
expected function of the intelligentsia were subjected to further, 
massive changes. At the outset of communist rule the existing 
intelligentsia was repressed and purged. More recruits from the 
workers and peasants swelled the next generation of the milieu. 
This milieu was expected to legitimise the communist regime in 
the eyes of Polish society. In the late communist period (1968-89) 
parts of the intelligentsia began to disengage from the state and 
form a sustained critique of communist power. Eventually this 
category was able to form alliances with other anti-communist 
sectors of Polish society and form, in the ISolidarityl movement a 
force which played a major role in the fall of the regime and the 
rise of the Mazowiecki government. 
Throughout modern Polish history the changes wrought on the 
intelligentsia milieu were reflected in the variety of prefixes 
bestowed on it: loldl, truel, Ipseudol or Iworkingl, I dissident I I. 
However my definition of lintelligentsial refers to the survival of 
the ethos established by the traditional Polish intelligentsia into 
contemporary times. The unique system of values of the old 
stratum outlined in Chapter 1 - alienation from state and society, 
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a dogmatic approach to politics and preoccupation with the 
exercise of political power despite attachment to an utopian 
vision of democracy and patriotism - provided a framework for 
successive generations of educated Poles who were dissatisfied 
with the Polish state and the lot of their compatriots~. 
In the midst of the Mazowiecki government's term in office 
Henryk Domanski presented a contemporary account of the 
functions of the intelligentsia as they stood in 1990. It confirmed 
that the attributes of the traditional Polish intelligentsia: etatism, 
sense of mission and social leadership, were still exerting influence 
over its contemporary equivalent. Around 90% of the 
intelligentSia regarded as its duty, besides the realisation of its 
own narrow, professional interests, the fulfilment of training, 
educational, cultural and leadership functions for Polish society. 
These functions, in the opinion of members of this layer, included 
spiritual and intellectual leadership, the creation and 
dissemination of culture, the propagation of community norms, 
behaviour patterns and opinions, and also the development of the 
arts and technology, in compliance with the forces of economic 
progress;). Thus Chapter 2 will concentrate on the political context 
of the intelligentsia's historical development. Its relationship with 
state, society and civil society is regarded as crucial to 
understanding the politics of democratisation during the 
Mazowiecki period. 
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2(a) The Intelligentsia in Inter-War Poland 
Introduction 
Developments in Poland in the years between the two world wars 
are of significance to those interested in the Mazowiecki period 
for several reasons. In 1990 many parties were at pains to stress 
the continuity between pre-WWII and post-communist 
organisations. 'llhis applied to parties from all sides of the pOlitical 
spectrum. For instance the programmatic declaration of the 
reactivated Polish Peasant Party 4 stated: liThe politics of the 
Peasant movement have existed uninterrupted for practically one 
hundred years"B. Likewise the re-emergent Polish Socialist Part;r 
asserted that it was "The depository of the continuous tradition of 
democratic, independent socialists"? The political cliInate of the 
Second Republic is worth examining because it must have shaped 
the traditions to which these parties laid claim in 1990. 
In addition if the major task of this work is to trace the 
Mazowiecki government's project of democratisation then the 
Second Republic represents an iInportant period. The advent of 
independence was accompanied by significant social and economic 
changes and a general expectancy in Poland and abroad that 
Western-style liberal democracy could be institutedCl • These 
sentiInents were echoed in the aspirations and delusions of the 
163 
Mazowiecki government as it took office in 1989-909 . 
lndependence offered various social groups the chance to 
institutionalise ditIerent visions of Poland developed in the 
partition and war years. Just as in the period 1989-90 social 
groups such as the Catholic Church, the workers, the peasants and 
a nascent middle-class and the political organisations which 
represented them, championed their role in the struggle for 
independence and claimed the major say in the shaping of the 
new Republic. 
The evolution of the inter-war Polish intelligentsia is worthy of 
particular attention because it was during this period that one 
would expect the milieu to develop along more IWesternl lines. If 
the leaders of the anti-communist movement and the Mazowiecki 
government referred to Poland1s tradition of Icivil societyl then it 
was in the period 1918-09 that it would have been most evident. 
Ideally the period should have seen a rapprochement between the 
intelligentsia and the rest of Polish society as the former was 
freed of the responsibilities of their Imissionl of leading national 
resistance. A healthy middle-class would otTer professional 
opportunities to the intelligentsia which would then integrate 
more fully with society. Through this it would gain the autonomy 
from the state necessary to play the mediating role fulfilled by 
intellectuals in the West, contributing to the democratisation of 
the region. 
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However the period was mar ked by social unrest, economic crisis 
and a process of political fragmentation which led to the decline of 
democracy and the rise of authoritarian rule. I will contend that 
the economic and political climate of the time was not conducive 
to the development of a stable civil society. Caught up in the 
profound political and social changes of the time the internal 
turmoil of the intelligentsia contributed to the degeneration of 
state/society relations in the Second Republic. Rather than 
mediating between both categories, the intelligentsia became 
engaged in a struggle for state power amongst themselves and 
with other social groups. Again one can see a parallel in the 
intelligentsia's identity crisis in transition Poland and the effect 
this had on the prospects for the development of a stable 
parliamentary democracy and market economy. 
Any evaluation of the development of the intelligentsia in the 
inter-war period must take into account the traumatic changes in 
state and society which occurred during these years. The 
following section will establish this context. 
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ei) Background to the Intelligent$i8.~ Development in Inter-war 
Period 
Inter-war Society 
In social terms Poland remained a largely backward agrarian 
country with around 64% of the people earning a living from the 
land. Subsistence agriculture was still common and the 
fragmentation of peasant holdings continued. With a rapidly 
growing population the problem of surplus agricultural 
population was serious. Land reform remained a major problem of 
the inter-war period. Table 2.1 illustrates how the growth of 
industry and attendant urbanisation in specific locales did not 
change Poland's fundamentally agricultural character lO. 
rfable 2.1: Percentage of Population Living in Villages in Poland in 
the Years 1870-1931 According to Provinces. 
frovinces Year 
1870 1900 1921 1931 
Village-dwelling 
Population 
lWestern 79 74 73 65 
lCentral 83 81 70 67 
Southern 84 82 80 78 
lEastern 91 92 89 86 
Source: Rosset ~, De:qlOgratl Polski p20o. 
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In spite of the largely agrarian economy, the emancipation of the 
peasantry meant that, from the second half of the nineteenth 
century onward, there was increased mobility from the 
countryside into the industrial towns. By the time of the Second 
Republic the Polish industrial sector had grown significantly. By 
1831 12.'1% of the population of the Second Republic was 
dependent on industrial employment Ll. Zarnowski, in his 
sociological study of the Second Republic, estimated that by 1938 
almost one-third of the population was working-class12• This 
process was nowhere near as strong as its counterpart in the 
countries of Western Europe, where the industrial revolution had 
occurred one hundred years earlier, but it made a significant 
impact in certain areas. The disjointed, fragmented process of 
industrialisation was another legacy of the partition period, 
where dilrerent areas had developed dilrerent types of economy. 
Table 2.2 illustrates the fact that the process of urbanisation 
varied in timing and intenSity throughout partitioned Poland and 
the Second Republic. 
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Table 2.2: Percentage of Population Living in Towns in Poland lib 
the Years 18'(0-19:51 according to Provinces. 
~rovince Year ~ 
1870 1900 1921 - 1931 ,-
lWestern 21 26 27 35 
!Central 17 19 30 33 
Southern 16 18 20 22 
~astern 9 8 11 14 
Source: Rosset ~ Demografi Polski p203 
The Polish middle class remained weak. W e have already noted 
how the conditions of the Gentry Republic had allowed the 
nobility to repress the development of a native middle class13. 
After the economic and political repression of the partition and 
W.W.I only the state was capable of leading economic development. 
Any figures relating to the development of the Polish middle class 
up to the beginning of W.W.IT pay testament to its numerical 
insignificance in comparison both to other social groups in Polish 
society. Even in 19:51 when the Polish middle-class was in a period 
of relative growth, the combined numbers of capitalists, landlords 
and petty bourgeoisie and their dependants amounted to only 
10.7% of the Polish populationl -1. Diagram 2.3 summarises this 
social structure of inter-war Poland: 
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Diagram 2.3: Polish Social Groups (1921-31) 
La.ndowners (1 'Yo) 
Peasa.nts D 1 • t 
(64%) Entrepreneurs D 2 n d 
(2%) 0 3 r d 
0 4 t h 
Professions &. 8 S t h 
Agricultural Intelligentsia (5% §§l 6 t h 
Labourer Industrial 
(10%) Proletariat (17%) 
Source: Norman Davies, Heart Of Europe: A Short History of 
Poland, Oxford, Oxford Uhiversity Press 1986 p199 
Thus during the inter-war period Polish society could be described 
as generally underdeveloped and agrarian With pockets of uneven 
industrial and urban growth. The economic underdevelopment 
and fragmentation of Polish society represented major 0 bstacles to 
the democratisation process. On the one hand the peasant 
majority of society remained in the Ipre-Modern l stage of 
development which political theorists associate with an absence of 
democratic aspirations. On the other hand there were areas of 
Poland where the processes of Modernity had taken root and 
which were undergoing the trauma of industrialisation and 
urbanisation. The rural/urban divide which remained a feature of 
Polish politics up to the Mazowiecki period had its roots in this 
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uneven process of modernisation tH. Fragmented development of 
this type precluded the formation of a unified political culture 
which is vital to the achievement of liberal democracy. Instead, 
each social group tended to have its own value system and vision 
of the newly independent state and tended to be intolerant of the 
others. 
The situation was exacerbated by the 'nationality issue'. 
Obviously, in a country which has just regained statehood after 
one century of repression, nationalism was high on the political 
agenda of almost all social groups. Political organisations of all 
types gave priority to national unity. Each stressed the continuity 
of their patriotic pre-independence activities and the politics of 
the new Poland. The national cause remained more important 
than the representation of various social interests16• For instance 
the peasant leader Wincenty Witos claimed that "Poland fell as a 
state of the nobility ... Poland rises again as a state of the peasantry 
and as such can and must survive II 17. 
The Right-wing National Democrats (endecja) likewise stressed the 
continuity between its pre-war policies and politics in 
independent Poland. According to them, independence had been 
built on the preservation of their vision of Polish identity: lithe 
principles which gave the nation the strength ... to regain 
independence ... have not ceased to be correct ... They represent the 
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most valuable ideological legacy that we are introducing into the 
independent state. The all-Polish principles continue to be as 
obligatory in independent Poland as they were during our 
enslavement ... " 18. 
The Left, under the leadership of J ozef Pilsudski was also more 
concerned with the defence of the new state than with the 
representation of the working class. It shared with the endecja a 
belief that Poland was a Igreat nation l and that guaranteeing this 
status was the first priority of the independent Republic. }I'or 
Pilsudski, the main task of his generation was "to turn the wheel 
of history so that Poland could become the greatest power in the 
east not only militarily but culturally" 19. In a similar way, in 
post-communist Poland groups from across the political spectrum 
laid claim to the national heritage20. 
The mosaic of ethnic identities within the borders of the new 
Poland gave nationalism even more salience. In Poland, Catholic 
Polish speakers represented around two-thirds of the population. 
Ethnic minorities in inter-war Poland included nationalities with 
which Poles felt aggrieved for either past conflicts and conquests 
(e.g. Ukrainians, Germans and Russians) or long-term cultural or 
religious animosities (e.g. Jews). Table 2.4 illustrates the ethnic 
diversity of inter-war Poland. 
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1921 census 1931 census 
(Nationality %) (Ethnicity %) 
lPolish 69.2 69.8 
fUkrainian and Ruthenian 14.3 13.9 
lByelorussian 3.9 3.1 
'Local' (tutejsi) 0.2 2.2 
~ew1sh (Hebrew and Yiddish) 7.8 8.6 
"Mosaic faith 10.5 9.8 
pennan 3.9 2.3 
~ithuanian 0.3 0.3 
Russian 0.2 0.4 
Czech O. ] 0.1 
IOther 0.1 0.2 
tI'otal Population 27,176,717 31,915,779 
Source: Rothschild., Joseph E~st_QE3nt}:>.aL~u;r'()2e __ ~E3t~~(3:g._ the 'lwo 
Y(Q!'JQ __ W-<¥'s, A Hlstory of East Central Europe VoL IX Seattle 
University of Washington Press, cited in Tomas Hellen E3}).C1Ki:Qg 
tl~:g,ds witll .. the Past: Origins of the Political Righ.Ltn Central 
Europe Helsinki Finish Society of Sciences and Letters 1996 p64). 
These groups had varying degrees of national consciousness and 
some were keen to press their own national interests in 
independent Poland. Tensions were raised by the overlap of ethnic 
and economic categories. For instance, the vast majority of the 
working class in the Second Republic was of Polish origin"]. 
However German, Russian and c.Jewish elements were much more 
prominent in the managerial class. There were no substantial 
capitalists of native Polish origin. Instead this role was filled by 
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foreigners, particularly Germans and Western Europeans22. Thus 
economtc aspirations were combined with nattonalist senttment: 
the economy had to be controlled for the benefit of one ethnic 
group at the expense of another. The rural/urban divide, 
mentioned previously, was deepened by the common perception of 
urban areas dominated by I alieni elements such as Germans and 
Jews explott:ing the Polish Ifolk-masses l of rural areas (again this 
nationalist feature of the urban/rural divide was apparent in 
1990)2;,. 
The recent recovery of sovereignty, the mosaic of ethnic identtties 
and the overlap of economic and ethnic categories guaranteed 
that the INattonal Question l was the major dynamic of the 
inter-war period. We shall return to nationalist ideology in 
inter-war Poland later in this chapter. For now it is important to 
note that nationalist sentiment contributed to political 
fragmentation and radicalisation rather than the integration and 
stability of Polish societY''!. 
During the inter-war period the desire of the Catholic Church, 
always an important social institution in Poland, to playa 
prominent public role, deepened the cleavages in Polish society. 
The Church saw the Catholic faith as of prime importance in 
preserving national identity. The precarious condition of Polish 
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sovereignty in the inter-war period necessitated the institution of 
a national, Catholic state as a guarantor of Polish independence. 
The old formula of 'Pole=Catholic,:<.tJ received fresh jmpetus in the 
nationalist atmosphere and ethnic diversity of inter-war Poland. 
Being a practising Catholic became at least as important as 
appreciating Polish language and culture - if you were not a good 
Catholic you were not a good Pole. Some of the most extreme 
policies of the 1930s such as the boycotts against Jewish 
businesses and active discrimination against eT ews in University 
and the free professions were taCitly supported by some Church 
elements. Polish Jews would face either economic ruination or 
large-scale emigration. This would serve the economic interests of 
the ethnic Polish middle-class and the desire of the Church for 
religious homogeneity in Poland. 
In general, the Church's stance ran contrary to the development 
of a modern, pluralist democracy. It created deep divides in 
inter-war Polish society. Substantial sections of Polish SOCiety 
were alienated by the Church. Enemies were made of Jews, 
Orthodox Russians and Protestant Germans but a significant 
amount of ethnic Poles, particularly those amongst the liberal 
intelligentsia, were also disillusioned~o. 
The fragmentation and radicalisation of Polish society along 




development of democracy in inter-war Poland. As we have seen, 
political theorists see the creation of a unified political culture 
committed to consensus and tolerant of a plurality of social 
interests as central to the establishment of liberal democracy27. 
The lack of consensus was reflected in the kaleidoscope of political 
parties, trade unions and interest groups which sprung up with 
the advent of independence. The four main political camps of the 
time - nationalists, socialists, peasants and Christian Democrats -
were all split according to the cleavages outlined above. In 1926 
there were 26 Polish and 33 ethnic minority parties, of which 31 
were represented in the Sejm. Up to that year Poland was 
governed by a series of coalitions which were unable to reach 
internal equilibrium, let alone develop a tolerant, unified political 
culture. One of the most revealing episodes of this period was the 
assassination of the Republic's first democratically-elected 
President, Gabriel N arutowicz. He was regarded as the candidate 
of the Left and the national minorities. His election was 
denounced by the Right as a fraudulent conspiracy of Jews and 
other national minorities. The political situation became 
increasingly violent and culminated in the assassination of 
Narutowicz by a nationalist fanatic on December 16th 1922. 
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The Inter-War State 
At the outset of the inter-war period Poland's commitment to 
developing Western-style democracy was illustrated by the 
adoption of a constitution modelled on the French Third Republic. 
The most important element in the new political system was the 
parliament (Sejm), elected by universal suffrage with 
proportional representation. It could question the activities of 
Ministries and compel members of the government to resign. It 
had the right of veto over many of the most important economic 
and military matters. The powers of the Senate and President 
were much more limited .. However, for several reasons, this 
commitment to parliamentary democracy in theory was not 
carried out in practice. 
The fundamental problem was that the new, democratic state was 
the only agent capable of instigating progress in inter-war Poland. 
The condition of Poland was such that the state was obliged to 
perform the tasks accorded to autonomous social spheres in 
Western liberal democracies. The national economy, split between 
the divergent structures of the old partitioning powers demanded 
a strong central agency if they were to be integrated. The 
fragmentation and polarisation of society, reflected in the chaos of 
the party political scene, likewise demanded a strong political 
centre. In addition, the statesmen of the period, though for the 
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most part self-declared democrats, had little understanding of or 
patience with democracy in practice. The legacy of the political 
culture of the partition period was evident. Manoeuvring 
between elites marked the politics of the time rather than the 
representation of popular forces:?8. The fragmentation and 
radicalisation of Mazowiecki's Poland mirrored the inter-war 
political scene. In 1990 the existence of deep social cleavages 
which the pOlitical system could not synthesise was a major 
obstacle to democratisation29. 
In 1926 the military leader and moderate socialist J ozef Pilsudki 
led a coup d'etat to put an end to the squabbling of the various 
coalitions. This effectively ended the Second Republic's 
experiment with parliamentary democracy. Though the facade of 
democratic politics was maintained Pilsudki's rule deteriorated 
into a military dictatorship; the 'Sanacja' ('Purification') regime. 
Opposition politicians were arrested and their organisations 
repressed. The decline was accelerated by the leader's death and 
the succession of the 'government of the generals' which became 
increasingly chauvinistic and authoritarian and anti-Semitic. 
More repressive policies were introduced against the national 
minorities and the Jewish population. A series of strikes by 
workers and peasants and demonstrations by minorities 
illustrated the breakdown of state/society relations. In 1936 there 
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were 2,056 strikes involving 675,000 workers (there were 
808,400 workers in medium and large-scale enterprises in 1938) 
and 22,016 farmers with the loss of four million man hoursoo. 
Thus from the 1930s onward the Polish industrial working class 
had discovered the efficacy of collective action;5l. This is important 
because these types of organised worker protests were to playa 
prominent role in Polish political life. In 1956 they contributed to 
the reform of the Party-state~52. In the 1970s they laid part of the 
foundation for the creation of SolidaritY53. In the late 1980s the 
fear of radical worker protests prompted the Round Table Talks 
between the regime and Solidarity and thus hastened the demise 
of communist rule. Finally, in Mazowiecki's Poland, increased 
worker unrest unambiguously signalled the deterioration in the 
relationship between the 'intelligent~ia in power' and the 
industrial working classM . As far as the inter-war period is 
concerned, worker and peasant unrest signalled the accelerated 
decline in inter-society and state/society relations after the death 
of Pilsudski35. 
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Democratic Civil Society in Inter-War Poland 
In Chapter One we established civil society as a realm where the 
freely expressed interests of a society are articulated and 
transmitted to a responsive state. As such we equated a 
functionirlg civil society with the development of democratic 
political values and procedures;so. This model of civil society did 
not exist in inter-war Poland. Polish society was deeply split by 
cleavages which precluded the development of a tolerant, unified 
political culture. The Polish state maintained many of the features 
of patronage or authoritarianism associated with the old 
partitionirlg powers. It regarded Polish society as incapable of 
progressing or even surviving by itself and refused to grant the 
economic, social and pOlitical autonomies associated with the 
development of civil society in the West37• 
Given this background the role of the Polish intelligentsia was 
vital. We have established Western intellectuals as the pivotal 
figures in the creation of a democratic, civil society. By 
formulating critiques of state power and mobilising society behind 
the formation of a unified, democratic pOlitical culture they are 
seen as agents of Modernity and democracYSH. It is therefore 
reasonable to expect that the Polish jntelligentsia would be 
heavily involved in the projects of democratisation and 
modernisation in the inter-war period. The following section will 
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contend that the involvement of the Polish 'intelligentsia, with its 
traditional attributes, in the politics of the inter-war period 
contributed to the failure of these projects. 
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(ii) The Intelligentsia in the Inter-war Period 
Despite its democratic credentials and admiration of Western 
pOlitical models, the Polish intelligentsia did not act as a mediator 
between state and society in inter-war Poland. Rather it 
contributed to the polarisation of society, the strengthening of 
authoritarian rule and the diSintegration of state/society relations 
during the period. This was the result of the milieu's inclusion in 
the far-reaching socio-economic changes of the time. It was also a 
consequence of the 'totalist' and 'etatist' attributes of the milieu. 
In this respect the experiences of the Polish intelligentsia in the 
inter-war period presaged the difficulties faced by the 
'intelligentsia in power' in 1990. 
The most profound change experienced by the intelligentsia in the 
inter-war period was the large increase in its membership. 
Governmental, economic, educational and cultural institutions 
proliferated in the wake of independence and made an enlarged 
educated stratum a necessity. It has been estimated that in 1931 
there were in Poland around 665,000 non-manual workers of 
various types, making up 24.6% of all those employed in the 
national economy. In his study of the period Zarnowski estimated 
the total membership of the intelligentsia to be 1.4 million~5Sl. In 
the period 1918-1938, about 140,000 persons graduated from the 
secondary schools and about 85,000 of those went on to get 
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diplomas of higher education40. The increased size of the 
intelligentsia altered its social composition with the lower social 
classes gaining greater representation. Thus in 190t) 10.4% of 
university students came from the peasantry and 19.0% from the 
lower middle-class41. 
This new, educated stratum also differed from the traditional 
intelligentsia in the role it was expected to play. Loyalty to the 
new state was now of utmost importance. The intelligentsia was 
expected to playa different role, not as social leaders, but as 
functionaries of the state42. To illustrate the change in function 
the historian Janusz Zarnoski compared two definitions of the 
milieu from the beginning and the end of the inter-war period. He 
first cites Stefan Zeromski's definition from 1919 which stressed 
the role of the intelligentsia as a leading force in political life: "'l'he 
rnember of ~he intelligentsia is a lover of public issues, inspirer ... of 
the defence of all layers and oppressed classes, an altruist, a man 
of crea~i vity in both ex~rernely conservative and most progressive 
prograrrunes, of all National Democratic, social-democratic and 
Polish Socialist Party prograrrunes, an arnateur who stands behind 
the oppressed workers ... Ii. He next cites the sociologist Jm~ef 
Chalasinski's definition from 1906 which portrays the 
intelligenl.,sia as servants of the state: liThe intelligentsia - that is 
the satellites of the propertied and political elite"40 . Thus for 
6arnowski one of the fundamental differences between the 
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intelligentsia of the inter-war period and its predecessor was the 
involvement of a significant part of it in the state bureaucracy. 
Given that the ability to formulate a critique of state power was 
one of the fundamental attributes of Western intellectuals and 
the Polish intelligentsia, the new stratum's bureaucratic ties to 
the state raised serious questions of identity - could this new 
educated stratum be regarded as an intelligentsia at all?44 In this 
context it may prove illuminating to introduce the observations 
made by Octavio Paz on the role of the Mexican intelligentsia in 
its 'revolution of 1910-1917. The experiences of the Mexican 
intelligentsia are comparable to the identity-crisis of the Polish 
intelligentsia in the inter-war period. They also touch on some of 
the difficulties faced by the 'intelligentsia in power' in 1990. Paz 
explains how, after playing an important role in mobilising the 
people in the revolution, the Mexican intelligentsia had to turn 
its hand to statecraft, turning their hands to law, economics, 
administration etc .. This immediately triggered a period of 
soul-searching amongst the milieu: "Within a short time the 
country possessed a considerable group of technicians and 
experts ... However their situation is extremely difficult ... they have 
lost their independence and their criticism has beqom~ excessively 
diluted, out of prudence or Machiavellism. The Mexican 
intelligentsia as a whole has not been able to use the weapons of 
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the intellectual - criticism, examination, judgement - or has not 
learned how to wield them effect ivelyll'1 tl. 
Again the pOlitical engagement of the intelligentsias of Mexico and 
Poland can be contrasted with the autonomy and critical distance 
of their idealised Western counterparts: "This situation is very 
different from that of the European intellectual. In Europe and 
the United States, the intellectual has been deprived of power. He 
lives in exile, so far as the state is concerned, and wields his 
power from outside the government, with criticism as his 
principle mission. In Mexico the intellectual's mission is pOlitical 
action. The Mexican intelligentsia has not only served its country, 
it has also defended it, honestly and effectively. But in so doing, 
has it not ceased to be an intelligentsia? That is, has it not 
renounced its proper role as the critical conscience of its 
people?" .46 
The turmoil of the Polish intelligentsia was worsened by the 
character of the state which was demanding its loyalty. Although 
proximity to state power suited the traditional etatism of the 
milieu this was always justified in the name of initiating social 
progress and leading SOCiety toward a modern, democratic future. 
The chauvi.n.Lsm of the military dictatorship, which steadily 
alienated national minorities and the Jews, made this stance 
increasingly untenable. 
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The Polish intelligentsia was thus left with a clear choice: service 
to an authoritarian state which demanded complete obedience or 
activity amongst the alienated and radical sections of Polish 
society. In this way we can see the advent of a split between that 
part of a new, conservative intelligentsia tied to the state and the 
old, liberal intelligentsia committed to social leadership. Indeed 
Zarnowski goes so far as to give separate estimates of the 
numbers of Ireall intelligentsia and others in non-manual 
occupations 










Source: J. Zarnowski Spoleczenstwo drugiej Rzeczypospolit~j, 
1918-1939 (PWN 1973). 
It is important to stress that those members of the intelligentsia 
who subscribed to the old values of liberalism and love of freedom 
nevertheless also maintained an etatist, Itotalist l attitude to 
politics. Members of the intelligentsia were prominent in the 
pOlitical scene of the new Republic. In her study of 1082 full 
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professors in the inter-war period Dorota Mycielska established 
that at least 10% took an active part in political life as presidents, 
prime ministers, ministers, members of parliament or senators. 
Pilsudski himself had an honorary doctorate from the University 
of Warsaw and his brother Bronislaw was a respected scientist47. 
Representatives of the milieu formed the leadership of most 
political parties of the period-1H. 
However, the leadership style of these activists reflected the 
elitism and etatism of the milieu. For instance, the alienation of 
the Polish peasantry from the urban intelligentsia was noticeable 
when the former eventually became more politically organised. 
The rural/urban divide led to a gulf in aspirations between the 
intelligentsia which wanted to lead the peasant organisations and 
the peasants who were divided amongst themselves. The 
intelligentSia, no matter how Idemocratic l their programmes 
appeared, continued to regard the peasantry as second class 
citizens at best. The alliance was to be uneven, with the 
intelligentsia performing the leading function. The attitude of the 
intelligentsia to peasant politics was superior and paternalistic. 
The following quote from the National Democrat K.8. Frycz 
exemplifies the intelligentsia1s approach: IIIt is often forgotten that 
the peasant will always be the source of national strength, yet a 
passive source, requiring leadership and protection. The peasant 
can strengthen the intelligentsia ... but he will never be able to 
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assume leadership because then he would cease to be a 
peasant ll 'l9.The gulf in understanding between the intelligentsia 
and the peasantry was to become a prominent cleavage in the 
Mazowiecki period. This had serious consequences for the 
Mazowiecki government5U. 
Similarly, the Polish intelligentsia's involvement in socialist 
programmes was different to that of Western intellectuals. The 
social concern of the Polish intelligentsia certainly found common 
cause in socialist philosophy. However the elitist element of the 
milieu was attracted to the hegemonic role allocated to 
intellectuals under Marxist philosophy. As we have seen the 
Polish intelligentsia regarded itself as the social group destined to 
lead because it alone contained the necessary knowledge and 
expertise. The milieu's new knowledge of the class struggle and 
the task of awakening the political awareness of the proletariat, 
given to intellectuals by Marxist philosophy, fitted well into this 
general outlook and added to the Polish intelligentsia's sense of 
superiority. The expanding urban working class was losing its 
attachment to traditional, peasant-based sources of leadership and 
authority were being broken down. It therefore represented a 
force in society through which the intelligentsia could introduce 
its own agenda which had more to do with didactic, theoretical 
socialism than true worker-based action. In effect the workers 
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were patronised by the intelligentsia in the same way the 
peasants had been. We shall see that the special role accorded 
intellectuals by Marxism also attracted the milieu in the 
communist periodli1 . 
In 1990 Kazirniel'z Korab described how social concern and LeftisL 
tllOught becalne syntlwsised witll the elitist ethos of the Polish 
intelligentsia and its self-appointed mission as leaders of Polish 
SOCiety: llLeftist thought has becorne widespread alnongst European 
intellectuals over the last two hundred years, based on the 
conviction that, through intellect, knowledge and technology one 
can order and transfornl the people. In this way the French and 
Russian Revolutions provided pllilosophies. In academic circles a 
utopian, Marxist view eInerged. After all, in its didactic approach 
Marxisln attelnpted to seize systemic and general control, unity 
and equality were placed in the sarne category. It is thus wrong to 
idenl..ifY the Left with tlle workers - I..he Left has an intelligentsia 
rather than working class pedigree .. 'l'he Left thinks in the lnanner 
of Central ~w·oJ.lean intellectuals. The issue of the workers arose 
only in relation to introducing concepts to societylltJ~. The 
inl..elligenl..sia's patronising approach to the industrial working 
class was echoed in the deterioration of the relationship between 
the Mazowiecki government and representatives of the workers 
in 1990b~). 
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This secLion has illusLrated Lhe intelligentsia's patronage ot' the 
peasantry and working class in the inter-war period. As with the 
intellecLuals of Western .Hlw'ope the Polish intelligentsia sirlcel'ely 
wished to help both these social groups progress. However they 
wel'e wlable to forge fulks strong enough to facilitate this process. 
TIle elitist, etatist outlook of the Polish intelligentsia played a 
significant part in thistl4. Thus the behaviour of the intelligentsia 
contributed to the fragmentation and radicalisation of Polish 
politics in the inter-war period. Political parties tended to be 
elitist, intelligentsia-led clubs engaged in a divisive battle for state 
power. Politics was presented as an 'all or nothing' game engaged 
in by those Inembers of the intelligentsia who believed they knew 
best how to modernise Poland5tl • Obvious parallels can be drawn 
with the diSintegration of Solidarity's parliamentary 
representation into competing intellectual clubs and the 
fragmentation of the political scene in 1990tlo. 
An examination of Polish nationalism in the inter-war period 
illustrates the l'adicalislil of the nliLieu. As we have seen, 
nationalislIl pr'ov ided a useful but sensitive tool in the al'lIlOW'Y 
of the pI'ogl'essi ve irlLelligenLsia. It helped soothe the LI'awnas 
attendant upon a Illoder'rllsirlg SOCiety but in the hands of 
disaffected intellectuals could reverse this processtl'l. In inter-war 
Poland the radicalislIl and irlternal divisions of the irltelligentsia 
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was reflected in t11e enwrgence of' ~ wo directly opposed versions of 
Polish nationalisIYL 1'hese COITlpeting visions were associated with 
~lle two rnain political personalities of the period - ROlnan 
Dmowski and J ozef Pilsudski. 
Roman Dmowski's philosophy, associated with the various 
National Democratic organisations (endecja), was concerned with 
the concept of the nation as a distinct ethnic commUnity whose 
right to existence superseded the individual rights of any of the 
individuals it was composed at any given time. Dmowski's goal 
was to transform the Polish people into a modern cOlnmUnity 
based on the masses of Polish society. Thus ethnic, linguistic and 
religious criteria were vitalt>8. This type of nationalism was 
supported by the Catholic Church for obvious reasons. It also 
found favour with elements of the young intelligentsia whose 
prospects of employment were threatened by the overproduction 
of graduates. The high representation of d ewish students at 
University increased these frustrations and attracted them to 
Dmowski's ethnic nationalism. 
However this form of nationalism was obviously not conducive to 
the developrIlent of liberal derIlocracy as it was intolerant of 
religious and etlwc m1n9r~tiB$, )1' jropl~mented, one third of 
Poland's clLlL;eIlS would have their civil rights severely diminished. 
In the secoilu haU' of the 1800s the chauvinist 'Banacja' regune 
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began to adopt some of the most illiberal features of Dmowskils 
nationalism such as anti-Semitic discrimination. 
Pilsudkils vision of the Polish nation was based on the oleL 
multi-ethnic republic of Poland-Lithuania. Polish identity was 
more a matter of subscribing to a common set of values and ideals 
than ethnic roots. In this it was more IWestern l than Dmowskils 
version. However, Pilsudkils nationalism was also undemocratic. 
Those who did not live up to Polish ideals and values, as 
interpreted by Pilsudski and his followers, were likely to find 
themselves excluded from political power. Pilsudski saw his 
ISanacjal military regime which took office after his coup diet at as 
a Ipurifyingl force in Polish politics. These versions of Polish 
nationalism were intolerant of each other. 
The involvement of the Pole==Catholic equation in the rise of 
Dmowskils intolerant version of nationalism increased the 
radicalism and fragmentation of the intelligentsia. The liberal core 
of the milieu came into direct conflict with the Catholic Church 
and its supporters over the nature of the reborn Polish state. 
Both groups regarded themselves as the important factors behind 
the survival of Polish identity in partition times. Both deigned to 
lead Polish society through reference to an lother-worldlyl realm; 
either the Kingdom of God or the Utopia of Reason. Consequently 
both felt that they should play the leading role in shaping 
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sovereign Poland. The liberal intelligentsia rejected the idea of a 
ICatholic statel. As the repository of Poland1s Western-oriented 
~radi~ions of democracy, pluralism and liberalism it supported the 
Ilaiflcation' of public institutions, the clear separation of Church 
froin 8~ate along western lines. These views fOWld support 
amongst national and religious minorities such as the J e-ws, 
J?ro~es~an~ Gerlnans and Uniate Ukrainians who felt threatened 
by the special status o[ the Catholic CllU.l'ch in Poland. The 
intelligentsia was thus split according to clerical and anti-clerical 
outlookm,. The division between the liberal intelligentsia and those 
who sought a great:.er public role [or t:.he Cat:.holic Church in 
public life [or political reasons was l'esw'l'ecLed ill 1990. This 
cleavage proved particularly drunagi.ng to the lintel.ligentsia in 
power/GO. 
The intelligentsia was thus split radically. Czeslaw Milosz61 
wItnessed the ideological polarisaLion o[ the milieu in the 
inter-war period between the right wing followers o[ DrIlowskils 
chauvinisLic brand of Catholic-nationalism and the elitist, socialist 
followers of Pilsudski. The clash between these visions was played 
out again between 1,11e followers of Mazowiecki and Walesa ill the 
presidential campaigns of 1990''''. Thus nationalist ideology did not 
provide a fJ:'amework [or the integration of Polish society behind 
the projecL of delIlOcratisatioll and rnodernisatlon. In the hands of 
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the intelligentsia it becalne a. di visl ve force. Both versions were 
intolerant of each other. Moreover, both in application lirIlited the 
societ,al freedoms associat,ed wlLll liberal dCIIlocracy. Both versions 
of Polish nationalisrIl could be deLecLed in 1990 where Lhe 
lnLellecLuals o[ t,he Maz:.owlecki govcr1lilwnt advocated Pilsu<.lski's 
ruulL.l-eL.hnlc buL. eliLlsL. v Islon o[ Poland s parL. o[ a broLlwrhood o[ 
naLloHs an<.11Ls opp011UnLs supported DlIlOwskl's narrow, 
chauvinistic definition. Again the clash between these visio~ns did 
not encow'age the developnlenL of derIlocracyl);5. 
As noted previously, the radicalisatlon of the Polish intelligenLsla 
in the lilLer-war period was deepened by the unpoverisIunent of 
the rnilieu. The expansion of the education systerTl led to an 
overproduction of highlY qualified gr'aduates and a shortage of 
posts for thelll. Moreovel', intellectuals w 110 had been accustorned 
Lo beli.lg the 'voice of the nation' in the partition periodo4 were 
now forced to compete for an audience. Cultw'e was novv a 
cOllunodity and writers realised that they were now addressing a 
slu'inku.tg public. They keenly fell, the paradox that in their own 
free cowltry tlley were Inore alienated [roin the people Lhan 
those wl'iLers of the prevlous cenLw'y who could not be l'ead 
openly. The J.lfflcultles faced by intelleotuals accu::;tOllled to 
play ing an l111portant societa11'01e through the politlcal worth of 
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their creations when confronted w itl1 the vagaries and whiIns of 
the market were also apparent in 1990t;~). 
ill conclusion we can sce that the Polish intelligentsia in the 
inteI'-war period was illlable to halt the erosion of its dream of 
liberal delnocracy and the breakdown of relations bet ween state 
and society. H.ather than acting as a 1Ilediating force between the 
two camps the intelligentsia found itself split between them along 
professional and ideological lines. As such it contributed to the 
situation vvhere state and society opposed each other and society 
itself was split by deep cleavages. A democratic, civil society was 
unlikely to develop in these conditions. As we shall see, the themes 
which have emerged from our study of the intelligentsia during 
the Second Republic can be cornpared to the state of affairs in 
Mazowiecki1s Poland. 
'l'11e intelligentsia1s experience of the brief period of independence 
between the two world wars was chastening. Sovereignty, the 
longed for panacea, had failed to solve Poland1s political, social and 
econOlnic pI'obleIlltl. Tlle lllilieu sensed this failure 1I1OI'e than 
other social groups as it felt it had invested 1110st iIi the project of 
naLional elnancipation. Its worsL fears over Polish soclety1s 
wldeIllOCI' a tic, a uLhoriLarian tendencies were COniiI'IIled. 
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Moreover tile intelJlgentsia's inability to cOWlter these trends 
alone was derIlOnsLl'ated. After 1900 tile political activity of 
intellectuals became Inore and more oppositional. Tho Democratic 
Party, founded in 1938, mlited intellectuals of 0,11 political shades 
in opposition to the regilne. lL was popularly known as 'The Party 
of the Progressive lntelligentsia'. However, by that tlrue Llle 
LlI'ea1I1S of LlelIlOUl'auy attendant aL the birLh of the Second 
Repu-blic had long since evaporated. Tlle experiences of the 
intelligentsia in the inter-war period inforrned its future tactiCS; 
notably its willingness to associate with the commilllist system 
and its atternpts to forge links with the Church and the 
worki:ng--class in the 1970s06 . 
All of these processes came to a halt with the outbreak of the 
Second World War. '1'he Nazis were aware of the intelligentsia's 
leading role in POlish society and the extermination of the lllilieu 
was a declared aimh'i'. Estimates of the losses suffered by the 
inLelligentsia dW'ing W.WJl vary but ail agree thaL they were 
particularly severe. DuracL;Yllski estunates that Poland lost 45% of 
her doctors, b7% of her lawyers, 15% of her Leachers, 40% of 
ulliversity professors, allnost bO% of qualified engineers and 00% 
of LeclulOlogists and Leclulicians dW'ing the war'iM. 
Nevel'Llleles8 tlle paLl'iotislU and sense of ruission of the sll'viving 
illtelJlgenLsia was reinforced by their' own suffering and the 
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national 'lnartyrdorn'. The intelligentsia reverted to its role of 
iruol'lual leader's of society and achieved a level of integration 
with the masses which had perhaps eluded them during tl1.e 
Second Republic. The tradition of cl'eatl.ug under'gr'ound 
8LrucGw'es aL Llrnes of naLional cri8is, begwl in the pel'lod of the 
par'Lition8, was continued .. By 1942, IIlOSL faculties of the 
wliver81Lles of Krakow, Warsaw, Wllno and Lwow wer'e lloldl.ng 
classes and giv:ing examinations in private dwelliIJ..gswl. Several 
prorninent melnbers of the lntelligentsia, who played leading role 
in the anti-coIT1Illunist 111.0Vell1.ent and the Mazowiecki 
govermnent were educated in 'underground universities' as the 
war raged. These included Jan J ozef Lipski (the co-founder of 
KOR), and Bronislaw Geremek (leader of Solidarity's 
Parliamentary representation duriIJ..g the Mazow lecki perlod'io. 
The tradition of the 'Flying University' was resurrected by these 
intellectuals during the 1970s where it became an important part 
of the anti-cormnwlist opposition's atternpt to 'reconstruct civil 
society"?'I. Thus, paradoxically, Nazi occupation replenished some of 
Lhe irltelJigentsia's rnoral authority and standing in Polish 
society?;';. As a result the intelligentsia played a m~jor part in 
preserving .Polish national identity duriIlg those years of 
subjugation and persecution'?:5. 
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2(b) The Intelligentsia Under Communism 
Introduction 
An examination of the experiences of the Polish intelligentsia 
under communism is vital to understanding the politics of the 
Mazowiecki period. The roots of the Mazowiecki government are 
found here. Prominent members of the Mazowiecki administration 
first emerged in the late communist period as dissident 
intellectuals with the project of rebuilding a democratic, civil 
society. As with the inter-war period the communist era witnessed 
substantial socio-economic changes in terms of urbanisation., 
industrialisation and modernisation. We would therefore expect 
the intelligentsia to be prominent at the forefront of these 
processes. However, there arc obvious differences between the 
development of the milieu in the inter-war and communist years. 
The regnant political culture under communism had none of the 
liboral democratic aspirations of the Second Republic. The will of 
the communist Party-state was the dominant political force in 
communist Poland. The characteristics of the communist system 
will be presented as inimical to the interests of a 'civil society' of 
the type identilled with Western democracies earlier. 
This section is thus concerned not with the role of the 
intelligentsia in the process of democratisation but with its part 
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in the irnposition, rnaintenance and eventual disintegration of 
authoritarian, corIDnunist pule. The experience of the Polish 
intelligentsia under cornmunism will be examined in two parts: 
Early Cormnunist (1945-68) and Late Cormnunist (1968-1989). The 
first part asks how the supposedly liberal intelligentsia adapted to 
authoritarian rule? This is important to our understandi.ng of the 
intelligentsia·'s relationship to state, society and civil society: was 
the traditional etatism of the milieu actually suited to the 
party-state model? The intelligentsia's involveInent with the 
construction of this system will be explained as a consequence of 
the legacy of the inter-war and war years but also through 
reference to its traditional ethos which urged it on to state power 
because it Iknew best'. If this is so, does it partially explain the 
desire of the Mazowiecki administration to maintain a 
government of exclusively the 'best and brightest I? 
The second part will examine the intelligentsia's involvement in 
the emergence of the anti-communist opposition. The period of 
opposition building from 1968 onward is viewed as an 
unprecedented period in the history of the milieu. After the 
communist regiIne's persecution of protesting students and 
intellect uals in 1968 the rnilieu moved its focus trom state to 
society. Links were forged with previously distant social forces 
SUCll as tlle industrial workers and the Catholic Church. The 
alliance, in the form of tlle 'Solidarity' rnovement, proved 
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indestructible to the cOImnunist state. However, the 
anticOImnunist intelligentsia announcernent of the rebirth of civil 
society was mistaken. The opposition movement was held together 
by opposition to the communist state alone. The long-term 
cleavages of these groups, outlined previously, were not resolved. 
A unified political culture and a responsive state, prerequisites for 
the development of a dernocratic, civil society in Western liberal 
democracies, were not present in late communist Poland. Instead 
artificial societal unity was achieved in opposition to a hostile 
state. Thus, once again., the intelligentsia contributed to the 
polarisation of state and society in Poland. Although it had turned 
from state to society it maintained its approach to politics as an 
'ail or nothing' game for state power. This myth of civil society 
was carried by dissident intellectuals into office under 
Mazowiecki where it contributed to a fresh polarisation of state 
and society in 1990. 
Once again., before examining the development of the intelligentsia 
in communist Poland, it is necessary to establish the 
socio-economic context. As with the inter-war period this is done 
through an examination of the categories of state, society and 
civil society. 
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(i) Background to the COlmnunist Period 
The Communist State 
Under communiSln the state completely overwhelmed the 
autonomous inclinations of Polish society and Polish national 
identity was subsumed by the weight of t1w SOViet ~Inpire. '1'lle 
communist theory of the 'leaciing role of the Party' meant that it 
saw the state as the sole representative of the interests of Polish 
society. As the Communist Party (PZPR) dominated both state and 
society there was no need for a 'contract' between them. 
Legal and constitutional bodies, vital in guaranteeing the rights of 
individuals and groups in democratic civil societies, were 
remodelled along Soviet lines. Poland's bicameral system of 
government with upper and lower Parliamentary bodies (the 
Senate and the Sejm) was abandoned. Supreme authority was 
formally invested in the legislative bodj of the 460 - member 
Sejm which was elected every four years by universal suffrage 
(communist control of the electoral process guaranteed its control 
of this body). Executive authority was exercised by the Council of 
IVlinisters which, along with the President and his Council of State 
and the Supreme board of Control were appointed by the Sejm. 
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The 8uprerne Court, o1Jicially rnade up of independent judges 
appOinted by the Council of State, represented the judicial branch. 
However in practice, all of these institutions were instruments of 
t11e Cornrnunist Party. '1'118 cornrnunist systern reflected the tenets 
of Idemocratic centralism l where pOlitical power was exercised by 
the Party and particularly its Political Bureau and Pirst 
Secretary. All appointments and directives affecting central state 
institutions were controlled by corresponding Party organisations. 
'Thus legislative power was concentrated in the hands of a small 
Party elite. 
A democratic electoral system and a representative party-pOlitical 
spectrum are vital channels between the state and society in 
functioning democracies. They simultaneously check the activities 
of the state and encourage the articulation of social interests1. In 
communist Poland these institutions were destroyed. The 
communist government1s repeated promise of free, democratic 
elections was never fulfilled. The formation of new parties was 
prohibited and the cornrnunists set about subordinating the 
existing ones to themselves. The Polish Peasant Party and the 
Polish SOCialist Party were, in turn, persecuted, infiltrated by , 
split and subsurned by the Cornrnunists. The pro-Cornmunist ZSL2 
became the only ofIicially recognised representative of the 
peasantry and the PPS was rnerged with the PPR to becorne the 
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pro-Moscow Polish United Workers' Party (PZPRY. The peasant 
leader Mikolajczyk and the socialist leader GOInlilka were 
rernoved from public lii'e. W hen elections were held in January 
194'7 the grossly falsifIed offlcial results gave over 80% of the vote 
to the government's "democratic block". The PZPB. was joined in 
govermnent by the ZSL and the SD; (a party purporting to 
represent the interests of independent urban craftsmen but 
committed to the objectives of the PZPR). Thus the governing 
coalition was merely a facade. Both satellite parties membership 
shrank. None of their members held high office and neither party 
had an independent say in political processes/[o 
The atmosphere of repression was not limited to central political 
organs. Trade unions, the army, local administrations, the 
judiciary, industrial enterprises, co-operative groups and social 
organisations (including the Catholic church) were subject to 
intense scrutiny by the state's greatly expanded social apparatus. 
Ali had to either allow themselves to be controlled by the 
Party-state or face the prospect of repression. 
In the economic sphere the situation was similar. The SOviet-type 
econOIny, rooted in Marxist ideology, was based on the idea that 
there was a 'collective social interest' that the communist party 
could esta blish, represent and protect. The party-state took on the 
role of 'econOInic planner' and intervened directly in all economic 
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matters on behalf" of society" In 1948 the State COmmission for 
J:tconomic PlaIlIling was instituted and it had a direct say in the 
economic development of the whole country. The .Party-state had 
acquired control of the command.ing heights of the economy. It is 
important to note that throughout the communist period state 
repression of society waxed and waned continuously. Particularly 
after the death of Stalin., the state's control over political, social 
and economic life was relaxed somewhat. However the 'leading 
role of the party', the central justification for the rule of the 
party-state remained till the fall of the system. 
2i2 
Society 
The end of the Second World War saw radical changes in Polish 
society. The Potsdam agreement between the Great Powers had a 
far-reaching effect on Polish society. The country's new borders 
and the migration of millions of people led to the creation of an 
ethnically homogeneous state. Unlike the inter-war period Poland 
was now ethnically Polish and predominantly Catholic. In the 
Second Republic national minorities had accounted for 10 million 
of the population., but they now numbered only 500,0005 . Ethnic 
tensions which had contributed to the collapse of the 
democratisation process in the inter-war years were eased. It 
might have been expected that an ethnically homogeneous society 
would foster the formation of a uni!led 'national' culture, which is 
vital to the development of modern democracy. However, as we 
shall see, homogeneity did not contribute to the development of 
democracy in communist Poland. Authoritarian rule dominated 
and manipulated social and ethnic cleavages whether real or 
imagined for its own purposes and intolerant nationalism was 
still in eVidenced. 
The advent of cormnunist rule also heralded massive changes in 
social structure. The ravages of the war combined with the 
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communist party1s political commitment to the development of 
hea vy industry, part of its ideological cOIIllnitlnent to the 
industrial work.1ng-class, led to a radical programme of 
industrialisation and urbanisation. These processes changed Polish 
society from being predominantly rural to ur ban in the space of 
two or three decades. Alter 4b years of communist rule the 
proportion of people living in ur ban areas had increased from 
31.8% in 1946 to 61.7% in 1992'/. Diagram 2.5 shows the 
composition of Polish society under communism. A comparison 
with the inter-war periods shows the significant growth of the 
working-class, the peasantry1s loss of dominance and the 
continued underdevelopment of the bourgeoisie: 
Diagram 2.v: Social Structure of Poland in 1970 r --- --- --- ------~-----~~--~~~ 












Source: M. Anazs and W. Wesolowski Przemiany struktury 
spoleczn~j w ZSRR i Polsce Warsaw 1976 p46) 
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It is important to note that this process of industrialisation 
fOllowed a particular regional pattern. Pre-war industrial areas 
were developed further. In addition, the western part of the 
country, iriherited from Germany after W.W .il, became the most 
urbanised. On the other lland central and eastern parts remained 
lar~el.Y ruraL Thus the traditional urban/rural divide survived 
into the communist period. Indeed, as we shall see, urban/rural 
tensions were exacerbated by the communists' coercive attempt 
to collectivise agriculture. 
The experience of the industrial workers during the communist 
period was generally negative. In economic terms the new 
industrial working class was initially satisfied. Most of the milieu 
were ex-peasants with memories of the hardships of life in rural 
Poland. '1'he guarantee of basic wages and amenities represented 
progress. However, as time went on, the expectations of the 
industrial workers increased. Primitive working conditions, strict 
work-place discipline and inadequate housing were increasingly 
seen as a cause for protest. Above all, the inadequacies of the 
command system~J were reflected in the lives of the worker 
through 'labour hoarding', corruption and a general pattern of 
declining standards of living punctuated with economic crises. The 
peasant background of the milieu was apparent in its pOlitical 
activisrn which vaCillated between alienated passivity and 
radicalism 1'.1. 
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or course, passivity was encouraged by the party-state which 
sought to limit the political activism of all sectors of society. 
Workers had no control over their work and had no independent 
trade unions or councils. The consequence of this was that when 
the industrial workforce did become politically active it tended to 
take a radical, populist form. Absenteeism, poor standards of work 
and illegal activities on the black market, characteristic of the 
industrial workers for most of the communist period, at times 
degenerated into the violent protests. In 1968, under the 
manipulation of the regime worker dissatisfaction was channelled 
into populist anti-Semitism and anti-intellectualismll. However the 
anti-statist tendencies of worker protest became increasingly 
organised (e.g. 1956, 1970, 1976 and 1980). This process 
culminated in the founding of the ten million-strong, non-state 
Solidarity Trade Union in 198012.. 
The peasantry also had varying fortunes under communism. The 
traditional urban/rural divide in Poland was deepened by the 
communist party-stateis attitude to the peasants. While the 
wor ker was accorded a special role in Marxist ideology, the 
peasant was expected to disappear with the fulfilment of the 
cOIIlInunist project. Marx had explicitlY condemned the 
backwardness of the peasantry1;5. The party-stateis aim was to 
homogenise society and this entailed addressing the ditferences 
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sUlmnarised by the urban/rural divide. The idiosyncrasies of the 
peasant way of life were to be ended. Moreover, the agricultural 
sector had to support the process of rapid industrialisation 
through increased production. All of' these goals were to be 
achieved by the state's coercive programme of collectivisation. 
However, the strong resistance of the Polish peasant landholders 
ended the collectivisation programme in the 1900s. In economic 
terms the peasantry initially suffered under state discrimination. 
~conomic plans stipulated unrealistically high levels of 
agricultural production while the state channelled what little 
investment there was into the small proportion of collectivised 
farms, '1'he prices the state paid for agricultural produce were set 
way below the costs of production. However, from the 1970s 
onward the general shortage of foodstllirs in the Soviet Union 
improved the position of the peasantry. In the early 1980s 
farmers' income increased and the agricultural sector expanded. 
Some observers have concluded that the peasantry actually 
benefited more than the workers under commurnsmH . 
The improved economic condition of the peasantry was illustrated 
in its increased political influence. The party-state formally 
recognised the right of the private farmer to property and 
discrimination against the peasantry in comparison to the 
workers was ended. However, the political victories of the 
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communist period were victories for the independence of the 
peasantry, for the continued isolation of the peasantry from the 
state and the rest of society. In other countries of Soviet Eastern 
l:!.:urope successful collectivisation forged links With the sector and 
the state and began to span the urban/rural divide w. In Poland 
the peasantry remained fiercely independent and tied to the 
backward economic and social values of the milieuw. The isolation 
of the Polish peasantry from the state and the rest of Polish 
society was apparent in the development of an autonomous, 
'Rural Solidarity' opposition movement and in the deterioration of 
the relationship between the MazoWiecki government and the 
peasantry in 19901'1. 
The middle-stratum of Polish society was hardest hit by 
communist rule. The remnants of the middle-class were seen as 
enemies of the party-state. Its economic bases could pose a threat 
to the exercise of complete power by the communists and were 
treated accordingly. Private enterprises were liquidated or pushed 
underground into the 'second economy' or 'black market'. Over 
time the decline of the command economy meant that the private 
sector, in its restricted otIicial and uno111cial forms, played an 
increasingly important part in the Polish economy. ill the 
conditions of insu111cient production the private sector became 
strong. This was marked in the regime's gradual concession of 
limited freedoms to petty entrepreneurs in the late communist 
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period. Nevertheless these concessions were piecerneal and, until 
the final years of communist rule, private enterprise was severely 
restrictedw . 
The Catholic Church was regarded as a threat to the communist 
state in theoretical and practical terms. Organised religion, 
founded on extra-temporal authority, was a threat to the 
hegemony of the Party and a distraction from the socialist 
struggle. On a practical level the communists were aware of the 
Polish Church's social authority and its links with Polish identity. 
They regarded the Church as a potential source of non-state, 
anti-Russian programmes. Consequently the initial communist 
approach to the Church involved takin.g measures to curtail its 
influence in Polish society in the short-term and the long-term. 
Church possessions were appropriated by the state. Its welfare 
and charity organisation, 'Caritas' was taken over by a 
Party-affiliated group. The state also reserved the right to approve 
ecclesiastical apPointments. Catholic publications were strictly 
censored. Heligious instruction in schools was ended and prison 
chaplains removed from prisons, hospitals and army units. 
The PAX organisation of 'patriotic' priests who were willi:n.g to 
collaborate with the authorities and support its policies was 
forrned to confuse the Catllolic laity. ill 19bB a group of its 
rnernbers, including its leader Boleslaw Piasecki who had links 
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with prewar fascist organisations, were admitted as deputies to 
the Sejln. 
Despite these eflorts the communist state realised that, even if the 
formal pOlitical in!1uence of the Church could be curbed, its social 
authority could not be easily undermined. The movement of'the 
Polish borders to the West after the W.Wll settlements meant 
that, uniquely in J:!jaster J:!jurope, the .Polish nation was to a great 
religiously homogeneous. In 19:.51 CathOliCS represented around 
65% of the population, in 1946, 96.6%18. Moreover, the communist 
persecution of the Church meant that the old Pole=Catholic 
formula could be revived. In the Second Republic this equation 
had been used as a weapon against the country's significant 
ethnic minorities20. Communist repression meant that in a 
religiously homogeneous society the stereotype could be used as a 
weapon against the atheistic, 'Russian' state21. Perversely, 
communist repression tended to strengthen the position of the 
Church in Polish society22. The election of the Pole Karol WoJtyla 
to the papacy in 19'78, a source of great national pride, 
strengthened these processes and f'irmly associated the Catholic 
Church with patriotism. Statistical evidence shows tho strength of 
Catholicism in communist Poland. J:!jven at the Church's lowest 
ebb in the 1960s 2/3 of the population were practicing Catholics. 
In the 1980s 90% of Poles declared themselves believers";:". 
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It is important to stress that the Church's opposition to 
commUlllsm did not automatically mean support for liberal 
democracy. Under communism the public role of the church was 
strengthened and the authority of the hierarchy was also 
increased. Both of these trends ran contrary to processes in the 
democratic West. Church patronage depended on obedience to the 
hierarchy's line~4. Moreover, the adaptation of the Pole=Catholic 
myth continued the intolerant, illiberal aspect of Polish 
Catholicism into the communist period . .J:i~or instance, the 
anti-Semitism of the inter-war version of the Pole=Catholic 
stereotype was reinforced by the appearance of its antithesis, the 
'Zydokomuna' (Jewish-Communist). This form of anti-Semitism 
was evident in the Mazowiecki period where it was used as a 
weapon against the intellectual supporters of the government 
during the Presidential campaign<::b. 
The strength of the Church as a social institution resulted in 
several concessions from the party-state. In 19t56 religious 
education was returned to schools. Jiepression of Catholic 
intellectuals was eased and some (known as the 'Znak' group) 
even allowed limited representation in the Sejm. Some Catholic 
publications resumed activity . .N evertheless the basic antagonism 
of Church and state remained. Occasional compromises between 
the two did not alter this. After the partial rapprochernent of 
19t50 the fundamental coni1ict was illustrated by several incidents 
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of state repression. It'or instance, in the 1906 thaw religious 
education Inade a brief return to the school curriculum. However 
the "Law on the Development of the ~ducation System'i of cJuly 
Ibth 1961 definitively removed religious instruction frOIn schools. 
It stated the need to develop a iiscientific world viewii with the 
school as a "secular institution"2(i. As we shall see the issue of 
religious education was revived as a bone of contention between 
church and state during the Mazowiecki period;;'''. 
Under communism the Catholic Church was a uni1'ying force in 
Polish society and it provided an alternative value system to the 
party-stateis. However, it maintained the Pole=Catholic equation 
which had undermined the development of liberal democracy in 
inter-war Poland. Moreover, it unified Polish society against the 
state. Again this type of mobilisation, though understandable in 
communist Poland, is not conducive to the development of 
democracy. The clash between the Mazowiecki government and 
the Church in 1990 can be understood in this context2e. 
Thus in communist Poland, it was impossible for society to develop 
a democratic culture despite the fact that it experienced, at least 
partially, the processes of urbanisation and industrialisation 
associated with the rise of democracy in the West. These processes 
were party-state led. Its agenda did not include the fostering of 
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modern, dernocratic ideas of citizenship. Social atOlnisation was the 
party-state's objective. Society had to be prevented trom 
organising itself in any way, lest this threatened the monopoly of 
power. This had obvious eflects on Polish society's political culture. 
The party-state attempted to remove the 'bourgeois' 
(authoritarian and hierarchical) norms and values governin.g 
social organisation in the pre-communist period. However, nothing 
was offered in their place apart from passive obedience to the 
dictates of a new type of regime. By the 1960s any support Soviet 
ideology held for Polish society had been lost. Only the 
demobilising fears of economic chaos and Soviet intervention were 
offered by the regime as a justification for its rule. Polish SOCiety 
was expected to drift passively along without subscribing to any 
values except self-preservation. 
The only alternative value-systems were the remnants of the 
inter-war period, such as populism and Catholicism which, as we 
have seen, were not conducive to the development of a unified., 
democratic political culture. lndeed the communist regime 
occasionally mobilised these values to dellect criticism back on 
society. This was the case in 18o(j wIlen the anti-intelligentsia 
and anti-8emitic elernents of Polish populism were successfully 
rnobilised against the dissident intelligentsia~~'. 
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The result was normlessness or anomie. When a society's 'normal' 
ways of being and doing are continually blocked by the political 
order a gap emerges between public and private, state and society 
spheres. This can be manifested in negligence, a bsenteeisrn or 
reluctance to take responsibility in state-owned enterprises in 
contrast witll the diligence, discipline and initiative apparent in 
non-state activities. Most importantly for those interested in 
democratisation and political culture, individuals refuse to express 
their interests and values through state structures00. 
The chances of torrning a democratic political culture in 
communist Poland were lessened by the perSistence of very deep 
social cleavages. As we have seen, the rise of democracy in the 
West is associated with the development of a consensual, tolerant 
relations between different sections of society. Although 
Marxist-Leninist ideology claimed for the Party the role of leading 
the people to a classless society, in practice, communist rule 
deepened existing social cleavages . .fi'or instance, the uneven 
spatial distribution of urban and industrial development 
maintained the traditional urban/rural divide. Moreover, the 
Warsaw government's coercive attempts to collectivise agriculture 
alienated the peasantry from the urban-based social groups. The 
ease with which the Party-state could mobilise one section of 
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Polish society against another in times of unrest suggested the 
depth of the divisiond;l. 
The formation of a unified political culture was further haInpered 
by the decline of social Inobility during the communist period. 
Originally the processes of Inodernisation included the promotion 
of workers or peasants to higher status roles in the Party-state 
system as part of the 'new intelligentsia'. However by the 1960s 
and 1970s these channels of social mo bility began to close. The 
communist elite strove to protect its status and guarantee its 
privileges for its children, usually through domination of the 
educational system. The 'best and brightest' of the working class 
and peasantry found their ambitions frustrated and inter-class 
ditIerentials and resentments intensified. In short, society 




Civil society, understood by this thesis to include the development 
of disparate but consensual society based organisations outwith 
state control, did not f'orlnally exist in cOIillnunist Poland. The 
Party and the forcG of cOlmnunist ideology, rather than the 
structures of' civil society sought to flll the gap between the 
individual and the state;)?'. 
If we recall the three spheres of Western civil society introduced 
previously (state, society and econorn:i5;5), the difference is clear. 
The state1s legal and constitutional bodies, vital in guaranteei.n.g 
the rights of individuals were remodelled along authoritarian 
Soviet lines. lntermediate organisations, central to the functioning 
of the Icommunitarian l aspect of civil society in the West were 
repressed. Political parties, trade unions, the army, local 
aillninistrations, the judiciary, industrial enterprises, co-operative 
groups and social organisations were subject to intense scrutiny 
by the state1s greatly expanded social apparatus. All had to either 
allow thelnselves to be controlled by the Party-state or face the 
prospect of repression. 
In the econOInic sphere private property, one of the bases of 
societal autonomy and thus of civil society, was prohibited for 
most of the cOIillnunist period:)4. 
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Once again one is entitled to ask what role the intelligentsia 
played in the radical social transf'orlnations of' the communist 
period. As the representatives ot Modernity the industrialisation 
and urbanisation of' Poland were welcOIned by the milieu. 
However as advocates ot Western ideals of modern citizenship it 
would be expected to struggle against the party-state1s destruction 
of civil society. The following section will contend that the ethos 
of the milieu with its Itotalisticl and letatisV approach to political 
activity played a part in the construction of communist rule. 
J:!}ventually state repression disillusioned a significant section of 
the intelligentsia. Dissidents began the construction of an 
anti-communist movement based on the Ireconstruction of civil 
societyl. This represented a unique departure for the milieu. Social 
change was to be attempted through society itself. Non-state 
initiati yes were to be fostered, most notably through the 
80lidarity movement. However the overriding purpose of the 
project was opposition to the state. Civil society, understood as a 
pluralist, mediating realm between state and society did not exist. 
Instead the project represented the intelllgentsials atternpt to 
wrest control of society trOIn the state. The ethos of' the 
institutions of Icivil societyl in late communist Poland, including 
Solidarity, was delineated by the dissident intelligentsia. As such 
the project Inaintained the milieu1s Itotalist l perspective and desire 
f'or power. '1'11e project Inay have been described as lantipoliticall 
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by dissident intellectuals but the organisation of non-state 
initiatives under cOImnunism oflered a political challenge to the 
regiIne. The intelligentsia's tendency to see state/society relations 
as antagonistic was thus maintained and this had serious 
consequences for the Mazowiecki govermnent. 
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(ii) The Intelligentsia under COInmunisrn 
The experiences of' tile intelligentsia under comrnunisrn can be 
divided into two parts: 1940-08 and 190()-()9. In the context of the 
thesis, 1868 can be seen as a watershed. Up until then the bulk of' 
the intelligentsia seemed convinced that its 'mission' for the 
modernisation and dernocratisation of Poland could be carried out 
through the party-state, to which the majority of its members had 
been subordinated. However the violent conflict between the state 
authorities and protesting students and lecturers in 1968 proved 
to be a turni:o.g point. It was a clear sign of the estrangement of a 
signitlcant section of the intelligentsia from the regime. As such it 
can be regarded as a founding moment for the 'anti-communist 
'civil society' projecto5. 
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The Intelligentsia in the Early Communist Period (1945-1968). 
As the communists set about constructing the model of a 
dominant party-state one might have expected the intelligentsia to 
resist the process. After all, the milieu traditionally saw itself as 
Polish societyls leading exponent of democratic values. However, 
the involvement of the Polish intelligentsia with communism was 
such that in 1990, just as the intellectual luminaries of the 
Solidarity movement were at the zenith of their social popularity, 
the intelligentsia as a social category was tainted in the eyes of 
other groups by its association with the old regime~.,tl. Moreover, 
many of those same luminaries, now the Government IS most 
prominent members and supporters, such as Bronislaw Geremek, 
Adam Michnik. and Jacek Kuron (the ILay Left') had at one time 
been personally linked with communism~w. As we shall see, in 
transition times the governmentls opponents exploited this aspect 
of new elite's biographies to claim that communists still exerted 
influence in state institutions;.,e. This section will contend that the 
intelligentsia's association with communism in the early 
communist period was the result of signi11cant changes in its 
composition and function. However, it will argue that the milieu's 
traditional desire to lead Polish society through the instrument of 
the state was also important. 
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The intelligentsia experienced signi11cant changes in composition 
and fUllction under communism. 1t had been severely depleted 
during W.W.il and the communist elite needed a class of managers 
and experts to stafl the expanding bureaucracy and oversee the 
planned industrialisation of the country. The state administration 
provided at least 100,000 new positions for educated people. 1t 
sought to replenish the educated ranks of the nation by 
expanding educational opportunities considerably. 'l'he amount of 
time required for wirming degrees was reduced, flelds of expertise 
for degrees were narrowed, evening schools for working people 
were opened and the number of technical colleges increased. In 
194b-49 bb,980 people enrolled in higher education. Five years 
later there were 125,09638. In comparison the number of 
graduates from the inter-war period was around 85,000-1°. 
~mphasis was placed on practical and technical subjects rather 
than the traditional humanities associated with the education of 
the traditional Polish intelligentsia .. Since the early 19bOs between 
1/3 and 2/5 of students in higher education were in technical 
studies41 . The participation of youths from working-class or 
peasant origins was encouraged. Between 184b and 1808, 01' the 
000,000 graduates produced by the higher education system, b6% 
were ot worker or peasant origin, compared to 1b% in the 18:.50s 
and 50% in 1984 4<~. 
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The purpose of these changes was twofold: to stall' the enlarged 
corrununist }larty-state and economy with bureaucrats, managers 
and technical professionals and to create a Inew intelligentsia' 
which was ideologically and professionally tied to the corrununist 
regiIne. This new milieu would help to legitiInise corrununist rule 
in the eyes of society. The influx of graduates with a technical 
education, from non-intelligentsia social backgrounds, owing their 
allegiance to the Party would undermine the ethos of the 
traditional milieu'l:3. As we have seen, the old intelligentsia's 
emphasis on the humanities encouraged the feeling of obligation 
to serve society as a whole. This was obviously contrary to the 
corrununists' desire to be the sole representative of society. rl'he 
rise of a new, technical stratum corrunitted to its own, narrow 
fields of expertise would diminish the intelligentsia's system-wide 
perspective and decrease its threat to the party-state'l4. 
At this point it is important to note that, in comparison to other 
~ast-Central ~uropean countries experiencing corrununist 
take-overs at the time, Poland's system of higher education 
mounted strong resistance to the regimeis directives. Chapter 2 
noted that underground universities had been a focus of patriotic 
resistance to the N azis4tl. In the iInmedia.te :post-war period the 
corrununists also encountered opposition from the Uhiversity. 
There was d.iillculty recruiting fiercely mdependent professors 
who had rallied to the defence of the nation during the war to 
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the cormnunist cause4 ,;. Initially at least, the cormnunist desire to 
alter the social composition of students in higher education was 
also successfully countered. Table 2.5 shows that, although the 
proportion of students of \.ivor ker and peasant origins increased 
between the mid-1900s and late 1940s, representatives of the 
intelligentSia milieu rernained the dominant social category in 
Polish universities. 
Table 2.6: Social Origin of' Freshmen in Polish Universities 
-
~-~ - --- - ~ - - - ---- ~ ~ - --~ ---_.- - ~ 
Social Origin 1935/36 (in %) 1947/48 (in %) 
Workers 9.9 22 
Peasants 11.7 ]9.7 
Jntelligentsia 38.2 45.6 
Free Professions, Craftsmen, 40.2 12.7 
Entrepreneurs 
source: '8klad spoleczny student ow I roku szkol wyzszych wig 
wydzialow w porownaniu ze stanem przewojennym 1935/6' 
Archiwum Akt Nowych KC PZPR MO/2879 cited in Donnelly p387 
The traditional weakness of Marxisrn in Polish intelligentsia 
circles, the stratwn's general antipathy towards Russia and the 
old cormnitrnent to independent thinking all contributed to the 
determination of acadernia to resist cornmunist directives. The 
strength of this ethos was such that students frorn 
non-intelligentsia backg~rounds were often assiInilated4'i. Although 
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in the long term the decrees of the regime took eHect, particularly 
through the force of the Stalinist state, the University remained a 
base for the independent-minded intelligentsia. The protests made 
by the Warsaw University lecturers Kuron and Modzelewski in 
19654d and the student dmnonstrations of 19684~J should be seen in 
this context. 
Nevertheless radical changes in the size and function of the 
milieu took place under communism. By 196'(' 40% of those 
students attending full time higher education were of peasant of 
manual worker social origins°o. The party-state adopted a carrot 
and stick approach to the intelligentsia: loyalty was rewarded 
with increased professional opportunities while the traditional 
intelligentsia's tendency to produce critique's of state power was 
repressed. In a newspaper article from 1990 entitled the 
Warsaw-based intellectual Andrzej Grzegorczyk offered an 
apologia for the intelligentsia's involvement in the construction of 
the party-state in terms of the professional opportunities it 
offeredb1 • 
Thus, in a manner rmniniscent of the inter-war period., it becarne 
necessary to distinguish between a new, technical class, 
ideologically and professionally cOImnitted to the state and those 
arnongst the educated who rnaintained the traditional 
intelligentsia's faculty for critical thinking. The heirs of the 
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traditional Polish intelligentsia were found in professions 
associated with the hwnanities. The new, 'technical' intelligentsia, 
increasingly subdivided accordin.g to area of expertise, had an 
interest in maintainin.g the stability of the bureaucracy which 
employed them. Thus, although at times it may have felt uneasy 
about the nature of cormnunist rule, it was tied to the party-state. 
On the other hand the 'creative' intelligentsia (writers, thinkers, 
academics etc.), the traditional core of the intelligentsia, required 
autonomy from the state to perform its function of serving 
society by creating values, generating ideas and forming a critique 
of the present in order to produce a vision of the future. 
The boundary between these two types of intelligentsia was hazy 
in communist Poland. It did not run strictly accordin.g to party 
membership or profession. H.epresentatives of what we could term 
the 'real' intelligentsia were found in a variety of positions with a 
wide range of professional and ideological backgrounds. 1t'or 
instance, members of the Catholic intelligentsia (e.g. Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki and Stanislaw Stomma), particularly after the 
thawing of 8talinism, followed an avowedly independent line in 
their publications, in Ineetings of Catholic lntellectual Clubs and 
in the activities of the 'L;nak' group in the 8ejm. They believed 
tllat participation in state institutions, even if one rejected tlleir 
fundarnental principles, was the best way of assuring progressive 
change:'c~. On the fringes of the communist cultural and 
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educational establishment lert-wi.ng intellectuals such as Bronislaw 
Gerernek and cJacek Kuron rnaintained tlle 'tree-thin.k.ing', critical 
outlook 01' the traditional rnilieu. 
Despite this distinction, both the technical and creative strands 01' 
tlle milieu were involved in tlle construction 01' the cornmunist 
system after W W il. W hUe tlle new, technical intelligentsia's 
in vol vement can be explained by its ideological and professional 
commitment to the party-state, the 'critical' or 'real' 
intelligentsia's association with communism is more problematic. 
There were several reasons for the involvement of the heirs of 
the traditional Polish intelligentsia in the consolidation of 
communist rule. It'irstly, it is important to note the weakened 
condition of the 'real' intelligentsia in the early communist period. 
As we have seen, the ranks of the old intelligentsia stratUlIl had 
been depleted during W W 11. The l::ltalinist campaign of repression, 
coercion and indoctrination aimed at the remnants of this 
stratUlIl weakened its ability to produce an effective critique of 
the party-state even more. 
However, iInportantly tor this thesis, the continued influence of 
the traditional attributes 01' the milieu - the 1'eeli.ng 01' inhabiti.ng 
a superior sphere in society, the resultant sense of obligation to 
use tllis position 1'or the betterment of that SOCiety, and the 
conviction that tlle best way of acllieving this was through the 
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instrUlllent of the state - was also apparent in the 'real' 
intelligentsia's initial acceptance of cornrnunist rule. CorIUnunism 
was itself an intellectual constructb :S• As such it carried many of 
the traditional attributes of the intelligentsia, albeit in extreme 
form. l.n theory the communist revolution relied heavily on the 
political intervention of the intelligentsia. According to 
MarXist-Leninist theory, society was confused by its fragmented., 
limited experience but the intellectual had the sound., total' 
knowledge of historical processes. Thus, under communism, the 
revolutionary intellectual was given the political power necessary 
to lead the unenlightened masses to the utopian future of 
rational, communism. This suited the social superiority and sense 
of mission associated with the traditional milieuM . The unity of 
cultural, spiritual leadership and political power, a long-held desire 
of the POlish intelligentsia, was satisfied., in theory at least, by 
communism btl. 
W hen .Polish intellectuals surveyed the deCline of the Second 
Republic (a process they felt at least partiallY responsible for) and 
the war-ravaged condition of Poland., its desire to playa radical, 
leading role in the reconstruction of the country is 
understandable'''' . 
Moreover, the patriotisln of the milieu was attracted by the 
cOImnunist project. GOImnunist ideologues such as Jakob Berlnan 
were careful to present the communist-led regeneration of Poland 
as a patriotic lnission.Unlike the case of the partitioning powers 
of the 19th century or the Nazi occupiers, the communist regime 
could, at least fOrInally, be presented as Polish. 'l'he task of 
building the cOImnunist systern could thus be presented as a 
service to the nation In a speech in 194'7 Herman assigned this 
task to the inteUigentsiab'r'. Thus a significant part of the post-war 
intelligentsia which still subscribed to the free-thinking, critical 
outlook of the milieu was attracted by the patriotic, 
revolutionary, leading role apparently accorded to it by 
communismt>tJ. 
The intelligentsia was not blind to the illiberal aspects of 
communist rule, particularly in its Stalinist form. However the 
injustices suffered by Polish society could be justified by reference 
to the teleological aspect of communist ideology and the 
intelligentsia ethos. The present may be bad, but todayls suffering 
will guarantee a better future. In his review of the intelligentsials 
association with communism Grzegorczyk talks of I'The conviction 
that compulsion can be turned to the good and therefore outlive 
the costs of force llhc,'. This outlook is reminiscent of the approach of 
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the 'intelligentsia in power l to the austerities caused by the 
Balcerowicz Plan in 1990iil' . 
As a result, tIle Polish intelligentsia Inaintained its preoccupation 
with state power even as that state was build.i.ng its dOIninance 
over society. As the conditions for the development of a 
democratic, civil society were removed, the intelligentsia, regarded 
as vital in the creation of this realm (through mobilising and 
integrating society and forming an autonomous critique of the 
state) was subsumed into the dominant culture of the party-state. 
The events of 1806 support this assertion. By the mid-1900s all 
sectors of Polish society were aware of the limitations placed on 
them by the party-state in its Stalinist form. The workers and 
peasants were increasingly burdened by the structural 
inadequacies of the command economy and the project of 
collectivisation. The creative intelligentsia was itself increasingly 
frustrated by 8talinist censorship. The autonomy needed to 
perform its functions was denied under Stalinism. Writers and 
artists who had accommodated to the communist system were 
nevertheless aware that being forced to follow the state line 
endangered their status as cultural and spiritual leaders of the 
nation(-; I . 
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oocietal frustrations with the otalinist state culminated in the 
rebellion of l800. The workers' riot in Poznan sparked the 
mushroo:rni.n.g of workersi councils all over Poland. Peasants 
disbanded collectiVised farrns. lntellectuals formed discussion clubs 
throughout the country and Hlled the media with new, diverse 
forms of criticism. However, the intelli.gentsia, the self-styled 
leaders of Polish SOCiety, did not move to integrate these protests 
into a unified articulation of the values of Polish society. ~ach 
social group, incluciin.g the intelligentsia, acted independently of 
the others°<:;. The intelligentsia's main concern remained its 
relationship with the party-state and how this could be revised. 
The demands of other social groups were ignored or even opposed 
as retrograde, populist or Catholic-obscurantist. As with the 
communists, the inteilectuals continued to see Polish society as a 
dangerous void; as nothing without their guidance();5 . 
.B'or instance, the revisionist intelligentsia opposed Gomulkais 
acceptance of the Catholic Church's demand for the return of 
religious education to schools in the wake of 1956t:51. This conflict 
was unresolved and religious education proved to be a Iwatershed' 
issue in the deterioration of the relationship between the Church 
and the iintelligentsia in power1b". Adam Michnik describes the 
intelligentsiais continued fascination with state institutions 
during this period: "ill analysing 1800 one sees that we did not 
adequately uncover the mechanism of otalinist power, and 
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publicise wllat was disclosed in police activities, public trials, 
injustice, the collectivisation of' agriculture, the dictatorship of' the 
Party over society ... we blalned the Inen when we should have 
blamed the institutionll<Ju. 
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The Intelligentsia Under Late Communism 0968-89) 
The period trom the mid-1800s to the collapse ot: communist rule 
in 19($9 represents a unique chapter in Polish history. These years 
witnessed the coalescence ot: broad sections ot: POlish society under 
the banner of ant i-communism. The process culminated in the 
t:ounding and legalisation in 18($0 ot: 'Bolidarity' Trade Union as a 
non-state, cross-class movement. Although outlawed at the end of 
1981, Bolidarity continued to exist as an underground group and 
as a potent symbol of anti-communism in Poland and ~ast-Central 
~urope. Its success as the t:igurehead ot: non-communist 
organisations was a contributory factor to the collapse of the 
regimes across the region. Bolidarity's importance is demonstrated 
by its dominance of the politics of the early transition period and 
its continued relevance in Poland today. 
The late communist period also represented an unprecedented 
period in the history of the Polish intelligentsia. 'l'he' Bolidarity 
experience' represented a turning-point in its relations with the 
rest ot: Polish society. The attention ot: the milieu turned from the 
project of state reform to building an alliance with workers, 
peasants and the Catholic Church. ill 18'10 a group of intellectuals 
founded the Committee in Defence of Workers (KORvi ). This move 
was the most obvious sign of the intelligentsia's attempt to bridge 
the traditional gap between itself and the rest of Polish society 6iJ. 
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The core of this group, drawn from the traditional, creative 
intelligentsia milieu, was deterrnined to help workers and their 
families persecuted by the authorities in the 18'76 strikes. 
According to a founder and historian of KOB. its antecedents could 
be found in largely Warsaw-based, Catholic, independent and 
'revisionist ' intellectual clubs(i:'. In the years that followed KOR 
expanded its rnernbership and activities in an attempt to support 
Polish society as a whole. Unprecedented alliances were built 
between the secular and independent, Catholic intelligentsia and 
consequently between the anti-communist movement and the 
Church'/<). This alliance between the intelligentsia, the workers and 
the Catholic Church is credited with the rise of 'Solidarity' as an 
organised, mass movement opposing the communist party-state'il. 
There is still much debate over the link between the activities of 
anti-communist intellectuals and the rise of the independent 
Trade Union 'Solidarity' in 1880 . .B'or many of the intellectuals 
involved the link was direct and causal. According to them 
intellectuals had acted in a way reminiscent of Marxist theory: 
they had 'raised the consciousness I of protesting workers, giving 
them the direction and articulation necessary to make a 
significant political iInpact'r'''''. On the other hand, some observers 
contend that the industrial workers were already politicised in 
1970 and the input of intellectuals was peripheral?;:'. This debate 
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over the origins and orientation of Solidarity became salient in 
the Inovernent's identity crisis in 1990'r4. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this section, it is important to 
note that intellectuals and tile intelligentsia, whether as leaders 
or advisers to labour leaders were influential in the formation 
and development of'the '80lidarity' movement. This was 
particularly the case after Martial Law when the labour side of 
the organisation was subjected to more severe repression than the 
movements intelligentsia-based elements'lb. What cannot be denied 
is that the late communist period witnessed a unique change in 
focus for the Polish intelligentsia. Its vision of a future Poland 
ruled according to rational, democratic principles was to be 
brought closer not through the instrUlllent of the state but 
through the mobilisation of society'lO. 
Anti-communist intellectuals and Western observers hailed this 
unique period in Polish society as the foundation of a democratic 
'civil society"r'I. However, this section will contend that, despite this 
change of focus trom state to society, the ethos of the traditional 
Polish intelligentsia was evident in the late communist period. The 
Illilieu continued to see the categories of' 'state' and 'society' as 
single, competing entities. Civil society, understood as a realm 
where a plurality of' interests could be articulated to a responsive 
state did not exist. The intelligentsia's commitment to Polish 
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society was the result of its awareness that it could lead a broad, 
anti-state front constructed in society. Thus society was still not 
understood as a source of various competing but equally valid 
interests, as in the West, but as a single, unified body which could 
be defined by the intelligentsia only with reference to 
anti-communism. 
There was no reconciliation of lon.g-term state/society and 
inter-societal cleavages into a unified, democratic pOlitical culture. 
The heated de bates, political fragmentation and the fall of the 
'intelligentsia in power' in the Mazowiecki period were a direct 
result of the unravelling of the intelligentsia's 'mythic' civil 
society and the birth pan.gs of a 'real' civil society. The image of 
unity between intelligentsia, worker and Church-based elements 
of the opposition, displayed in the late communist period, masked 
competing visions of Poland's future. As we have seen, these social 
groups had always been involved in internal and external 
rivalries which had continued despite the facade of harmony 
constructed from 19'76 onward. The Mazowiecki government's 
transition programme triggered the disclosure of these conflicting 
agendas. The failure of the 'government of the intelligentsia' to 
cope with these processes explains its downf'all. After the 
resignation of the Mazowiecki administration Adam Michnik 
mourned what he regarded as the democratisation process' best 
chance. tlavin.g identified the unity between worker - claimant, 
245 
Catholic - traditional and intelligentsia - democratic strands of 
Polish pOlitical life as the reason for Solidarity1s success and the 
best means for ensurin.g a successfUl transition, he notes the 
demise of the alliance in post-communist Poland'i/j. 
The section will first explain the causes of the intelligentsia1s shift 
from the state to society. The party-stateis alienation of broad 
sections of Polish society is regarded as the prime reason, rather 
than a idamascenei conversion of the intelligentsia to the merits 
of the worker, Church or peasant agendas. It will explain that the 
intelligentsia decided that the state was unreformable, and that 
the opportunity was there to build alliances within society. 
However, these alliance were not built on the reconciliation of 
Ibread and butter l disputes between intellectuals, workers and 
Catholics. They were built to offer an intellectual challenge to the 
state. By fosterin.g non-state organisations, antithetical to a 
communist party-state, the opposition intelligentsia showed that 
its cultural power could challenge the political power of the state. 
The anti-communist intelligentsia thus moved from mainly leftist 
opposition to a more centrist road and attempted to mould the 
opposition to suit its agenda. 
We have already noted the declining relationship between the 
party-state and broad sections of Polish society. In the 191(Os 
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dissatisfaction and frustration turned to alienation. The Gierek 
regime1s continued policy 01' under-pricing agricultural products 
and setting unrealistic production targets confirmed the 
peasantry1s estrangernent'h'. The threat of food shortages 
illustrated the potential anti-systemic, political strength of the 
peasantry. 
Helations between the Catholic Church and the party-state 
followed a similar pattern. As we have seen, after the thaw of 
19b6 the party-state began to remove several of the concessions 
granted to the Church. The election and visit of Pope John Paul il 
in the late 19'(Os confirmed Catholicism1s strength in Polish 
society and its association with Polish patriotism and 
anti-communism. The Pope1s visit proceeded without any 
contribution from the party-state and thus provided a practical 
example of the potential 01' non-state organisation. 
The decline of the command economy under Gierek guaranteed 
the alienation of the industrial workers from the regime. The 
workers l protests in 1900 did little to alter their lack of power in 
the work-place, where the Party managers exercised controlIH). The 
workers l fortunes thus remained dependent on the performance 
of the state economy which could be characterised by gradual 
decline, punctuated by periods of crises. ill the 19'70s Gierek1s 
programme 01' economic modernisation, t'inanced by Western 
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credits, proved disastrous. lVlassive loans accumulated while the 
corrunand economy soaked up fInances into politically motivated, 
wasteful schemes or corrupt enterpriseslJ1 • 
'I'he resulting economic crises were marked with radical protests 
by the industrial working class. In l~,(O, 1~,(6 and 1~80 food price 
rises prompted organised demonstrations and strikes which 
threatened to paralyse the economy and prompt country-wide 
chaos. From 19'('0 onward these involved demands for 
independent trade union representation - a sign that workers 
were looking beyond the narrow economic concerns of wage and 
price levels to systemic mattersd2. These were met with inunediate 
concessions by the state in the form of leadership changes or the 
rescinding of price increases. The industrial working class had 
proven to itself and to the intelligentsia its potential as an 
anti-state forced". This realisation was fundamental to the 
founding of oolidarity. Thus, during the 19rrOs the activities of the 
party-state alienated major sections of Polish society tl-1. The 
awareness of the potential for the development of a broad 
anti-corrununist front in SOCiety, spurred the intelligentsia1s 
involvenlent in the alliance-building of the period. 
In the late corrununist period the Polish intelligentsia was itselJ 
becoming alienated trom the party-state. This process can be 
applied to both the new Iprofessional l or Itechnical l category and 
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the traditional Icreativel intelligentsia. On the one hand, the 
professionals, tied ideologically and professionally to the state, 
were frustrated by declining opportunities for career 
advancement and the interference of the Party in economic 
rnatters as the command system deteriorated. Representatives of 
the intelligentsia had penetrated the highest levels of the 
bureaucracy and become part of the ruling classtltl . 
However, by the 19r70s the ruling class had constructed the 
conditions for the reproduction of its status. The ailocation of 
school places and jobs were controlled by the ruling elite for its 
own benefit. Observers talked of the appearance of a Inew classl, a 
IRed bourgeoisiel, a Ipriviligentsial8d. This, in combination with the 
general decline of the economy led to decreased social mo bilitT'( 
and the build up of frustration amongst educated Poles. The Inewl 
intelligentsials commitment to the Party-state relied heavily on 
the system1s ability to provide a relatively rewarding career 
rather than sincere subscription to communist ideologyB8. When 
this was lost the commitment of this category to the regime 
decreased. 
More importantly for this thesis, during the 18,(Os any links 
between the old, Icreativel intelligentsia and the state were finally 
severed. The alienation was the result of awareness that Poland 
was heading in the wrong political and economic direction and 
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that the intelligentsia, the traditional guide and leader of Polish 
society, was powerless to halt these processes. The programme of 
de-ideologisation mounted by Gomulka alter 18b6 obViously 
threatened the status of the traditional intelligentsia whose basic 
function was to stimulate and explain social progress through 
reference to value-systerns and ideas. The call to get rich in the 
short-term and ignore the pressing, national questions posed by 
the political and economic injustices of 'People's Poland' was 
antithetical to the democratic and patriotic aspects of the ethos of 
the traditional Polish intelligentsiabY• 
Poland had always had a revolutionary 'destiny' or 'mission': 
defender of the 'Western tradition', agent of 'civilisation', martyr 
to aggressive neighbouring countries, model 'People's Republic' etc .. 
'l'he absence of such a destiny in 1960s Poland prompted 
speculation on the future development of Polish society, a task 
traditionallY assigned to the intelligentsia8u. Continued state 
censorship meant that the Polish intelligentsia was unable to 
explore these issues and perform this role as critics of the present 
and heralds of the future just when their country needed it most. 
In March 1804 the so-called 'Letter of 04', signed by a group of 
intellectuals and writers protested over the cultural e1fect of 
censorship. Those Party members who had signed were expelled 
from the PZPR. At the end ot 180b two junior lecturers at 
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Warsaw University, Jacek .Kuron and .Karol Modzelewski, were 
imprisoned after their neo-Marxist critique of Polish Communism 
was published. Their identi11cation 01' a basic clash between the 
workin.g-class and the state bureaucracy was an explicit signal of 
the intelligentsia's growin.g alienation from the Party-state. 
The party-state's alternative to de-ideologisation was even worse. 
A group of veterans from the Party's war-time military 
organisations, led by Mieczyslaw Moczar (Minister for the 
Interior from 1964) and known as the 'Partisans', condemned 
Gomulka1s attempt to 'depoliticise l Poland for encouragin.g apathy 
and passivity in Polish society. The 'Partisans' sought to revive 
Poland1s romantiC, military tradition as a means of reinvigoratin.g 
society1s commitment to the party-state and enhancin.g their own 
pOSitions within it~l. 
'1'0 this end it drew on the narrow, defensivebackward-lookin.g 
version of Polish nationalism which we have aJready identified as 
an enemy of the progressive intelligentsia. The Partisans 
highlighted the heroic part played by the Polish communist 
resistance durin.g W W il. Its exploits were contrasted with the 
attitudes 01' the revisionist intelligentsia which was condemned as 
pro-Western, Jewish and unpatriotic. The Partisan's resurrection 
01' Poland1s insurrectionary past emphasised to the intelligentsia 
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how far removed their vision of Poland frorn the reality of the 
'People's Poland'. As such it triggered the intelligentsia's latent 
patriotism. 'The classical, Romantic tradition within the 
intelligentsia and Polish society as a whole included anti-Russian 
elements. By attempting to use nationalism to mobilise society 
behind the party-state, the Partisans risked reterring to it in 
People's Poland the Partisans drew attention to Soviet dornination 
over the life of the nation and risked the revival of anti-J:{ussian 
sentiment amongst that milieu which traditionally led the 
struggle against Russian aggression"". 
The most 0 bvious manifestation of the breakdown in relations 
between the communist state and the reformist Polish 
intelligentsia was the banning of Adam Mickiewicz's political and 
patriotic play "Dziady" in 1968. This led to student demonstrations 
centred around Warsaw University which were brutally put 
down by the police. Some workers were mobilised against the 
students and intellectuals by the Partisan's populist, antbSemitic 
portrayal of the demonstrations. Lecturers and inteliectuals who 
had supported the student demonstrations were arrested or 
expelled from the University and/or the Party. Universities and 
institutions of higher education throughout the country staged 
demonstrations in sympathy. In the opinion ot many observers 
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and participants these events represented a turning-point in the 
relationship between the intelligentsia and the cormnunist stateu:< 
:B'inally, intellectual currents on the international scene during 
the 1860s in11uenced the attitude of the Polish intelligentsia. As 
we have seen throughout the 1860s intellectuals in the West 
questioned their functions. The increasing professional 
specialisation of' the idiom and its subordination to the state, 
industry or the university was criticised.'J4. Intellectuals changed 
their f'ocus to grass-roots political activities through the f'ostering 
of Inew social movements l • These e1forts were rellected in the 
leventsl of' May 196d when student unrest escalated into a general 
strike. Thus in the West, the source of the modern notion of the 
intellectual, the model was being redefined to function in a closer 
ailiance with the masses. This occurred just as the Polish 
intelligentsia was turning its attention f'rom state to society. 
1t'rench inteilectuals saw a revolutionary lin.k. between these 
processesS!t'. There was likewise support of events in France 
amongst the Polish intelligentsia. W hen students and academics 
organised themselves in Warsaw in 1968 they did so in solidarity 
with their French counterparts"r-,. 
1t'or all these reasons, sections of the 'creative' intelligentsia 
previously content to pursue their Imission l of leading SOCietal 
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progress in Poland through the party-state as either mainly 
communist 'revisionists' (e.g. Kolakowski. Michnik and Kuron) or 
Catholic 'neo-positivists' (such as Mazowiecki and Stomma) turned 
to society. The project presented to society was labelled 'the 
reconstruction of civil society'~.l'i. Within KOR Michnik and Kuron 
developed a program where organising assistance for persecuted 
sections of society could be extended into a network of society 
based organisations determined to guarantee civil rights. The 
formation of non-state associations, underground publishing and 
education (notably the revival of the war-time 'Flying 
University') etc. would create 'spaces' where individual and group 
rights could be defended. The ultimate goal was the 
democratisation of .Poland but in the mean-time society had to 
concentrate on carving out pockets of autonomy from the stateYtl . 
In the introduction to the thesis we noted how broadly similar 
projects emerged amongst opposition groups throughout 
communist East-Central Europe~~Y. Each attempted to develop a 
realm where people could pursue their interests without 
interference from the .Party-state. This realm, variously described 
as the 'second society', the 'parallel pOlis I and so on could be based 
on private economic activity (in the 'second economy' or black 
market), opposition pOlitical activity in the underground or 
participation in non-political associations. It thus approximated 
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what this thesis terms 'civil society': the mediatory realm between 
rulers and ruled. 
Vaclav Havel, Gyorgy Konrad and Janos Kis formulated 
society-based programmes and presented them as 'antipolitical'. 
Signatories of' Czechoslovakia's Charter '('7 declared their 
intention lito give up 'politics 'll and Konrad stated "The most 
eflective way to in11uence policy is by changing a society's 
customary thinldng patterns and tacit compactsll10U• This broad 
similarity can be explained by several factors. Communist rule in 
Poland., Hungary and Czechoslovakia encouraged political 
passivity. At best membership of the Communist Party offered the 
chance of professional advancement. Independent political 
representation was forbidden. 'l'his reduced the importance of the 
public sphere for ail but a minority of Party leaders and 
apparatchikS. The existence on the one hand of an impervious 
public sphere and a largely normless private sphere in these 
cOillltries (to different degrees) was conducive to the development 
of strategies aimed at the regeneration of society. As a reaction to 
the party-state's obsession with 'total' political power the 
opposition rejected the quest for formal political power and 
concentrated on society. In this sense, the programme f'or the 
regeneration of civil society in ~ast-Uentral ~urope was 
anti-pOlitical. 
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However, the strategy was two-pron.ged1'i1 . It was both a reaction 
to communist authoritarianism and a manifestation of the 
political inlluence of intellectuals in the opposition. We have 
established the characteristics of intellectuals l involvement in 
politicslU~. They demur at the factionalism and narrowness of 
everyday politics and instead refer to universal truths and moral 
absolutes. In the West in the 1960s and 19'70s this approach was 
manifested in the growth of cross-class Inew social movements l 
based on issues such as environmentalism and feminism which 
have universal applications. 
In ~ast-Central ~urope intellectuals theorised a bout the 
development of similar organisations based on support for basic 
human rights and freedoms. The mixing of the ethical and the 
political marked out the opposition movements of communist 
East-Central Europe as the constructs of political intellectualsw;s. 
The political component of this approach was different from 
Western social movements in its aims. Attempting to foster 
non-state organisations in a communist system explicitly 
challen.ged the foundations of the state itself. While in the West 
social movements sought to increase the power of social categories 
within the state, in ~ast-Central ~urope hoped to oUer a lon.g 
term critique of state power. This was in keeping with the etatism 
of the intellectual idiom in the ~ast-Central ~uropean case. 
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As we shall see, the consequences of this 'antipolitical' philosophy 
for the politics of the transition was ambiguous. On the one hand 
it contributed to the collapse of the communist system and 
spurred the development of institutional change. However, it is 
fair to say that the first aim of the strategy, to address the 
'normlessness' of these communist societies and inculcate 
democratic values was not signi11cantly altered by the 
'antipolitical' strategy. Democratic political cultures can only 
develop beyond a rudimentary stage through time and in the 
presence of democratic state institutions. A healthy civil society is 
independent of the state but has strong links with it. 'l'he essence 
of the 'civil society project' was its determination to exist in 
isolation from the communist state. Beyond anti-communism and 
a vague commitment to 'democracy' and human rights this 'civil 
society project' could not develop a consensual model of 
state/society relations for the post-communist period. 
Bast-Central Buropean sociologists such as Hankiss noted the 
absence of unified cultures for the post-communist periodlO-1. 
What's more, the political success of the anti-communist 
movements instantly removed a vital factor in the development 
of such a paradigm: the autonomous intellectual. 'l'his had 
negative consequences for the early transition period where 
societal frustrations were articulated in an incoherent, populist 
Way. 
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As we have noted, the Polish case for the 'antipolitical 
reconstruction of civil society' was envied throughout 
~ast-Central ~urope for its potential to move out from purely 
intellectual circles and involve large sections of society in the 
project 1<)'< The most obvious manifestation of the project was the 
Solidarity movement. lt maybe imagined that in Poland there 
would be a greater chance of developing a genuinely unified 
political culture that spanned all sections of society and would be 
robust enough to survive the early transition period. However, as 
we shall see, Solidarity experienced the same damaging fissures as 
opposition movements throughout the region. Indeed the 
disintegration of anti-communist unity was perhaps made more 
acrimonious in Poland by the variety of unresolved dtlIerences in 
its broad social base. 
Beyond basic commitment to anti-communism and civil rights, 
there were many differences within the opposition intelligentsia 
and between the intelligentsia and other social groups in Poland. 
Hor instance, did the commitment to civil freedoms refer to 
freedom for the Catholic identity of Polish society to be expressed 
or for the acceptance of freedom of conscience for all beliefs'? This 
issue caused deep splits within the opposition intelligentsia and 
between the Church hierarchy and KOB.. The revisionist 
intellectuals of the 'Lay Lett' and sorne of the liberal, Catholic 
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intellectuals of the 'L:nak' circle supported religious tolerance and 
a secular, civil society. The reconciliation of these two 
intelligentsia strands was vital for the alliance-bUild.in.g process of 
the anti-communist opposition. Adam Miclmik, a representative of 
the secular Left saw the rnoderation and toleration of the liberal 
CatholiC intelligentsia, personified by 'l'adeusz Mazowiecki as of 
fundamental importance I Uti • 
The alliance between the Church and the intelligentsia in the late 
communist period was vital to the development of the opposition. 
The Church with its institutional autonomy and independent 
outlook provided the anti--communist movement With moral 
authority from the pulpit and practical sanctuarylO? It provided 
an umbrella, uniting and protecting all those With broadly 
anti--communist views throughout the Martial Law periodlOu • 
The Church's vital role continued up to the transition period. Two 
representatives of the Church hierarchy, :b'ather Bronislaw 
Dembowski and .B'ather Alojzy Orszulik, were present at the 
Round Table talks1U8. At the partially free elections of June 1989 
the Church was a vital source of moral and practical support for 
Solidarity candidates. Studies showed a strong correlation 
between the number of clergy in a local community and the 
share of votes won by a Solidarity candidatellu . 
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On the other hand the lay intelligentsia's relationship with the 
CathOlic hierarchy and loyal Catholic intellectuals was only as 
strong as anti-communist sentiInent allowed. Kosela's study or the 
June 1888 elections revealed that the roots of electoral success 
lay in the willi.:n.gness of communities to mo bilise in the name of 
anti-communismlll. There was no resolution of the long-term 
differences between the lay intelligentsia and the Catholic 
Church I 1". 
Clerical and nationalist intellectuals continued to espouse the 
Pole=Catholic formula and believed that Poland's CatholiCism 
should be emphasised. The formation of the more nationalist and 
CathOlic opposition group ROPCiOilo as a rival opposition 
organisation to KOR illustrated the depth of this cleavagell-1. 
Linked to the dispute was the Nationalists and Catholics suspicion 
of the communist background of the 'revisionists'. }I'or instance 
the dispute in KO..H. between Antoni Macierewicz and ~Jacek 
Kuron was caused partly by the former's feeling that Kuron was 
too willing to compromise with the regiIne. According to Kuron 
the right wing of the anti-communist opposition believed that 
"those who had a hand in [communism] are alien to POlishness, do 
not understand the nation and its culture ... and that the 
anti-totalitarian resistance must be based on the national 
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tradition rooted in Catholicism. It is only a small step from this to 
the conclusion that only those who grew from that tradition are 
able to lead opposition"lw. 
In the Mazowiecki period these related cleavages came fully to the 
surface in the conflict between the Catholic hierarchy and the 
Mazowiecki government ll"'. It was also evident in the formation of 
Catholic-Nationalist parties such as ZChN11'1 which were hostile to 
the Mazowiecki government. It'inally it was apparent in the 
presidential campaign where the Mazowiecki camp's refusal to 
lead a programme of radical decommunisation was seen by its 
opponents as an illustration of the ex-revisionist intelligentsia's 
continued links with the old regimell8 . 
In economic terms signi11cant deep cleavages also existed within 
the anti-communist intelligentsia and between the intelligentsia 
and the industrial workers. Did economic freedom from the 
party-state refer to the freedom of workers to have a say in the 
running of their enterprises in accordance with social justice'? 
This coUld be achieved through workers' councils and stronger 
trade unions. Or, did it refer to the freedom for all citizens to 
pursue their economic goals without state interference? These 
freedoms are usually associated with elements of a free market 
economy. lnitially the core of the opposition intelligentsia was 
committed to workers' rightsHu. However, through time parts of 
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the milieu began to change their orientation towards liberal 
economics. There were several reasons tor this. }I'irstly, the 
ongoing disintegration of the Polish economy under the tenets of 
the command system did much to undermine the reputation of 
left-wing economics in Polish intellectual circles in the 18,(Os and 
19bOs. Moreover, the overriding goal of the Polish intelligentsia 
was freedom and democracy for all Poles, not just workers. 
Logically this could be achieved best by reducing the power of the 
state in all spheres, including the economy. Related to this was the 
elitism of the Polish intelligentsia. As we have seen, the traditional 
Polish intelligentsia had a tendency to treat the radicalism of the 
working-class as an instrument to further its own 'universal' or 
'total' agenda L80. 
Traditional prejudices against the populist, short sighted 
tendencies of the work-force suggested that the universality and 
rationality of neo-liberal economics was a better model for the 
intelligentsia to espouse. After all this was the system preferred 
by the western liberal democracies the intelligentsia idealised. 
According to David Ost even left-Wing intellectuals such as 
Michnik were sceptical about the elficacy of workers' 
participation because too many seemed susceptible to delnagogy. 
Such intellectuals embraced private property because 
maintenance 01' state property gave the state too much power. 
Distrust 01' workers rel1ected a belief that since rational, universal 
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values were not likely to win majorities in a post-coIIllnunist 
future, the rational-legal rules central to a modern society could 
only be introduced by intellectuals1'u. 
'l'his attitude was particularly apparent in the Martial Law period 
where state repression was seen as a direct result of the 
radicalism of the Solidarity Trade Union and the workers' 
susceptibility to populism. Liberal economic circles such as \Hos' 
and the 'Young Poland Movement' emerged to criticise the model 
of state socialism and militant worker activismj~8. Finally, the 
regimes of the 1980s renewed their etIorts to win over parts of 
the intelligentsia, particularly the technical or managerial 
sections, through 'professionalisation'. This time the chance to 
improve their economic status was offered through expansion of 
the private sectorl~<5. 
Therefore deep splits existed between liberal and leftist members 
of the anti-communist intelligentsia. They were also apparent in 
the relationship between the intelligentsia and worker strands in 
the opposition movement as a whole1M. This split was lnanifested 
in the tension between KOB. members and the radical worker 
activists of the Coastal l1'ree Trade Unions such as Anna 
Walentynowicz. There were increasingly volatile clashes between 
those who wanted the Solidarity 'l'rade Uhion to be based 
priInarily on worker enterprises and regional associations rather 
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in the intelligentsia-dominated national leadership based in 
Warsaw. The fear that the direction of the movement was being 
decided by distant intellectual elites in secret, conspirational 
negotiations with the regime, as we have seen a classic populist 
attack on intellectuals in politicSli<:~\ was apparent. For instance, 
the Solidarity activist J adwiga Staniszkis voiced concerns over 
the in11uence exerted by Warsaw-based intellectuals or 'experts' 
over the movement as a wholel;;ti • In Mazowiecki's Poland the 
introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan which entailed severe 
austerity for most of the work-force brought these tensions fUlly 
to the surface. Issues such as privatisation, wage indexation and 
the role of the workers' leader Lech Walesa accelerated the 
disintegration of Solidarity along intel.ligentsia/worker lines l;;'( . 
.Populists applied similar arguments over the secrecy surrounding 
the 'Magdalenka' negotiations between tlolidarity intellectuals and 
the regime to build oppOSition to the Mazowiecki government1;:!fJ. 
Thus, in the conventional sense, the programme formulated by 
the intelligentsia was 'antipolitical'. li!conomic and political issues 
central to the development of a clearly defined pOlitical spectrum 
were suppressed, albeit with increasing di1ficulty. However, the 
ultimate aim of the anti-communist movement was to challenge 
the state. ill the context of communist rule, any groups organised 
outwith the aegis of the party-state were intrinsically political, 
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even it trwy claiIned otherViise. Adam .Michr.Likis theory 01' 
t;volutiomsm ll explained the 'civil society' project lll. terms of tIle 
opposition bet1tveen an 8\711, totalitarian state and a good., 
delllOcratically inclilled societyW'). Alt1:lOugl1 tlw 'civil society' 
project 1tvaS presented b}rT its creators as a radical departure iLl. 
recent .Folish history it Vias based on established elements of the 
ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia: the concern -.- .. -.-~-J- h VVJ.u.H 
moral purity, the preoccupation viith the character of power and 
the rejection of div'1.sive, bread and butter Issues lll. the name of 
societal unity. An educated elite Vias attempting to mobilise })olish 
society against the state iLL the name of patriotic and egalitarian 
ideals. The only difference vv-as that COTI1IIlunist rule had succeeded 
iLL alienating broad sections of Polish society and givtng the 
iLlipression t.tlat society Vias fluid and eager to be reshaped in the 
image of the intelligentsia. 
it may r.lave appeared that the t)olidarity experience r.lad bridged 
the gap betvieen intelligentsia and society ill Poland indefinitely. 
lioViever, the rapprochement must be seen as a temporary 
consequence of COITllIlUTlist repre8sion1 ;:;'). Iv1ichrtlk outlined the 
didactic ratr.ler than integrative approach of the opposition 
intelligentsia: liThe program for evolution ougr.lt to be addressed to 
an independent public, not totalitarian povllvTer. ouch a 
Sllould gi\re directt\TeS to the people on h .... '"TI\T J..lV VV 
povlTers on how to re1'onll themselves. N"othhJ..g instructs the 
authorities better tllan pressure frorn below"1M 
ill conclusion the 'civll society' project vvas clearly a product of 
the ethos ot' the traditional Polish intelligentsia. The age-old 
ter.LSion bet\tveen state and societjlT, political and cultural p01/\Ter, 
v".;as beir.t&: played out 1Il a ne,/'J context. A democratic clv"1.1 
did not exist. The articulation of political values remahl.ed lhllited 
to often personalised conflicts betvveen inteUectual elites or the 
intolerant competition of social categories vlTithin the opposition. 
The state remained ur.tresponsive and hostile; the target of the 
inteUigentsia's activities and their ulthllate goal. 
Conclusion to Chapter 8 
'l'hroughout the twentieth century the }JoliSh intelligentsia, along 
with the rest 01' .Polish society, was subject to tar-reaching changes. 
ill socio-economic terms, the processes 01' urbanisation and 
industrialisation led to the expansion ot the milieu and the 
widening 01' its class bases. ill political terms the period vvitnessed 
massive changes and traumas The .Polish state was dominated by 
military and communist regimes with varying degrees of 
authoritarianism. ~ach system had its own vision ot the part the 
intelligentsia should play within it. This was usuaUy a subservient 
one. However, despite these transformations the traditional ethos 
of the milieu remained evident. The elitist, etatist belief that it 
alone was qualified to oversee the economic and pOlitical 
modernisation of .Poland was never completely extinguished. 
Whenever the direction of the state diverged signi!'icantly from 
the intelligentsia's vision of the '.Polish path!, significant sections of 
the milieu voiced their dissatisfaction in a characteristic way. The 
intelligentsia had to show 'the people' what was best for them and 
this required pOlitical power. Thus in the radical struggles ot the 
inter-war period, the 'revisionism' of the early communist period 
and the 'civil SOCiety project' of the late communist period the 
political activity of the intelligentsia was centred on a usually 
acrimonious, elite-level discourse on the characteristics of state 
power. Polish society was not encouraged to develOp a tolerant, 
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dernocratic political culture. Instead the intelligentsia atternpted 
to rno bilise it behind various revolutionary prograrmnes. 
The political activities of'the intelligentsia thus contributed to 
Poland's tradition of' authoritarian states and radical, fragmented 
society. In tIle late cormnunist period the intelligentsia as a 
revolutionary class contributed to the mobilisation ot POlish 
society against cormn unist rule. As such it played a part in the 
advent of the post-cormnunist prograrmne of democratisation. 
However, as we shall see, the ethos of the traditional POlish 
intelligentsia was evident in the approach of the lintelligentsia in 
powerl in 1989-90. The state alone was seen as an instrument for 
change and SOCiety as a single, passive entity to be moulded by the 
lintelligentsia in powerl. This approach had a negative iniluence 
on the development of a democratic civil society in the 
Mazowiecki period and on the fortunes of the goverrnnent. 
Chapters:5 and 4 will maintain the framework introduced above. 
Chapter 0 will examine the ini1uence of the intelligentsia ethos on 
the relationship between the Mazowiecki goverrnnent and state 
power. Chapter 4 will study the relationship between the 
lintelligentsia in power I and Polish society in the Mazowiecki 
period. Consequently the Mazowiecki administration1s 
contribution to the development of' a democratic, civil society in 
post-cormnunist Poland can be evaluated. 
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Chapter 3 'The Mazowiecki Government and the State 
lntroduction 
Chapter 1 established the relationship between the int.ellectual 
and the state as vital to the development of democracy. As 
autonomous critics of political power they help maintain civil 
society as a realm where the interests of societal values are 
articulated to a responsive state!. w.~ identified the intelligentsia 
as a milieu in Polish society which has a special relationship with 
state power. The universal, 'totalist' perspective which the 
intellectual idiom employs (thanks to its superior knowledge) to 
criticise and reform state power is combined in the Polish case 
with a desire to exercise that power2. 
Ll. Chapter 2 this relationship was examined in modern Polish 
history. The inter-war and communist periods were marked by 
the inteliigentsia1s preoccupation with state power, either as 
incumbents or alienated outsiders. The discourse tended to be 
concerned with which strand of the intelligentsia should control 
the state in order to lead Polish society to a better future, rather 
than how the state could be reformed to grant different forces in 
Polish society a greater say5. The collapse of communist rule and 
the rise of the Solidarity movement to a position of pOlitical 
dominance gave the Polish intelligentsia an unprecedented 
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opportunity to finally uniJy the categories of knowledge and 
culture in the state. The intelligentsia dominated Solidarity and 
representatives of the milieu took up the most prominent state 
positions in post-communist Poland4 . 
This chapter will contend that, although the circumstances of 
transition Poland suggested a strengthening of state power, the 
etatist, 'totalist' ethos of the Polish intelligentsia was an especially 
salient factor as the Mazowiecki goverrnnent approached 
economic and political reform. In theory both the economic and 
political spheres were liberalised by the 'inteiligentsia in power' 
from state control. This was in keeping with the declared aim of 
the new elite to institute a market economy and parliamentary 
democracy in Poland. However, at the same time, prominent 
inteilectuals in the new elite argued that until Polish society 
could fulfil the rights and duties of modern citizenship, the state 
ought to maintain control of the transition process. Consequently, 
transition was presented as an elite-level, intelligentsia led process 
and SOCiety was expected to act as a homogeneous, passive entity. 
This was an unrealistic proposition, given the deep socio-economic 
cleavages within POlish society and the ideological cleavages 
within the intelligentsia milieu itself'. 
The Mazowiecki goverrnnent1s programme deepened these 
cleavages in the short-term at least. Its economic reforms 
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heightened socio-econornic disparities in Poland and its political 
reforms alienated certain strands of the intelligentsia who could 
draw on societal frustrations to further their own etatist 
ambitions. As a result, the politics of the Mazowiecki period was 
marked by the acrimonious battle of intelligentsia elites for state 
power. This is, of course, inimical to the development of a 
consensual, civil society and a representative, democratic system. 
Chapter 3 will examine the relationship between the 
'intelligentsia in power l and the state in this context. The 
government's approach to reform of the state economy and the 
centralised pOlitical system will be seen as the result of a number 
of factors (including the legacy of communism and the necessities 
of the transition period). However the influence of the ethos of 
the Polish intelligentsia will be presented as a vital factor behind 
the elite-level approach to economic liberalisation and 
democratisation. The short-term consequences of this approach, in 
terms of the rise of populism and the fragmentation and 
instability of the political scene will be shown as contrary to the 
development of a representative democracy and Western-style 
civil society. They will also be seen as a threat to the political 
reign of the I best and brightest I. 
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3(a) The Economic Sphere 
L"ltroduction 
Before address1.ng the major themes of this work, namely political 
and social developments during the MazoWiecki government IS 
time in office, one has to pay heed to the economic context. I 
agree with Norman Davies that in explaining the systemic 
changes in Poland one should give primacy to the political over 
the economic sphere. Although one can point to the iniluence of 
the corrununist regimeis economic mistakes in the radicalisation of 
the anti-corrununist opposition, the reasons these mistakes were 
made lie in the realm of ideological constraints and political 
manoeuvring°. 
Nevertheless, recent history illustrates the particularly symbiotic 
relationship between political ferment and economic crisis in 
Poland. In recent Polish history the most profound social and 
political events have been stimulated by the communist regime1s 
economic policies. The explosions of societal anger which occurred 
in 1970, 1976 and 1980 were all sparked by one of the perennial 
pro blems in centrally-plarmed economies - price distortions« 
Moreover the state of the Polish economy in 1989 made economic 
reform one of the most press1.ng and difficult tasks for the 
MazoWiecki government. Much of it1s subsequent troubles 
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involved the defence of itis economic reforms against social and 
political groups. For these reasons economic analysis plays an 
essential part in our study of the transition period. 
The Mazowiecki government had an onerous task in reforming 
the state-owned economy. It was in a state of collapse and 
required immediate and drastic reform. However, the pace and 
direction of economic reform remained contentious issues. On the 
one hand, the state was expected to encourage the modernisation 
of the economy. This entailed a willi:ngness to surrender areas of 
competence to the private sphere, in keeping with the practice of 
developed market economies in the West. As we have seen, the 
development of a propertied middle-class is one of the bases for 
the development of civil society and democracy'i'. 
On the other hand the Polish state, after forty years of 
communism was expected to maintain its obligation to society in 
terms of guaranteed employment, welfare and subsidies. As a 
government exercising power under the auspices of the Solidarity 
trade union, the Mazowiecki administration was seen by many as 
representative of working-class interests. Workers expected to be 
the main beneficiaries of economic reform. After the experience of 
communism they were well aware of the potency of organised, 
anti-state protest should these expectations be disappointed. 
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In effect, the Mazowiecki govermnent faced a choice between 
gradual and radical economic reform: "There are essentially two 
strategies that the Polish government can adopt: to try to 
transform the economy at a stroke or to push through structural 
reforms at a somewhat slower but nevertheless resolute pacelli:). 
Gradually introducing the elernents of a market-based economy 
(such as private property, the end of govermnent subsidies to 
industry, freeing prices) would protect Polish society from some of 
the side-effects of too rapid system change. This in turn would 
help maintain public support for the Mazowiecki govermnent and 
its general democratisation programme. On the other hand, one 
could argue that gradual reform could needlessly lengthen the 
trauma of transition and ultimately harm the prospects of 
achieving an efficient market economy. 
The other choice was so-called 'shock therapyl which would 
involve the introduction of most of the basic features of a 
functioning market economy virtually overnight. This option 
promised a shortening of the transition period and, so the logic 
ran, the prospect of the benefits of a market economy becoming 
apparent sooner rather than later. This approach would obviously 
subject large parts of Polish society, including the workers, to 
immediate austerity and threaten society1s support for the 
Mazowiecki govermnent. 
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The government chose the radical approach to economic reform 
through the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan in January 
1990. Although the choice can be explained by a number of 
factors (the plight of the Polish economy, the general rejection of 
leftist economic theory and piecemeal reform and the influence of 
Western institutions), the ethos of the traditional Polish 
intelligentsia was especially important. The elitism and social 
isolation of the milieu was evident in its underestimation of the 
short-term effects of 'shock therapy' on the workers and peasants. 
~ have also noted the intelligentsia's attachment to rational 
systems, especially those of Western origin, and this was how the 
neo-liberal programme was packaged. Moreover, the radical 
approach also favoured the etatism of the milieu. In the long-term 
marketisation of the economy would reduce the role of the state. 
However, the rapid introduction of market rules on a society that 
was largely unprepared to take advantage of them meant that 
the state would continue to playa leading role in the economic 
sphere (especially in comparison with corporatist or 
neo-corporatist options which would give worker or peasant 
representatives more of a say). 
The consequence of this approach was that the development of 
the economic aspect of a democratic, civil society was impossible in 
the short-term at least. Social inequalities were exacerbated by 
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the Balcerowicz Plan. The majority of citizens had neither the 
capital nor the expertise to develop private enterprise. What was 
worse, the new economic elite consisted mainly of forlner 
communists who had transferred state-owned property into their 
own hands and thus had assets to develop. The Balcerowicz Plan 
thus contributed to the polarisation of society and the 
development of populist, anti-state organisations. 
The section will proceed as follows: the factors behind the need for 
drastic economic reform (including the deficiencies of the 
command system) will be outlined. The influence of the ethos of 
the traditional Polish intelligentsia is regarded as central. The 
contents of the Balcerowicz Plan will then be presented. Finally 
the results of the Balcerowicz Plan in the short and long-term and 
their influence on the development of a democratic, civil society 
will be evaluated. 
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(i) Reasons Behind the Radical Approach to Economic Reform 
The Legacy of the Command Economy 
The fundalTIental flaws of the command syst61TI (mostly concerned 
with the unrealistic asswnption that the operations of a complex 
economy could be controlled, planned and directed from the 
centre) were manifested in Poland in several ways. The 
communistsl determination to develop heavY industry - in keeping 
with an ideological commitment to the industrial working-class -
skewed the allocation of resources in favour of this sector. HeavY 
industries (such as steel, coal etc.) were over-developed at the 
expense of other parts of the economy, notably agriculture and 
service sectors. Poland was something of an exception in 
communist East-Central Europe. Itls traditionally large and 
influential agricultural sector meant that, uniquely in communist 
Eastern Europe, its farm sector managed to retain some degree of 
economic independence from the state. However, as with the other 
non-heavY industrial sectors of the economy it was neglected by 
the communists (Table 3.1)' 
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Table 3.1: Comparative Structure of Employment, 1988, in 'Yo) 
Country Agriculture Industry Construction Services 
Poland 27.8 28.2 7.9 36 
'flungary 17 32.5 5.2 45.3 
Czechoslovakia 10.1 36.5 9.3 44.1 
Austria 7.8 28.9 8.5 54.8 
Netherlands 4.6 19.7 6.5 69.1 
~apan 7.2 24.6 9.4 58.7 
Gemlany 3.7 33.5 6.7 56.1 
Sweden 5 22.7 6 66.4 
pnited States 2.8 19.9 6.5 70.7 
Source: GUS, Rocznik Statystyczny 1992 p484 and Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Labour Force 
Statistics (Paris OECD 1991). 
This problem was exacerbated by the obligations of membership of 
Comecon. The industrial structure of member countries was 
geared to the needs of the SOviet Union as a whole rather than 
domestic requirements. In the early years this entailed the Soviet 
Union's maximum exploitation of raw, heavy materials in 
member countries. As a result the range, quality and a vaila bility 
of products on the native market was poor. It must also be noted 
that large-scale industrialisation led to massive pollution. 
Competition for preferential treatment under the Plan 
encouraged enterprises to Ihoardl resources. Uncertainties over 
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supply encouraged enterprise managers to stockpile raw 
materials. There was also hoarding of labour. Larger firms with 
bigger work-forces were usually granted greater status by the 
Plan and they stood more chance of gaining support for further 
development. Unemployment in was illegal in communist Poland 
but labour hoarding and disguised unemployment were pervasive, 
accounting for at least 25% of the country's work-force, and 
perhaps as much as 50-60%9. 
The official absence of unemployment, labour hoard.ir~ and poor 
working conditions led to poor worker discipline. Efforts to 
bolster worker productivity were undermined by the wage scales 
mandated by central planners. Wage differentials based on 
professional qualifications and educational achievements were far 
narrower than in the -West. They also suJfered in comparison to 
some of Poland's eastern bloc neighbours. In the 1980's the 
average wages of non-manual workers in Poland were only 1.05 
times higher than the earnings of manual workers. In the West a 
typical ratio was 1.45 and in Hungary the ratio was roughly 1.13 -
well above PolandlO. Absenteeism and idleness led to low levels of 
production. Workers' lack of commitment to their enterprises and 
the disorganisation caused by hoarding contributed to the 
development of a black market or second economy with its own, 
often inordinately inflated, prices. This added to the inefficiency of 
the official economy. 
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From the 1970s onward changes in the global economy made the 
defects of the command system even more noticeable. In the 
non-communist global economy lighter industries such as 
electronics, with new products, and those with flexible enterprise 
structures in which innovation and research was central, 
emerged as the motor of growth. The performance of the Polish 
command economy, with cumbersome bureaucracy and 
inordinate concentration on heavy industries which required 
large amounts of raw materials and labour, looked increasingly 
out-dated. (see Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2: Resource Intensity of East European CPEs and 
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rl'he cOIIli'nand system was designed to expand heavy industry but 
the bureaucracy involved was too unwieldy to make the type of 
rapid, innovative decisions required to develop lighter, modern 
industries l1. In the 19'70s Poland ploughed money, usually 
borrowed from the West, into industries to make up for this 
inability to innovate. However the money was either wasted or 
absorbed by the dominant heavy industrial sector which wielded 
most political influence. This trend was exemplified by the 
economic policies of the Gierek regime in the 1970s. The only 
lasting feature of this process was serious indebtedness to the 
West (see Table 3.3) 




Roman Czech Bulgar Hung R_Ger Yugo Poland 
Source: Economist 13/1/90 p28 
The scale of Poland's debt burden and the negative illi-fJuence of 
debt repayments on any attempts to develop the domestic 
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economy were obvious12. Thus the theoretical and practical 
deficiencies of the command system in the Polish case, apparent 
from the outset, became increasingly noticeable during the late 
communist period. These weaknesses resulted in a pattern of 
general economic decline punctuated with periods of deep crisis1;5. 
'l'he party-state's refusal to contemplate systemic reform of the 
command economy doomed attempts to halt economic decline. The 
founding of the command system on the central tenets of 
communist ideology, including the 'leading role of the Party', 
meant that no comprehensive reform of the economy could be 
undertaken without challenging the guiding principles of the 
entire party-state. 
Piecemeal reform efforts in the 1980s by the J aruzelski, Messner 
and Rakowski regimes actuallY contributed to the crisis. For 
instance some prices were freed in the hope that they find more 
realistic, market levels and end the pricing disparities which were 
seriously impairing central planners decisions. However these 
moves merely provoked demands by the work-force for increased 
wages. Fearing social unrest the communists consistently 
submitted to these demands. This fuelled galloping inflation (see 
Table 3.4) and contributed to the collapse of the government's 
buclgetary discipline. 
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Other measures, such as Inomenl\:latura privatisation' whereby 
communist managers were allowed to transfer their firms into 
private enterprises were received equally badly by the workers 
and Polish society in general14. In general tl1.e reformist elements 
of the regimes in the 1980s IlITere trapped in a vicious circle: on 
the one hand they recognised the need to reform the economy in 
the direction of market-based criteria, on the other hand they 
were constrained by the presence of a radically politicised 
work-force which resisted and by the party-state1s refusal to 
contemplate far-reaching reform, lest it spark pOlitical 
liberalisation. The end result was a piecemeal approach which 




'Table 3.4: Polish Inflation Explodes - Prices of Selected Goods 
1983-1989 (Zloty). 
-
Commodity December 1983 December 1988 December 1989 
IBread 16 50 120 
~filk 14.5 39 1070 
Sugar 41 165 2850 
iBeef (wlbone) 180 400 5850 
-
Vodka (0.51) 670 1950 13050 
C()ffee (J OOg) 320 @800 3400 
[Daily paper 5 15 180 
iRefrigerator 17200 33-129000 640000 
lFiat 126p (FSO) 250,000 1000000 12000000 
$1.00 (market) 660 3400 8-10000 
Average Monthly 20005 52600 622000 
Wage 
Source: compiled from POlityka 6/1/90 by MH Bernhard IBarriers 
to Further Political and Economic Change in Poland l Studies in 
Comparative Communism Vol xxm Nos 3/4 1990 p325 
At the end of the 1980s, after four decades of a centrally planned 
system, Poland was left in a state of economic crisis. 
Commentators stressed the atmosphere of impending calamity 
rampant in the country at the end of the 1980s: massive debt, the 
cru.iublin.g infrastructure, the problem of severe pollution etc. 
were brir~ the country to the brinl~ of disaster. 'The gravity of 
Poland's plight was symbolically marked when, at the beginnin.g of 
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1990, the United Nations changed the country's economic status 
from Group B (developed) to Group C (developing)lCi. 
'The scale of the communists' failure also guaranteed the societal 
rejection of any economic strategies which were recognisably 
left-wing. 'The general mood in Polish society at the time of the 
transition precluded the introduction of any programmes of 
economic reform which displayed the slogans and trappings of 
socialist thinking!'!. However, Polish society's rejection of the Left 
had more to do with the language of the Left than with concrete 
programmes or pOlicies. l\f.[ost workers continued to demand the 
type of state policies associated with leftist ideology18. 
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The Role of the West 
Western governments and financial institutions also pressed the 
Mazowiecki government for a radical, pro-market reform pacl-cage. 
In the wake of the Round 1'able and the partially free elections of 
summer 1989, Poland was targeted by several foreign aid and loan 
programmes. The EC contributed to a ICurrency Stabilisation 
F1L.lJ.d l ai...TJled at bolstering confidence amon.g bankers and foreign 
investors. Its provision was co-ordinated with the llv[F which itself 
agreed a loan deal with the lVIazowiecki governiuent in early 
January 1990. The IM:F agreement involved a $725 million 
bricigLJ.g loan by the US and the Basle-based Bar...k for 
L"lternational Settlements. A further $1.67 billion worth of loans 
ltvas scheduled for disbursement over the following eighteen 
months. The European Community, aiming to stimulate an 
economic boom in Central Europe set up the European Banl-c for 
Reconstruction and Development, and approved further grants 
and food aid for Poland .. 
One of the obvious costs of this help was acceptance, for the 
foreseeable future at least, that the tight fiscal and monetarist 
policies of 'Western institutions would playa large part in guiding 
Poland1s domestic economic programmes. The Mazowiecki 
governrnent was clearly aware that an agreement II'Jith the llVL}l) 
was a precondition for substantive Western support. The Th1:B-'ls 
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lVIanagin.g Director described relations with the Polish goverlliYfient 
as haviLlg entered an "intenseli, limore clirectli phase1D• 
However, recent studies of the role of Western financial 
institutions in the formulation of economic policy in 
post-cOIIL.Yfiunist Poland suggest that their input was not 
necessarily decisive"o. The IMF was found to be more tolerant of 
budget deficits and inilation rates than may be imagined. Western 
institutions were thus influential, but they did not dominate the 
will of the Mazowiecki government when it came to economic 
reform21. 
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eli) The 'Intelligentsia in Power I and Economic Reform 
All of these factors notwithstanding, I would argue that a major 
:i:n.t+J.uence behind the MazoWiecki administration's choice of a 
radical course of economic reform was the ethos of the traditional 
Polish intelligentsia. Neo-Uberal economics attracted the 
'intelligentsia in powerl in a number of ways. ]'irstly, it was 
commonly seen as a Western system., supported by Western 
institutions and economists. We have noted the intelligentsia's 
idealistic attachment to Western practices22. In 1990 the logic that 
Poland's Ireturn to the Westl would be facilitated by the 
immediate introduction of a Western-type economic system was 
prevalent2:5. 
The strategy of 'shock therapy' was also redolent of the 
utopianism of the intelligentsia milieu24 . The plan's advocates 
repeatedly justified the initial austerity engendered by a rapid 
shift to market condition through reference to a future, capitalist 
paradise. Jeffrey Sachs, one of the main architects of the Plan., 
initially envisioned the period of austerity lasting only six months 
to a year2b. 
rrhe technocratic aspect of the neo-liberal approach to economic 
reform was also attractive to the ethos of the traditional Polish 
intelligentsia. We have already noted the dogmatiC, patronising 
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relationship between the milieu and the rest of Polish society<"< In 
effect, the details of economic reform were presented as the result 
of rational, scientific processes which were beyond the 
understanding of Polish society and outside the scope of political 
cut and thrust. The government of the 'best and brightest' was 
building a market economy and Polish society had merely to 
follow its lead. Quotes from government circles were suffused with 
scientific or surgical imagery2'!'. Emphasis on the technical 
expertise of the 'intelligentsia in power', on the fact that it 'knew 
better', substituted for any attempt to build a political package for 
the reforms28. Jacek Kuron, the Minister for Labour at the time, 
has referred to the Mazowiecki administration's failure to 
mobilise Polish society behind its programme of economic reform29. 
The Polish intelligentsia's 'totalist' perspective was, therefore, 
revealed in its chosen method of economic reform Although in 
theory the economy was being opened up, for the time being only 
the "intelligentsia in power" could lead the process of economic 
liberalisation. SOCiety was regarded as a single, passive entity to be 
modelled in accordance with the milieu's own enlightened values. 
We have already noted the intelligentsia's move in the 1980s from 
leftist to centrist political outlooks in keeping with its vision of 
itself as a 'national' intelligentsia. Thus economic reform was to be 
carried out for the benefit of society as a whole. One must bear in 
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mind the social isolation and elitism of the Polish intelligentsia. 
The worst effects of its economic reform programme were visited 
on sectors of Polish society which were distant from the 
intelligentsia circles of Warsaw and Cracow:30• 
The idealistic, technical approach of the 'intelligentsia in power' to 
economic reform is further illustrated by its failure to fully 
appreciate the consequences of unrestrained marketisation for 
the social status of the intelligentsia milieu itself. The 
intelligentsia's ambivalent approach to the market was outlined 
in Chapter 1 ~"l. On the one hand, economic liberalisation and the 
development of a healthy middle class are accepted foundations 
for the rise of democracy and Western-style civil societies. In this 
situation Western-style intellectuals can play the role of critics of 
state power and interpreters of societal values:58 . 
For the Polish intelligentsia, the fall of communism meant, first 
and foremost, the end of state censorship. However, liberalisation 
brought certain disadvantages. Under communism, culture was 
given privileged status. The party-state was conscious of the 
political power of culture as a potential ally or enemy. Hence the 
creative intelligentsia and his or her works were accorded special 
attention. Special status was accorded to creative intellectuals 
either as privileged, subsidised apologists for the party-state or as 
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impoverished but lionised champions of a persecuted society. In 
the market conditions of post-communist Poland culture became a 
commodity just like any other. The creative intelligentsia faced 
the prospect of competing amongst itself and with Western 
imports for a market. This may be comparable with the situation 
of Western intellectuals, but in the West there are established 
markets for cUltural producers and consmners, based on the 
middle-classes. In transition Poland such markets did not exist~;5. 
Creative intellectuals faced the levelling down of artistic merit in 
keeping with the poor quality, mass-produced works flooding the 
country from the West. The intelligentsia, perhaps expecting.to be 
greeted by an informed, cultivated audience, was disappointed~'S/j. 
The discomfiture of the creative intelligentsia with the tastes of 
the Polish public is an indication of the radically different visions 
of post-communist Poland held by different groups in Polish 
society~.,tl. Calls from creative intellectuals for greater state 
intervention to offset the effects of mar ketisation can be 
interpreted as an indication of the financial plight of the stratum 
in post-communist times and as a nostalgic longing for the days 
when the state guaranteed them a privileged social position. In 
this sense they illustrate the etatism of the milieu:S6 . 
In a manner reminiscent of the inter-war periocr'f" the onset of 
democracy, independence and marketisation initiated far-reaching 
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changes within the POlish intelligentsia. Initially neo-liberal, 
monetarist pOlicies suited the technocratic and creative strands of 
the intelligentsia. The expertise of the former guaranteed it a 
leading role in the new circumstances, while, as we have seen, the 
'total' or 'anti-politicar perspective of the latter was attracted to 
neo-liberalism;5d. However, OVer tiIne the professional, technical 
strata of the milieu assumed new iInportance in a context where 
economists and lawyers are required for the modernisation of the 
country. Financial experts such as Leszek Balcerowicz who had 
been relatively obscure figures working in universities and 
research institutes in the communist period, became the new elite 
of the intelligentsia~'i9. 
The iInportance of the creative intellectual's role as guardian of 
Polish culture would be reduced now that culture "'-JVas no longer 
seen as the priIne vehicle of political expression. The Balcerowicz 
Plan posed serious questions for the intelligentsia. If it forsook its 
traditional concentration on serious issue and questions to pursue 
a more commercially viable route it would forfeit the right to 
perform the basic, teleological role of the traditional milieu. The 
intelligentsia's traditional function as guardian of Polish identity 
was largely based on its appreciation of Polish culture and 
history. It was therefore possible that it would cease to be an 
I int elligent sial in the Polish or East Central European sense of the 
term. The observations of Octavio Paz on the identity crisis of the 
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Mexican intelligentsia when confronted With the task of 
rebuilding the state and the economy are pertinent in the context 
of Mazowiecki's Poland40. The identity crisis of the Polish 
intelligentsia in capitalism is ongoing41. Thus the economic reforms 
of the Balcerowicz Plan reflected the elitist, dogmatic, 'totalist' 
ethos of the 'intelligentsia in power'. The folloWing section Will 
present the detail of the Plan and evaluate its contribution to the 
development of a democratic, civil society under the aegis of the 
Mazowiecki government. 
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(iii) The Balcerowicz Plan - Liberalism with an iron glove 
The programme of economic reform introduced by the first 
post-communist administration became known as iThe Balcerowicz 
Plani, after the Mazowiecki governmentis deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Finance, Leszek Balcerowicz42. His Finance 
Department worked in consultation with Jeffrey Sachs, a 
professor of economics at Harvard who had advised Latin 
American governments. The programme introduced on January 
the 1st 1990 had four simultaneous aims designed to facilitate a 
transformation from the command system to the market: 
Free Prices 
Price distortions created by the command system were ended 
immediately by allowing prices to find market-based levels which 
realistically reflected the balance of demand and supply. Price 
controls were to be lifted, subsidies reduced or eliminated, and the 
economy opened up to international trade. Most commodity prices 
(about 87% with the exception of energy prices, housing prices 
and a few others) were freed from administrative control. The 
zloty was to be made lIinternally convertible ll • This meant that 
both individuals and firms could exchange zloties within Poland 
for any Western currency but the zloty was not tradable outside 
Poland. 
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Encourage Private Sector 
Restrictions on private economic activity were eliIninated. New 
comrnerciallaws were to be enacted. Company laws would allow 
for the easy establishment of new enterprises. A Western style tax 
system was introduced with tax and VAT. Various licensing 
restrictions applied at the time to international trade and 
dOInestic investlnent were also to be eliminated. 
Reform State-owned Sector 
State enterprises were disciplined. Part of this process clearly 
involved trimming their number through privatisation . However, 
for the time being, the government did not go beyond laying the 
foundations for some form of privatisation process to be set in 
motion at an unspecified date. In addition, state-owned enterprises 
were to be subjected to real market disciplines. This would be 
achieved by allowing private firms and importers to provide real 
competition, eliminating the bias previously shown by central 
government to state enterprises in the form of subsidies, cheap 
credits and tax concessions. The halting of state sector borrowing 
based on central government guarantees would also contribute to 
the process. Anti-trust laws were to be introduced in order to 
fragment industrial giants which dominated their fields and the 
government's new-found willingness to declare loss-making 
enterprises bankrupt would also ensure a more level playing field. 
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Arrest Ll..i..+J.ation Rate 
'The final, and at the time most pressing, part of the Balcerowicz 
Plan dealt with the need to halt accelerating :inflation. This was to 
be realised mainly through strict fiscal and monetary policies. 
State spending on investment, grants for industries and subsidies 
for consumers were drasticallY reduced as the new government 
made a concerted bid to lower the state's budget deficit. To this 
end the level of government subsidies was to be reduced 
significantly. The communist practice of indexing workers' wages 
to the level of inflation was to be curtailed as part of the push for 
fiscal control. Wastefulness was to be avoided as the reduced level 
of credit was to be dispensed on a purely economic basis, without 
traditional pro-state sector prejudices. 
Long-term Results of the Balcerowicz Plan 
Many of the most significant results of the plan can best be 
viewed through retrospective comparison on a larger time-scale 
(see Table 3.5). After the initial shock of the early transition 
period one can see a gradual stabilisation in most economic 
indicators. In the long term the Balcerowicz Plan achievelnents 
were commendable and they succeeded in ensuring that the 
defining characteristics of the communist command system were 
irrevocably replaced. It introduced full and maintained current 
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account convertibility of the zloty. Significant increases in 
convertible currency exports and a trade surplus were also 
achieved .. In addition import liberalisation was initiated and this 
was responsible for an incomparably better supply system. For 
the first time since the Second World W~ar a demand barrier or 
'buyer's market' emerged. rocketing inflation, after initial 
acceleration, was arrested and the budget deficit successfully 
attacked. Industrial output gradually recovered and the rate of 
unemployment stabilised somewhat. The command economy's 
concentration on resource-intensive heavy industries was 
replaced by emphasis on modern, light industries. 
Table 3.5 - Poland's Economy 1989-9'7 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 ]994 1995 1996 1997 
Yo 'real' 
change -0.2 -12 -7 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9 
GDP 
Inflation 
251 586 70 43 35 32 28 20 15 
Unempl-
oyment 0 6.5 12.2 14.3 16.4 16 14.9 13.2 10.5 
fReal 
lEarnings n.a. -24.4 -0.3 -2.7 -2.9 0.5 3 5.7 6.1 
Source: Official Polish statistics. 
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Initial Results of the Balcerowicz Plan 
The results of the Balcerowicz Plan in the long-term were 
commendable. However for the purpose of this thesis - an 
evaluation of the democratisation process under l\f.[azowiecki - the 
short-term results are more iInportant. In this respect, the social 
costs of the Balcerowicz Plan were worse than anticipated and 
they had a fundamental, negative effect on the tenure of the 
lintelligentsia in powerl. The main outcomes of the Balcerowicz 
Plan during the Mazowiecki period were: 
Accelerating Inflation 
One of the most obvious results of the Balcerowicz Plan in its 
initial stages was the accelerating rate of inflation which shot up 
radically at the start of 1990 and remained at a high and 
persistent level relative to developed market economies (79% in 
January, 24% in February and 4-5% per month from then on4:5). 
Price rises were much greater than the government expected. For 
instance, the government spokesperson Malgorzata Niezabitowska 
predicted a rise of 45% during January. In fact prices rose by, on 
average, 60% in the first half of the month/]/]. The cost of hot 
water rose by 400%, gas by 250%, electricity by 300%, rail-fares 
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by 250%, gasoline by 100%, bread by 38%, ham by 55% and 
tractors by 104%4b. This was a direct result of the liberalisation of 
prices which had been kept artificially low by the COIIllllunists. 
Fall in industrial production 
Another immediate side-effect was the surprisingly steep fall in 
industrial production. During the first few months of the Plan 
there was a sharp drop in industrial production, much more than 
decision makers and analysts had expected. In the first quarter of 
1990 production in the state industries fell by around 24% in 
comparison with the last quarter of 1989 and by 30% in 
comparison to the first quarter of 1989'1Ci. In the consumer 
industries it fell by around 40% and in the light industries by 
around 30%. This was due to price liberalisation of the pricing 
system in an economy still dominated by the state. 
:Most state-owned enterprises had to contend with sharp cost 
increases from devaluation, customs duties, the new taxes and 
high interest rates. These costs were passed directly on to the 
customer in the form of higher prices. In early 1990 prices of 
consumer goods were increased by 80% or more. Being sure that 
competitive cheaper imports would not appear on the market for 
three to four months, the enterprises raised their prices often by 
as much as 100%. This prices Ishockl led to a sharp fall in demand. 
Monopolistic producers reacted to this by making cuts in 
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production and then by cutting back on labour in order to 
maintain high prices. Agriculture was particUlarly hard hit by 
the fall in consumer demand. Agricultural prices declined as 
demand fell and imported W~estern foodstuffs appeared for the 
first time in Poland. Prices reached an unprecedented low just as 
the cost of materials needed for agricultural production reached a 
higher, market-determined value. In the food industry production 
fell by 40% in comparison with the previous year-1'i'. 
Unemployment 
As enterprises shed the excess work-force built up under 
communism the unemployment rate exceeded the government's 
predictions. Speaking in the Sejm, Jacek KuroIl, the Minister for 
Labour and Social Policy initially estimated a minimum of 
400,0004 ('.. However, he soon conceded that unemployment could 
exceed 1,000,000"'19. The unemployment rate rose from 0.3% or 
56,000 people in January 1990 to 3.1% at the end of June and 
6.1 % by DecemberBO• About 30% of them were unskilled workers 
and 107,000 were recent school graduates seeking their first jobs. 
While this may sound low by UK standards, where unemployment 
hovered at 2-3 million each year, in Poland it was a huge shock to 
leap from zero unemployment to one million in a few months. 
The government was aware of the unexpected severity of the rise 
and quickly altered it's predictiOns. In fact the number of 
unemployed reached 1.1 million or 6.1% of the work-force by the 
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end of 1990, three times higher than had been originally forecast. 
Of course the nl.llllber of people out of work was bound to rise as 
before the advent of the Mazowiecki government unemployment 
had not officially existed. However the abruptness of the rise was 
seen by some as a deficiency of the PlanbL• 
}l'all in real wages 
The workers l plight was worsened by the Mazowiecki 
government1s wages policy. VVhile Balcerowicz had freed most 
price controls and allowed them to find a real market level, wages 
were controlled to aid the attack on inflation and help control the 
budgetary deficit. Pay rises were limited and if any firm broke the 
limit it faced severe taxation (the so-called 'popiwek' tax). The 
communist practice of indexing the wages of all the workers to 
the rate of inflation was ended. This, it was thought, would give 
enterprises an incentive to shed labour and increase wage 
differentiation and so encourage productivity. It was hoped that 
enterprises would therefore strive to retain their better workers. 
Liberalisation of prices combined with strict wage pOlicies caused 
an immediate and dramatic decline in real wage levels when the 
Plan was introduced. Indeed in January alone real wages fell by 
around 40% in comparison to December 1989. As we have seen, at 
the same time inflation rocketed to nearly 80%. Again this was a 
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more extreme reaction than government economists had 
predictedfi2 . 
Sluggish privatisation 
Privatisation proceeded more slowly than expected. This was due 
to the intensely political nature of the issue. By the time the Sejm 
approved the first privatisation law in 1990, 15 proposals had 
been under discussion':);). 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, although the long-term effects of the Balcerowicz 
Plan were beneficial for the Polish economy and thus for the 
development of a democratic, civil society its influence on 
state/society relations during the Mazowiecki period was negative. 
The lintelligentsia in powerl looked on society as a single, 
malleable entity; ready to be transformed by the dictates of the 
Ibest and brightestl. This was in keeping with its traditional elitist 
ethos. However all social groups, workers, peasants and the 
intelligentsia itself, had experienced specific changes under 
communist ruletl4. Each group came into the transition period 
with specific expectations and visions of post-communist Poland 
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The Balcerowicz Plan initiated further, dramatic changes in 
Poland1s social structure. The industrial workers, peasantry and 
intelligentsia were faced with economic challenges by the 
emerging market system. The introduction of free market 
conditions and privatisation threatened the future of workers in 
heavily subsidised, state-owned industries. Lil{:ewise the peasantry, 
so long used to state intervention to guarantee cost and price 
levels, would now have to compete according to real market 
conditions and in competition with international producersbti • The 
intelligentsia itself' faced an identity crisis with the Imarketisation 
of culture l • 
Table 3.6 gives some impression of the socio-economic flux 
experienced in Poland during the transition. The standard of 
living of social and occupational groups, measured in terms of 
income, material possessions and cultural levels, changed 
considerably over the period. Most improvement was noted in 
those socio-occupational categories which aspired to form the new 
middle class. On the other hand the situation of manual categories, 
particularly workers and peasants, below the national average 
before the tranSition., had worsened (see Table 3.6). 
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Table 3.6: Evolution of income, material and cultural position of 
households 1987-93 
Socio- 1987 (a) 1993 (a) 1987 (b) 1993 (b) 1987 (c) 1993 (c) 
occupational 
categories 




N"on- 145 226 56.7 74.4 251 907 
technical 
ntelligentsia 
!Engineers 123 134 47.4 76 304 542 
Technicians 104 101 37.9 65 191 294 
Middle- 112 129 43.9 68.8 241 325 
grade clerks 
Lower- 103 105 39.9 63.7 146 182 
grade clerks 
Businessmen 146 144 52.4 77 173 271 
Employed in 98 91 34.6 62.8 105 247 
sales and 
servlce 
IForemen 100 85 28.6 50.8 344 243 
Skilled 95 79 28.3 55.5 83 84 
Iworkers 
IUnskilled 91 68 21.9 45.6 47 65 
Iworkers 
lManual 80 63 25.6 45.8 67 62 
Iworkers in 
servIce 
'Employed in 77 58 21 50.1 48 75 
~arming 
!Farm 88 57 22.1 40.1 48 68 
owners 
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(a) Monthly family income per person, in relation to national 
average. 
(b) Material positions as a percentage of possession of seven goods 
in household. 
(c) Number of books in household 
source: Grzegorz Weclawo"vicz Contemporary Poland: Space and 
Society UCL 1996 p95. 
One can see that inequalities in Polish society increased 
dramatically during the Mazowiecki period. The economic, 
material and cultural differences between high status groups such 
as managers, intelligentsia and entrepreneurs and low status 
groups such as unskilled workers and farm workers was much 
larger than in the 1970s. In a condition of such disequilibria, the 
chances of creating a unified commitment to democratic political 
procedures is weakened. Social groups who feel discriminated 
against are unlikely to accept the legitimacy of existing 
state/society relationships even if they have the appearance of 
democracy. The liberal side of democracy may be satisfied by 
introducing market mechanisms but the inequality introduced 
severely tests democracy1s commitment to equality. Much of the 
struggle between the Mazowiecki workers and the industrial 
workers revolved around this issuetiCi •• Indeed such an attitude can 
give rise to anti-democratic tendencies5'r. 
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It is important to note that, despite the universal application of 
reforms introduced as part of the first phase of the Balcerowicz 
Plan, regional variations and the urban/rural diVide were 
widened. The economic transition produced major changes in the 
national labour market. Provinces in the northern part of the 
country reported the greatest decline in the labour force. This 
primarily stemmed from the collapse of collectiVised farming. 
Equally worrying in this region was the erosion of the 
non-agricultural labour market as, for instance, the construction 
sector contracted. The lowest unemployment rates were found in 
regions with large urban centres and richer, more internally 
diflerentiated economic structures such as Warsaw, Cracow, 
Poznan and Katowice. Moreover, regional disparities in terms of 
the profile of the labour force were intensified by the immobility 
of the population. 
Each region also varied in terms of potential for developing a 
private sector. Most privately-run businesses and therefore most 
private sector employees are concentrated in regions with large 
urban centres. Generally the smallest number of private 
bUSinesses were to be found in the less developed regions of 
eastern Poland. 
Although potential foreign investment was primarily guided by 
the attraction of indiVidual enterprises it too displayed regional 
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patterns. The Warsaw metropolitan area was decidedly preferred 
by foreign investors. By April 1994 the Warsaw province 
accounted for nearly 40% of all foreign capital investment in 
Polandb8 • It should be noted that regions in the west of the 
country were more likely to benefit from foreign investment 
than those in the East. The former was bordered by an 
econOInically strong Germany while the latter had much weaker 
immediate neighbours. 
On the basis of the criteria detailed above Golebiowski makes 
useful classification of the Polish territories in terms of economic 
potentialtl9. I-lis scheme approximately matches the boundaries of 
the traditional Polish regions. The first group is described as 
"backwardll • It is characterised by a low level of social and 
economic development and agriculture is dominant. It also has an 
underdeveloped infrastructure and a relatively low-skilled labour 
force. This group has the country's slowest private sector growth 
and attracts little interest from foreign investors. Such areas are 
to be found in north-eastern and eastern Poland. 
The next category was identified with the old industrial areas of 
Silesia such as Katowice and Walbrzych. It was characterised by a 
dominant industry and relatively underdeveloped services. It IS 
industrial structure was undiversified and dominated by 
traditional practices and raw materials which could run out at 
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any time. This category also suffered from the environmental 
degradation which accOInpanies heavy industry on this scale. 
Finally areas linked with the country's largest urban centres 
such as W·arsaw, Cracow, Poznan, Wroclaw and Gdansk led the 
way in economic reforms. This group had extensive links with the 
outside world and a highly skilled, diverse labour force. They were 
home to an active entrepreneurial class and the country's most 
sophisticated business environment. This category had the lowest 
unemployment and was expected to profit most from the 
transition. Moreover, it was the home of the Polish intelligentsia. 
Thus, immediately after the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan, 
socio-economic tensions were exacerbated by regional disparities 
and the intensification of the urban/rural divide. 
The Mazowiecki government is failure to address the social 
consequences of the Balcerowicz reform - its insistence on seeing 
the process as a technical, apolitical exercise, in keeping with the 
ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia - exacerbated the 
situation. Rather than the development of consensual 
relationships between different social forces and the state, 
fundamental to the development of a unified democratic culture 
and civil SOCiety, the scene was set for the deterioration of 
relationships between social groups and between society and the 
state. The following section will deal with the Mazowiecki 
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govermnent's performance in the area of political reform. Again it 
will argue that the ethos of the traditional POlish intelligentsia 
was apparent in the administration's approach and that, in the 
short-term at least, it had a negative influence on the 
development of a democratic civil society. 
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L 
3(b) 'The Political Sphere 
Introduction 
A democratic political system was the declared aim of the 
'intelligentsia in power l in 19901. According to (}ur;thesis the 
development of democracy involves the reformation and 
reconciliation of state and society through the development of 
civil societyB. On the one hand it is necessary to reform state 
institutions to make them representative and responsive to the 
interests of society. On the other hand society must be mobilised 
to participate in pOlitics in a tolerant, democratic manner. 
In this context, the challenge for the leaders who came to power 
in 1989 was substantial. The Mazowiecki government inherited 
state institutions which had been moulded in accordance with the 
desire of the party-state to completely dominate society. The 
majority of Polish society had long been alienated from these 
institutions. Moreover Polish society's traditional political culture 
was characterised by radicalism and fragmentation, neither of 
which was conducive to the development of democratic values. 
Finally, it is important to note that the democratisation process 
ran in tandem with the Balcerowicz programme of radical 
economic reform, which, a,s we have seen deepened state/society 
and inter-society divisions duri:ng the Mazowiecki period .. 
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Observers described the challenges of democratisation in 
transition from communism in terms of bridging these divisions0. 
Chapter 1 examined some of the approaches designed to spur and 
explain democratic reform. These included some which emphasised 
the manipulation of state institutions as a means of inculcating 
democratic values and others which stressed the importance of 
developing a democratic political culture at mass, society leveL 
The conclusion reached was that a successful democratisation 
process must balance both elite and mass perspectives in a civil 
society'1. At the O1]tset of the transition observers described the 
task facing the Mazowiecki government as it attempted 
democratisation in these terms; as a choice between different 
models of mass-elite relationstJ • 
This section will argue that the Mazowiecki government's 
approach to democratisation concentrated almost exclusively on 
elite-level politics. This can be explained by several factors: the 
desperate need for reform of the remnants of the communist 
party-state system and the need for a strong state in the face of 
the social flux, economic austerity and pOlitical fragmentation of 
early transition Poland. However this section contends that 
prominent amongst these reasons was the influence of the etatist, 
elitist ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia on the 
Mazowiecki government. This factor led to the government's 
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failure to pay heed to the social aspect of its political reforms. The 
resultant isolation of state from society was inimical to the 
development of a democratic, civil society. The political sphere 
became an arena for quarrellin.g intellectual elites. This spurred 
the development of populist forces which undermined the 
democratisation process and challenged the rule of the Ibest and 
brightest'. 
The section will proceed as follows. Firstly, the condition of state 
institutions a& the Mazowiecki government took office are 
presented as a partial explanation of the etatism of the 
administration. However the influence of the ethos of the Polish 
intelligentsia on the political philosophy of the Mazowiecki 
government is then presented as a major reason for its etatist, 
Itotalist l approach to democratisation. The Mazowiecki 
government's attempt to stifle the development of pOlitical 
alternatives, through it vision of the I Solidarity I social movement, 
is presented as symptomatic of this approach. The battle for 
pOlitical power became an elite-level discourse carried out 
between different intelligentsia strands. Society at large was seen 
as a passive, homofSeneous entity, there to be led by the 
intelligentsia towards a democratic, utopian future. 
The existence of deep pOlitical divisions within the intelligentsia, 
obvious throlifShout recent Polish history, were apparent in the 
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nascent political spectrum and within the Solidarity movement. 
Failure to take these differences into account explains the rise of 
anti-intellectual populism and the acrimonious fragmentation of 
the Solidarity movement. The stage was set for the end of the 
democratisation experiment under the 'intelligentsia in power'. 
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(i) Factors Behind the Etatism Approach to Political Reform 
Disorganisation of State Institutions 
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communist power in 
1989 the Mazowiecki government was forced to operate in a state 
arena which did not yet reflect the democratically expressed 
interests of Polish society. The new model of central state 
institutions drawn up at the Round Table talks reformed the 
system and introduced a formal separation of legislative, 
execmtive and Judicial hrancnes (see Diagram 3.7). 
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Diagram 3.7: State institutions in Poland 1990 
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However the true status and functions of the most important 
orgar...s Vlere distorted by the Round Table process. The aim of the 
agreement ha:rIh-rnered out between the cO:rIh-rnunists and the 
SOlidarity-led opposition was to guarantee the regime control over 
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the cOD....-r'J.try while §trantL.~ Solidarity an opportunity to enter 
official political institutions. The system formUlated at the Hound 
Table talks coUld be regarded as the outcome of a series of 
bargains and trade-offs reached bet,,'\Teen the COIr.u'.llw..-r'J.ist regi..."'1le 
and the Solidarity movement6 . The constitutional arrangement 
arrived at was, therefore, not the product of the consen.sual 
interplay betvJeen a responsive state and the freely articulated 
interests of Polish society. It ,,'\Tas the resUlt of negotiations 
betvJeen the elite of a reluctant regi.."'1le and the elite of a 
movement ,,'\Those unity could only be guaranteed in opposition to 
~iI.aU,.v organs of political povJer became hybrids. existing in a Igrey 
area' betvJeen the communist past and the democratic future. The 
460 member Sejm remained the 'highest organ of the state'. It 
could pass legislation vlith a simple majority ,,"lith at least half of 
the total number of lvr...Ps present. It chose members of the 
Constitutional Tribunal. It had formal authority over the 
Supreme Court and the Cabinet Office. However 65% of seats in 
the Sejm ,,'ITere conceded to PZPR and its satellite parties. All 100 
seats of the reconstituted Senate were to be subject to completely 
free general elections. For the opposition side at the Hound Table 
the Senate was to be a Solidarity-based counterbalance to the 
communist-dominated SejmrJ • 
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However the Senate had IL."'1lited leaislative initiative. Legislation 
passed by the S~jm could be amended or r~jected by the Senate. 
For the Senate1s rejection of legislation to be overturned the Sejm 
required a majority vote with at least half of its members present. 
Special legislation such as budget proposals or systemic 
t.ransforma.t.ions in t.he socio-economic sphere required a 2/3 
majority in the Sejm if the Senate's decisions were to be rejected. 
The manipulation of the Presidency at the Round Table was one 
of the most obvious examples of this bargainir...g process. The 
communist desire to ratifY far-reaching pOII'lerS for a President 
WllO was expec;tBd t.o be c;ommunist (hB vvOlJld be t.he appoint.ment. 
of the comml1nist-c1ominatec1 ,sBjm) clashed ·with ,solic1arity l s 
demands that Presidential powers be limited. This resulted in the 
c;onfl1sion of the powers anc1 fl1nctions of the officeS). 
Thus at the outset of the transition the roles of the most 
important political institutions and their relationships with each 
other were still not c1ec;ic1ec1 by state/soc;iety c;onsensus. COlllc1 Poles 
be expected to partiCipate in ir....stitutions which most still 
associated with the authoritarian, communist era? There was 
plenty of evidence concernL.YJ..g the depth of Polish society's 
alienation from public life in 1989-90. At a time when the 
euphoria of the collapse of CO:r:rL.-rrllli-rUsm could have been expected 
to spur pOlitical mobilisation voter participation remained low. 
Turn-out for the June 1989 elections was expected to be high, 
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given the fact that they amounted to a plebiscite against 
communist rule. In the event these expectations proved 
uiJ.realistic lO. A downward trend in turn-out levels was observed 
throu§Shout the Mazowiecki period. A senatorial by-election in 
October 1989 attracted a vote of 15%11 and 42% of those eligible 
voted in the local elections of 8pring 199012. 
The situation was also reflected in levels of confidence in public 
institutions during the early transition period. The trust of Polish 
society in public or §Sans increased substantially when the 
Mazowiecki government took office in September 1989. 
Institutions previously led by the discredited communist re§Sime 
were now under the influence of the heroes of the 
anti-Communist opposition. Polls of the time reported a rise of 15 
percentage points in public confidence in the Government 
between May and October 1989, 10 points for the Sejm and 5 
points for 801idarity10. TTowever the frailty of this confidence was 
revealed as the economic rigours and political frustrations of the 
reform process developed (see T'able 3.8). 
345 
















iA • I pproveo 
• isapproved I 







I isapproved I 
I 1 Ii C i I 1'7'-'1 
9.91 I 
I ! 
11 I 13.41 
I I 
i I 
' " 14.2; I.Y 
1 
55.41 58.7i 
15 71 J. • J i 1471 J. • J i 

















.1 • I 
• I 
M.i (5.). "1-1 
9.61 
I 














-~ 2i / ';J. I 
8.81 
I 





19 I 25 I 








1 ,) ''1 I -'-",-·JI • I I 
_~ J _~ J 
115·(51 1:)·(51 
11.91 14.51 
Sources: Centre for Public Opinion Research reported in 
346 
Such data paid testament to the poorly developed relationship 
between Polish society and public institutions and to the need for 
the latter to become much more representative if a democratic 
pOlitical system was to develop. Thus Polish citizens as well as the 
state had to redefine their roles under democracy. The 
authoritarian and communist pOlitical culture of hostility to and 
dependency on the state had to be replaced by civic 0 blli?;ations 
and participation in Fl.1blic 1ife1'1. 
The particular demands of the transition period includ..ing the 
reform of these institutions, complicated the effort to institute a 
liberal democratic state. On the one hand.. a democracy is expected 
to limit the role of the state. On the other hand the demands of 
transition., includ..ing institutional reform, suggested an 
intensification of state powers in tne snort-term at 1eastw. 
Clearly the structure, personnel and functions of the state would 
have to be completely redefined if Poland was to progress toward 
liberal democracy. In short, it would have to become more 
responsive to and representative of society. This entailed the 
state's withdrawal from parts of economic, social and political life. 
However, alInost everything in the pOlitical traditions of the 
Polish state pointed in the opposite direction. The traditional ethos 
of the intelligentsia milieu whose representatives now dominated 
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state institutions was part of these traditions. We have established 
etatism as a basic element of this ethoslG . It was based on the 
belief that representatives of the milieu 'knew best I how to lead 
the processes of modernisation and that society was incapable of 
lead.ing itself. 
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Weakness of the Party Political Scene 
The etatism of the Mazowiecki government could also be justified 
by reference to the poor condition of the country's political 
organisations. Not only were state institutions disorganised and 
unresponsive, society itself was unable to articulate its interests 
efficiently to them through pOlitical parties. Our study of the 
party political scene will illustrate the lack of a unified. 
representative political culture. Although Solidarity, as the main 
arena for political developments in 1989-90, is the major focus of 
this thesis, an examination of the party political scene can also 
serve as a guide to the diiIerent ideological currents that were 
quicke:o.in.g beneath the surface of Solidarity unity. Some of these 
currents were to become prominent in the disintegration of the 
movement and the rise of radical, populist alternatives to 
Mazowiecki. 
Political parties are a central component of civil societies and 
have a vital role to play in the consolidation of democracyl'i'. (['hey 
serve as instruments of popular mobilisation and citizen 
participation at election times. They integrate and organise 
groups within society that have similar values, interests and goals. 
Their potential election allows them to act as checks to those 
exercising political power. Parties act as a vital source of 
organisational support once a government takes office lB . They are 
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also central to the process of political recruitment. Leaders of 
state usually achieve their position through membership of 
parties. A party system which guarantees all sections of the 
citizenry some representation in the central state institutions is a 
vital defence against potentially destabilising social unrest. 
By act:i:rJg as links between the independently structured interests 
of social groups and the centres of state power, pOlitical parties 
are vital for the functioni:o.g of a consensuaL civil society. There 
has been much de bate over the location of parties within the 
state/civil society framework. Are they instyuments of social 
representation and therefore an integral part of civil society or 
part of the process of government and therefore an instrument of 
the state? Although the thesis includes political parties in its 
examination of the evolution of the state under Mazowiecki, a 
party system is a vital component of both state and civil society. 
It helps ensure the articulation of social interests and the 
functioni:o.g of central institutions according to established 
conventions19. 
The consolidation of political parties in Western democracies relies 
on a number of factors: the existence of a cohesive structure 
based on a recognised social constituency, the availability of a 
sponsor:i:rJg institution to lend le~itimacy to the or~anisation and 
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the presence of a strong party elite. Electoral laws and 
parliamentary rules also playa role. 
In comparison to the West Poland has a tradition of poorly 
developed party pOlitical organisations. Durir...g the country's brief 
experience of parliamentary democracy the party system had 
consisted of multifarious, small intellectual elites with little or no 
territorial organisation. 
Under communism political parties served as instruments for the 
perpetuation of Communist Party control of Polish society rather 
than as means of articulating the interests of social constituencies 
to a responsive state. Up to the transition Poland had been ruled 
by the Polish Uniten Workers' Party (P7.FR20). This organisation 
was the product of the forced merger of the pro-communist Polish 
Workers' Party (PFR) ann the Polish Socialist Party (PPS21), which 
had by then been broken by communist infiltration and 
persecution. In keeping with communist ideology the PZPR was 
seen as the sole representative of the interests of the Polish 
proletariat. 
Other groups represented social interests which were now either 
defunct or contrary to the objectives of communism. As a result 
the communist Party-state only tolerated the existence of 
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symbolic and subservient political or~anisations. The appearance 
of what was in practice a pOlitical monopoly was softened by the 
inclusion of these 'satellite' organisations, the United Peasant 
Party CZSL22) which purported to serve farmers' interests and the 
Democratic Party (SD23), in a completely unequal coalition with 
the PZPR . 
.f.J'ter the political thaw of 1956 another loyal organisation the 
CrrriRt.ian Rocial ARRociat.ion (GhRR) waR permit.t.eo Parliament.ary 
representation along with a more independent group of Catholic 
intellectuals, ZNAK. While ChSS diligently pursued the Communist 
line, ZN AK remained independent and at times verged on open 
opposition. Nevertheless, after the rigged elections of 1947, all 
trace of independent political parties, excepting the above, 
disappeared under the total domination of the PZPR. Thus in 
Polish history the political party, or political society had not been 
an ally but an enemy of civil society. As primarily elite-focused 
institutions or instruments of the state they contributed to the 
frustration of Polish society's attempts to articulate its interests. 
The collapse of the communist regime cleared the path for the 
organisation of political parties along more representative, 
democratic lines. However, there were several obstacles to this 
process. The potential sources of political organisation each had 
their own weaknesses in terms of the criteria outlined above. At 
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the outset of the transition there were three potential sources of 
political organisation: the communist, non-Solidarity and 
Solidarity opposition movernents. The fate of the Solidarity 
movement, the dOminant political force of the Mazowiecki period 
(though one with its own weaknesses) is dealt with separately 
later on24. The other two camps, though they varied considerably 
in terms of legitimacy, territorial organisation and elite level 
influence were not in a position to foster truly representative 
political parties during this time. 
The Communists 
In Autumn 1989 the communist camp appeared strong in terms 
of organisational framework, institutional base and leadership. 
The PZPR and its satellite parties the ZSL and SD retained 
substantial apparatus at central and local levels, an established 
press, funds and property. Its cadre dominated local government 
and central state instit11tions (65% of 8ejm seats, tne key 
Ministries of Internal Affairs and Defence - which were held by 
Czeslaw Kiszczak and Florian Siwicki - and the Presidential office 
- occupied by W ojciech J aruzelski). The elite of the communist 
movement represented the only truly experienced political 
leadership in the country at that time. 
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In reality, the political condition of the communists in the 
aftermath of the disastrous results of the June 1989 elections was 
very different. Communism was held responsible by Polish society 
for the dire state of the economy and the abuse of political power 
over the previous four decades. It was regarded as an alien 
ideology whose system had been imposed by force. The struggle to 
distance themselves from the past and forge a fresh ideology 
contributed to an identity-crisis in the communist camp and the 
disintegration of the PZPR. Any advantages the camp held in 
terms of infrastructure, institutional representation and elite 
experience were negated in the struggle by different forces and 
personalities for influence in the process of re-invention. Kiszczak, 
Siwicki and Jaruzelski followed the Solidarity government's 
general line before the popular mood removed them from public 
office in Summer 1990. 
Within the Sejm dictated by the partiaUy free elections of June 
1989 the communist camp quickly conceded its advantages. The 
P7.FB's old allies vvere eitner in a state of decline (e.g. PAX, tne 
Christian Social Union and the Polish-Catholic Union) or were 
forming links with the Solidarity camp and desperately trying to 
dissociate themselves from their heritage (e.g. Polish Peasant Party 
'Rebirth', the Labour Party). The PZPR's own parliamentary 
caucus was also diSintegrating. Former PZPR JVIP's formed the 
Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left under the leadership 
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of VVlodzimierz Cimoszewicz. It resisted political marginalisation, 
but the factionalism which accompanied the PZPR's attempt to 
transform itself into la new party of the Left I rendered its 
parliamentary representation impotent. A PZPR plenum at the 
beg1nni.ng of 1990 revealed the level of fragmentation taking 
place. A party survey revealed that 200 proposals had been 
received by the party1s Central Congress Commission for 
consideration. Committee spokesman Jan Biszytga identified 32 
different political platforms and Aleksander Kwasniewski told 
reporters that his sub-committee had received 70 suggestions for 
the partyis new name25. 
From the June elections of 1989 to the end of the year the PZPRls 
parliamentary Ca11C1]S (KP P7.PR), with 173 members 1]nrler the 
leadership of Marian Orzechowski maintained unity. However 
decomposition commenced in the new year and by Summer 1990 
there were four different parliamentary groups with roots in the 
PZPR. These were: 
1. The Parliamentary 011]b of the Democratic T,eft (KP T,D). 
-Wormerl ~~l/l/90. 11 0 members 1]nrler the learlership of 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz. 
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2. The Parliamentary Club of the Social-Democratic Union (KP 
pus} Formed 2/3/90,44 members ·tmder leadership of Wieslawa 
Ziolkowska. 
3, The Club of Lndependent. MPs (KP N} Formed 1/2/90, 9 
members under Marian Czerwinski. 
4. The Club of Veteran MFs. 8 members. Led by Zbigniew 
Puzewiczsee Diagram 3.9 
.Diagram 3.9: Decomposition of PZPR Parliamentary Caucus 
~------'-'-----'--""'-""--'-' ._--_ .. _-_ .. __ .... _--_._--------_ .. -.--.--~-.-.~ ( . I Autumn 1989 Winter 1989 Spring 1990 Summer 1990 I 
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! I I KP PZPR KP PZPTI KP PUS KP LD i 
I
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I KPN i l.~====================================~J 
source: compiled from Inl-ca Slodkowska, Programy partii i 
lioOTupowan parlamentarnych 1989-91 Vol.l PAN Warsaw 1995 
nXTV - XVT) p~ . / 
The main party political offshoot of the PZPR the Social 
Democracy of the Hepublic Of Poland (SdRP26 ) led by Aleksander 
KVlTasn.ie-wski27, renounced and reversed many of t.he fundament.al 
policies of the communist past and projected itself as part of the 
Western European, social-democratic current. In its founding 
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document, published in February 1990, it announced itself in 
favour of Icivil societyl, elements of a free-market economy and a 
multi-party system. Observers of the political scene noted the 
process of disintegration and re-invention occurring in the 
COIIlllllJ_Il.ist. calnp duri:ng 1989/9028. Nevert.heless t.hey also saw 
that the ex-communists still held political ambitions29. 
In conclusion the communist camp could not be looked upon as a 
source of stable, democratic pOlitical organisations during the 
early transition period. The presence of an experienced elite, 
8xt8nsiv8 PT'OP8T'ty (alth011gh a 88jm bill of NOV8mb8T' 1990 
transferred most of these assets to the state on the grounds that 
th8y had b88n anqlJiT'8d ill8gally) and nOTItinlJ8d infllJ8nn8 in 
government suggested the strength of the post-cOInmunist camp. 
This potential was eventually confirmed by the victory of the 
post-communist Democratic Left Alliance - SLD - under 
Kwasniewski in the parliamentary elections of 1993. 
However in 1990 the disintegration and internal ideological 
manoeuvring contributed to the fragmentation and obfuscation of 
the Polish political spectrum. The emergence of offshoots of the 
PZPR into post-communist times under the banner of social 
democracy skewed the political spectrum by maki:ng other 
emergent parties reluctant to be associated with the Left. The 
group could playa potentially significant role in the legislative 
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processr30 but, for the time being, it was not in a position to take 
advantage of its superior infrastructure, experience and 
resources. It must be noted that the institutional disintegration of 
the PZPR could either hand legislative authority to a unified 
Solidarity or provide an incentive for political competition in the 
Solidarity camp. 
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The Non-Solidarity Opposition: The 'Salon of the Rejected' 
In 1989 the political strength of the non-Solidarity former 
opposition was ambiguous. In terms of territorial organisation., 
leadership and access to institutions the camp was weak. However 
its potential pOlitical influence "vas significant. It included 
organisations which had split from KOR~)l and mainstream 
Solidarity during the commurList period and those which had 
rema.ined 011t8ide the KOR!8olida.rity line from the 011t8et. A 1mo8t 
all could be characterised as Right wing in opposition to the 'Lay 
Left' intellectuals who formed the elite of KOR and subsequently 
Solidarity. 
In 1990 the only emerging party from outside the communist 
tradition which openly declared itself as left-Wing was the 
reactivated Polish Socialist Party. It faced several obstacles to 
orgarLising itself as a mass party. As a party of nostalgia it had to 
confront the difficulty of appealing to contemporary Poland while 
basing itself on a model which had been frozen in the 1940s. 
Moreover the PPS had traditionally been dominated by an elite, 
emigre core and had never developed a mass support. Above all 
the PPS had problems in coming to terms with the damage done 
to left-wing ideology by communist rule. Sharing the same part of 
the political spectrum with the successor parties of the PZPR 
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which had persecuted Polish socialists for so long was intolerable 
to elements of this current. All of these difficulties were reflected 
in nlliilerous internal splits and in its lo-vv membership and poor 
electoral performances. 
Apart from the PPS the most important emergent parties of the 
early transition period could be classed as Rightist. Unlike the 
secular, social-democratic or Marxist backgrounds of the Lay Left, 
the neo-liberal, Catholic, patriotic and radically anti-cOIDIDlli--llst 
ethos of the non-Solidarity camp found its inspiration largely in 
the traditions of the Right. 
The political weakness of the Right in 1989 was the result of 
traditional characteristics, communist repression and exclusion 
from Solidarity-dominated centres of political power in the early 
transition period. The Polish Right was traditionally poorly 
organised. The founder and editor of the emigre journal II Kultur all, 
Jerzy Giedroyc, has pOinted to the paradox that Poland is a 
conservative, Catholic, (right-wing ( society ruled by a small, leftist 
elite32. 
The Polish Left had the urban working class as a clearly defined 
social constituency and the close-knit, left-wing intelligentsia as a 
source of political leadership. Marxism and social democracy gave 
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the Polish Left well-defined ideologies on which to base its 
organisations. Under communism the Left dominated the central 
pOlitical institutions and the reformist wir...g of the PZPR 
eventually provided an institutional base of support to leftist 
opposition to the re~ime. 
The Polish Right was less certain of its potential constituency. Its 
various strands appealed to broad sections of Polish society but in 
a politically ill-defined way. Reference was made to the destiny of 
the Polish nation and the Polish people but in a country so long 
partitioned and dominated by powerful neighbours these concepts 
were vague and meant different thin.gs to different social 
cat.egories and geographical region:s:s. Rigrlt.-wing ideology in Poland 
can be divided into four strands: neo-liberal economistic, Christian 
Demo(~rat.ic, radical-independent. and Cat.holic-Nat.ioTlalist.34. "Rach of 
these had their own drawbacks when it came to political 
organisation in 1990. 
N eo-liberals 
The leconomisticl Right was forward-looking and ideologically close 
to what could be represented as Western neo-liberalism. It had 
gained momentum from the beginn.in.g of the 1980s with the 
experiences of some Polish economists who had studied and 
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lectured in the TJlJ est. It also drew strength from the general 
awareness in Poland of the challenge being offered to the Left in 
Western Europe by representatives of the New Right such as the 
Thatcher and Rea~an administrations. Liberal economic thou~ht 
does not have deep roots in the Polish tradition due to the 
underdevelopment of a native middle class, the natural 
constituency for this strand in the vVest. 
However, as we have seen. after the introduction of Martial Law 
some Poles looked to the dire condition of their own economy and 
found the New Right's critique of Left-wing economics applicable. 
Poland's economic plight had been caused by the imposition of the 
Communist command system. The Solidarity Trade Union's 
demands for worker rights had only made matters worse. 
Representatives of the neo-liberal Right looked to reform Poland's 
economy without challenging the PZPR's basic hold on political 
power:55. T'ney 8upported tne radical, 'l a i88e7.-faire ' concept8 of 
neo-liberali8m: "initiative, enterpri8e and a 8en8e of (~ompetition"0(). 
They stressed that state institutions should regulate but not 
control society and the market. 
In 1990 the leconomisticl Right saw one of the major tasks of the 
day as guiding society aT.JVay from the dependence of communist 
times, and if this entailed a period of synthetic political consensus 
while a cOInpet.it:ive market. was est.al)lished, t.hen so be ttY". 
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This strand was represented by groups such as the Union of Real 
Politics (upr{'3e) and the Gdansk Social and Economic Society 
IILiberals l Congress ll • These groups called for the i.iillnediate 
introduction of a completely free market economy, privatisation 
as quickly as possible, curbing of trade union power and the end 
of welfare provisions. Despite the weak traditions of liberal 
economic thought in Poland and the underdevelopment of the 
Polish middle-class this strand benefited from the emergence, at 
the start of the transition, of a general pro-market consensus in 
Polish society. The remains of the planned economy had to be 
dismantled and replaced by what is normally considered to be a 
Ifree market economyl. Mazowiecki1s Finance Minister, Leszek 
Balcerowicz, was obviously influenced by neo-liberal ideas as his 
Plan for economic reform illustrated. 
As the transition proceeded., a major drawback for this group in 
terms of political organisation emerged. The beneficiaries of the 
neo-liberal economic policies pursued by the Mazowiecki 
government were popularly conceived to be ex-communist 
enterprise mana~ers who had acquired private property throu~h 
the Rakowski administration1s controversial I nomenklatur a 
privatisation' and rapacious Western firms who were strippir...g 
Poland of its -best financial assets. This strand1s essentially 
nep:ative attitude to 'Solidaritv', trade unions and social welfare 
- - . 
undermined its popularity. Polish society1s appreciation of the 
363 
benefits of unbridled capitalism was mixed with an expectation of 
strong worker representation and basic welfare provisions. 
Indeed, the most vociferous critics of neo-liberalism were the more 
nationalist elements of the Polish Hight itself (see below). This 
contributed to the fragmentation of the Right. 
Christian Democrats 
This strand could be described as more Centrist than Rightist. Its 
roots lay ill. the founding of the Christian Democratic Movement 
(ch2.deQj2.) in 1902. Tt W2.S the C2.trw1ic Ch1JT'ch IS T'esponse to the 
rising popularity of socialism amongst industrial workers. It 
became very popular and was particularly strong in Silesia. Its 
policies were informed by an emphasis on Catholic social teaching. 
Thus while favouring features of the market system such as 
privatisation as important to individual dignity it also advocated 
state and social ownership. social services and welfare to protect 
all members of society . .lUthough the chadecja movement had a 
strong tradition to refer to in 1990. it faced several obstacles 
when it came to political organisation. Any party planning to 
utilise the strandls tradition would necessarily be a 'nostalgia 
party'. The chadecja strand had been broken in 1946 by 
communist repression and continuity was impossible. 
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The reactivated Labour Party (SP) which attempted this move 
faced such difficulties. Its programInes were dominated by those of 
its pre-WvVII ancestor and it openly called for discussions over 
what a Christian-Democratic movement amounted to in tr&~ition 
Poland. Representatives of the liberal, Catholic milieu were 
prominent durto.g the transition. The ZNAK movement with 
several dozen Clubs of the Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK) and the 
influential Tygodnik Powszechny played an important role in 
shaping political opinion. Moreover individuals such as the Prime 
Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Speaker of the Senate Andrzej 
Stelmachowski hailed from this milieu. However the ZNAK strand 
had been founded on the desire of moderate Catholic intellectuals 
to find a p-ragmatic mod118 vivendi with the (~omml1ni8t -regime39. 
In 1990 this commitment to a non-political approach to Poland1s 
problems continued. These luminaries were therefore not 
committed to organising an explicitly Christian Democratic party 
in 1990. 
National-Catholics 
This strand shared some of the economistic R1.ght1s characteristics 
but with more religious (i.e. Catholic) or nationalist orientations. 
It drew on tne trad.itiorw of the historic National Democratic 
Party (endecja) which, with its guiding light Roman Dmowski, 
dominated the Polish Right from the beg:inni:o.g of the 20th 
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century until the Second World War40. The most significant point 
of departure between the liberal-economic and 
national-conservative strands concerned Poland1s relationship 
with the W-est. Although in favour of basing systemic (especially 
economic) change on the experiences of other countries, this 
strand was conscious of specifically 'Polish' factors, in keeping 
with Dmowski's defensive, insular attitude to international 
relations. Instead of advocating the direct transferral of liberal 
economic practices from the West it stressed the need to adapt 
these systems to the unique cultural characteristics of the Polish 
condition. An....v policies emanatin.g from this strand would be 
based on the native Polish tradition and on an awareness of 
Polisn 11isto-ry 41. 
Several organisations of this strand could be traced to the split in 
the late 1970s between representatives of the Lay Left such as 
Michnil{. and Kuron and National-Catholic intellectuals such as 
Antoni -Macie-rewic7. in ROR 42. 'Tnis nad led to tne c-reation of 
ROPCi04~" as a -rival oppositioTl o-rganisation witn a mo-re 
nationalist, Catnolic (~na-racte-r44. ROPCiO in t1J-rn p-rodl1ced 
organisations such as The Young Poland Movement, The Political 
Club HOrder and Freedomu, The Political Society Young Poland and 
the Political Club lI]'reedom and Solidarityll. 
366 
In October 1989 some of these groups united to form the 
Christian National Union (ZChN40). Hostility to the old ILay Left I 
group which formed the intellectual leadership of KOR and 
ISolidarityl was apparent in ZChN policies. It called for the 
dissolution of the Lay Left-dorninated OKP and the encouragement 
of parties with an anti-Cormnunist pedigree. It also wanted the 
importance of the Catholic faith to Polish identity to be reflected 
in the new Constitution., institutions and legislation. 
Representatives of this milieu exercised some political influence. 
i'.J.exander Hall, leader of The Political Society Young Poland was 
Minister for Contact with Political Parties in the Mazowiecki 
Cabinet. However, the fLay Leftf was ir.1..l.fluential in the 
Mazowiecki goverrilllent and parliament and the fact that the 
leaders of the National-Catholic strand had distanced themselves 
from the Lay Left in opposition times meant that they were now 
peripheral in terms of access to political power. 
With its conservative social teaching and links to Poland's sense of 
national identity the Catholic Church provided an obvious source 
of support for this strand. It gave this strand a philosophical 
framework4G • It also offered institutional support. Nevertheless the 
support of the Catholic Church was not necessarily helpful when 
it came to political organisation. Unity was strengthened by the 
Church1s internal hierarchy and during cormnu.ljist repression it 
provided this strand with spiritual and practical sanctuary~ 
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However, although the Church represents an important public 
institution in Poland it does not offer direct access to formal 
political power. Under communism the pragmatic outlook of the 
GhllT'~n pT'e~111ded diT'e~t, polit,i~al a~t,ivit,y4'7'. 
However, as we shall see, conflict between the Church and the 
Mazowiecki government· and the increased political involvement 
of the former in 1990 raised the political influence of the 
Nat.ional/Catholic strancl48 , Parts of the agrarian political 
movement such as ZSL and PSL could also be included in the 
non-Solidarity camp. In 1989-90 it was a potentially significant 
political movement with a rich tradition, sizeable constituency, 
established political structures, and an experienced political elite. 
However the influence of the peasant movement was undermined 
by its traditional insularity and internal quarrels caused by the 
~omm1]nist,s' ~T'eat,ion of it,s own peasant, oT'ganisat,ion49. 
Pro-independence Radicals 
The radical Right consisted of several small but potentially 
significant groups which put the achievement of Polish 
sovereignty above all political priorities. Poland's past suiler:ing 
and its present ills were the result of foreign domination and the 
only remedy was full Polish sovereignty. The strand was part of a 
long tradition of nationalist insurrectionary organisations which 
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included 18th century groups and the pre-war Sanacja 
movement50. The strand virulently opposed communism as an 
instrument of Russian domination and was critical of the 
Solidarity movement1s Iconcillatoryl approach to the regime. It 
rejected the Round Table process and subsequently criticised the 
continued communist presence in the Sejm and the government 
and the tolerance of the nomenklatura under Mazowiecki. It thus 
refused to recognise the Mazowiecki administration as Poland1s 
first sovereign government of the post-communist period. By its 
very nature and aims this strand was ill-equipped to form mass 
political organisations. Based underground and relentlessly 
persecuted by the communist authorities the radical Right's 
rejection of the Round Table process also resulted in its absence 
from the centres of political power in the early transition period. 
It did have some centres of support in areas traditionally 
associated with strong resistance to communism. Its chief 
representatives were IIFighting Solidarityll and the Confederation 
of Tndependent Poland (KPNt)]), dominated by the personality of 
Leszek Moczulskf32. 
In SlL.-rnrnary, the non-Solidarity opposition in 1989 consisted of 
severaL poorly integrated organisations; unsure of their popular 
bases, led by a diffuse, ideologically confused elite and absent from 
the central instit1Jtions of political power5~5. 
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Categorisation of Parties 
The existence of different factions within these emergent political 
organisations whose values appeared to overlap with groups in 
other parties increased the fragmentation and complexity of the 
political scene during this period.G4• Within each organisation it 
was possible to identify neo-liberal economists and state 
interventionists, reformers and populists, clerical and anti-clerical 
factions. As a result of this ideological and organisational 
vagueness observers categorised parties through other criteria. 
For instance Ge bethner and J asiewicz placed emergent parties or 
'quasi-parties' into groups according to their antecedents rather 
than their current political Ii"i.ews. These were as follows: 
1. Post-Solidarity parties: PC, ROAD, and PSL 'Solidarity'. 
2. Post-P7.PR parties: SdRP, FUS, PST" ST) (and tne 1ess important 
PAX, nOns and P7.KS) 
3. Historic or Nostalgic Parties: SP, SN and PPS. 
4. Radical New Parties: KPN, ZChN, UPR 
However there was evidence that the emergent party spectrum 
could be grouped accordir....g to political issues, albeit in an 
inconclusive way. In April 1990 a questionnaire was given by the 
nWJVspaper 'Politvka' to the leaders of various pOlitical groups 
- - "-' - --
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"concernin.g their responses to the most important political, social 
and economic issues"BU• The questionnaire is worthy of close 
attention for two reasons. Firstly the questions give an insight 
into the important issues of 1990. Secondly, the answers challenge 
that traditional ideological divisions were obsolete. These 
differences did exist. AlthQugh the nascent pOlitical spectrum was 
not the best framework in which they could be perceived., it still 
hinted at ideological variations. 
State intervention in the economy, the balance of central state 
institutions and Gh1n'~h/8tate relations all be~ame watershed 
issues in the differentiation of the intelligentsia, Church, worker 
and peasant visions of Polish civil society. The Polish political 
scientist Krzysztof Palacki confirms the pertinence of the 
IPolityka l questionnaire by introducin.g a very similar set of 
criteria in his attempt to differentiate political organisations 
a~~ording to ideology. Tris ~ategories are as followsti6: 
1. The Economic Criteria - The duration and pace of state 
intervention in the economic sphere, privatisation and 
reprivatization of industries and banks, restructuring of the 
economic sector, the battle with inflation, unemployment, 
restructuring of agriculture sector according to farmers l models, 
social welfare and social services, openin.gs to foreign competition. 
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2. The Political Criteria - The Relations between the executive and 
legislature, the role of the judiciary in the state. 
3. The CUltural Criteria - vVhether to refer to civil society or the 
nation., the correct model for European integration., the 
relationship with national traditions, the role of the Church with 
the State, the role of the State in relation to morality and 
religious belief. 
Before exa:rnin.ing the responses to the POlityka questionnaire 
certain qualifications must be made. As noted previously 
communist rUle had distorted man..v of the labels and ideals of the 
Left in the eyes of Poles and this had skewed the political 
spectrum. Fledgling political organisations were understandably 
wary of associating themselves with the Left, even if their policies 
inevitably placed them in that part of the spectrum. It was also 
common for parties to brand rivals as left-wing in order to 
undermine their social popularity. One must also bear in mind 
that the value of certain criteria in terms of characterising 
parties was variable. For instance the cultural criteria would be 
of more importance in describing the ZChN whose main aim was 
pushing for an increased public role for the Catholic Church 
whereas the economic criteria was more important to the 
neo-liberal object.ives of UPH57. These qualificat.ions 
notwithstandio.g, the political questionnaire threw up some 
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interesting results for those concerned with the politics of the 
early tran.sition period. Despite the events of the communist era 
and the fluidity of the situation at that time, the overwhelmin.g 
majority of respondents thought that the traditional political 
divisions were still relevant. In the four criteria selected by the 
questionnaire and displayed in Diagram 3.10 one can see that 
parties which declared themselves to be close together on the 
traditional T ,eft/Centre/Right spectr1Jm for the most part grmJped 
together according to the criteria. It is also worth noting that the 
tendency of the Polish Right to espouse clerical and authoritarian 
va11Jes is also consistently i1l1Jstrated in the questionnaire (see 
Diagram ~~.I 0). 
Thus pOlitical differences, obvious in the anti-cornmunist 
movement of the 1970s and 1980s were observable in the nascent 
party political scene in 1990. For a more detailed presentation of 
the development of parties and their political programmes refer 
to Appendix I. Nevertheless. in summary the extra-Solidarity 
party political scene in 1990 was fragmented., unstable and 
unrepresentative. It1s condition suggested to the lintelligentsia in 
powerl that civil society ought to be nurtured through the 
structures of Solidarity. 
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(ii) The 'LLtelllgentsia irL PO"ver l and Political Reform 
The vleakness of state institutions and the party political 
spectr1L.~ coUld, and ~'Vere, seen as justificatior.ti3 for the 
concentration of state pOVlers at the onset of the J11:azo'V'Viecki 
period (see belovv p378). HO"vever tIle irilluence of tIle ethos of 
the traditional Polish intelligentsia Vlas a significant factor in this 
process. In Chapter 1 Vle established the Polish 1ntelligentsia as a 
milieu'V'Vhich combined the 'totalist ' perspective of the intellectual 
idiom 'V'Vith a desire to direct the vvrhole of Polish society through 
dogmatic use of the state. The elitism of the milieu urged it to 
concentrate political po--;,"rer in its OWTl hands because Polish 
SOCiety coUld not be expected to lead itself in the direction of 
modernityB8. Tnis approacn "vas observed in tne role of tne 
intelligentsia in the fragmentation and decline of the 
parliamGntary democracy of thG SGcond RGpublic and in the 
establishment of the cormnunist party-state. In 1990 this approach 
to po'V'Ver 'V'Vas apparent in trw political philosophy of the 
intelligentsia in power: Polish society was in no condition to 
develop democracy, thus democratic values had to be impoSGd on 
it by the mnieu tr...rough the state. 
The 'V'Vork of Adam lJIichnik, a prominGnt membGr of the 
IJIlarsa'V'V-based 'Lay Left I milieu -which this thesis identifies 'V"v-rith 
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the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia, was illustrative of 
this approach. l\f.[ichnik ,,"Jas an MP in the l\f.[azowiecki period, and 
widely seen as an influential member of the new elite59. According 
to him the intelligentsia's commitment to liberal, democratic 
values was joined in the anti-cornrnunist opposition by 
As the cement of anttcoIIL.-rnunism v.Thich had bound the 
intelligentsia to previously distant sections of Polish society 
disappeared vnth the regime the supporters of the 'intelligentsia 
in povler' feared that the emergence of undemocratic forces 
within Polish society vITould tr~eaten the authority of the 
Mazo,,"Jiecki govern.ment and its lmissionl to introduce democracy 
to the nation. If pro-lv1azovvtecki government unity was to be 
preserved then another cement, Bu."'1.other lenemyl, had to be 
The ne,,'\T 'enemy' identified was as much an indicator of the 
Mazowiecld government's intelligentsia pedigree as an appraisal of 
the potential threats to the introduction of a democratic civil 
society in Poland. In place of the old Ilus and tr ... em ll divide 1vlichnik 
suggested an Ilus and itll dialectic; it being Polish society's 
ever-present potential to slip into populist or authoritarian ways. 
Thus in 198990 the intelligentsia's negative attitude to and 
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alienation from the rest of POlish society re emerged after the 
unprecedented societal unity of the late communist period62. 
The fears of the 'intelligentsia in power' vvere heightened by its 
decision to give priority to the roform of the economy along 
liberal pro-Inarket lines as a vital step in the journey to the 
democratic West. The government feared that the social groups 
affected most severely by the trauma of economic transition had 
their OI/VTl., loss 'enlightened' visions of the reform process and that 
denying them a say could risk the emergence of authoritarian 
tend en ciesl-);-;. 
BronislavlT Geremek(H the VfarsavlT-haRed intellectlJal and leader of 
Bolidarity's parliamentary representation (OKpfitl) regularly 
expressed the intelligentsia's fears over Polish society's 
anti-democratic tendencies in the atmosphere of painful 
transitionCio • rT"he 'intelligentsia in power' proclaimed the 
democratisation of Polish politics just as it had heralded the 
liberalisation of the economic sphere through the Balcerovricz 
Plan. Hovrever, just as the nevv elite held on to economic power on 
account of the underdevelopment of the POlish economy, so 
political po,,'\Ter ,,'\Tas to remain vrith the state because it judged the 
Polisll political systern as too irnrnature and undernocratic. 
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J erzy Turo\tv1.cz, a prominent Oatholic intellectual and supporter 
of the lJ[azo\i\i'iecki government vvarned that the immediate 
development of political parties coUld lead to political crisis: IIIt 
tlu'eatens to destabilise the present political balance, to weaken 
the ernergir...g dernocracy. Nobody denies [new parties] the right to 
participation in public life, but they need to acquire a following 
first. Mazovv1.ecki's government should be given time to carry out 
its programme in peacellfj'i'. 'T'his strategy enjoyed t-he explicit 
support of the Mazowiecki government. Indeed at a meeting called 
to discuss reform of the OKP the Premier himsolf stated: III wish to 
confide in you my big ,/Vorry: please don't let this bGgL.-rm.i..c~ of 
Polish democracy into hell, the Polish hell of quarrels, rivalries 
and fights". Quarrels, rivalries and fights are part and parcel of 
the democratic political process and the desire of the Mazo\iv-iecki 
government to quell them betrayed its idealistic, intellectual 
character. 
Thus the intelligentsia, as Poland's foremost exponents of 
democracy, \iv-ould retain political control for the time being. Just 
as in the inter-vvar and communist periods, the development of 
political parties were seen as a threat to, rather than 
prerequisites of, democracy. The Mazovviecki government coUld 
thus be seen as the 1990 version of the 'despotism of the 
enlightened'G8 . The Solidarity movement was central to the plans 
378 
of the 'L.~tolligontsia in povV'"or' to maintain political control of the 
transition process. 
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The Mazovliecki Govermnent and 'Solidarity'. 
Of all the potential sources of political legitimacy in early 
transition Poland the Solidarity movement VIas best qualified. In 
1990 it operated both as a po-werful symbol of national unity and 
as the dorr..L.YJ.ant political organisation in Polish society. In 
sYlnbolic terrns Solidarity was credited., in Poland and elsewhere, 
vlith a vital role in the overthrovl of Commlli'1ism in East Central 
Europe68. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the old regime 
Solidarity's image as the h&"'T'.JIler of East-Central European 
communism 'v"las po-werful. Even after the introduction of the 
Balcerowicz Plan and its associated econornic strictures, over 50% 
of PoleR Rtill expr8RR tr1.1Rt in and Rl.lpport for 801idarity 'i'o. 
In organisational terms Solidarity's status VIas ambiguous. It was 
famous'v"lorld-wide as a trade union but in reality this side of the 
organisation had not recovered from the depredations of the 
Martial Law period. In 1990 available information provided 
tangible evidence of the decline. Polls taken by CBOS at the end of 
June 1990 showed that 35% of the respondents were uindifferent" 
to the fortunes of the movement and 10% considered themselves 
against Solidarity. Union activism 'v"las also at a very low ebb. At 
its peak in 1980 around ten million people belonged to the union. 
By June 1989 less than two million'v"lere paying their union 
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dues?\ In comparison t.he leader of t.he post.-PZPR uD-.ion OPZZ, 
Alfred Miodovlicz, claimed to have 6.5 million members at the end 
of 1989?~:.LTl 1990 t.here were Widespread report.s of fact.ories not. 
electing delegates, delegates faili.ng to arrive at meetings and 
failures t.o elect. fact.ory cOIDIDJ.ssioners?~~, A poll t.aken in lat.e 1989 
and reported in Tygocinik Solidarnosc sho'wed that there was no 
Solidarit.y presence in over 40% of t.he fact.ories canvassed.?4, 
Solidarity's status as a political organisation was also open to 
competing interpretations. In the aftermath of its decisive victory 
in the semi·free elections of CJune 1989, Solidarity seemed to be in 
a dO:rIlh""'lant position. It had organised a network of local 
organisations (the Citi7.ens' Committees) to he1p r1Jn its campaign 
for the June 1989 elections. The movement had over 1,000 
branches in most Polish towns and the number of activists was 
estimat.ed as between 90,000 and 100,000'7'5. Solidarity's 
comprehensive victory in the June 1989 elections· where it won 
all but one of the 161 contested seats in the Sejm and all but one 
of the seats in the Senate - paid testament to the efficacy of its 
political rnachine. 
However, closer analysis suggested that Solidarity's pOlitical power 
was less overwhelmiI)g than the election results implied. Although 
a turn-out of 62% was comparable to those for elections in 
developed liberal democracies in the If'! cst, it was 10v'\Ter than the 
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66% turnout for the Sejm elections of autumn 1985 (as estimated 
by Solidarity activists). Given the unprecedented nature of the 
1989 election in terms of the level of free choice and the amount 
of campaigning allowed, the turnout was low. The obvious 
conclusion is that Polish society's support for SOlidarity was not 
total. Sociologists discovered a strong correlation between those 
who had expressed support for Solidarity throughout the Martial 
Law period and those who voted for the movement in June 1989. 
Parts of Polish society outside the Solidarity traditiOn., associated 
mostly with economically underdeveloped and socially fragmented 
regions, remained 1arge1y ol1tside of p01itics'ie. Observers of the 
election explained that Polish society, in the grip of economic 
recession., was more concerned with survival than political 
participation. Moreover, it was sceptical of what Solidarity could 
do to improve the sit1Jation'i"I'. 1'he fact that the standard of living 
of the majority of Polish society was set to worsen considerably 
with the launch of the Balcerowicz Plan is salient in this context. 
Solidarity's political stand.ing was bound to suffer with the 
introduction of the plan under the auspices of a 'Solidarity 
government' . 
In terms of institutional support the Solidarity movement 
appeared to have a dOIninant position. Besides the obvious 
assistance provided by SOCiety-based institutions such as tl18 
Solidarity Trade Union and the CathOlic Church, the movement 
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had made significant inroads into state bodies after the 1989 
elections. Although the key Ministries of Internal Affairs and 
Defence (which were still held by the ex-Communists Czeslavv 
Kiszczak and Florian Siwicki) the Mazowiecki government was 
dominated by Solidarity members (the premiership and 10 of the 
20 government posts went to Bolidarity' members with the PZPR 
ga:in.ing 6, and its former satellites ZSL and SD two apiece). With 
the fragmentation of the communist caucus in the Sejm, 
Solida1'ity's pa1'liamenta1'Y 1'ep1'esentation (OKP) became the 
dominant force in the lower house. The Senate, which had been 
freely elected in June 1989, was virtually filled by Solidarity 
mernbers. 
Moreover it counted amongst its leadership national figures such 
as VT alesa, Mazowiecki and Geremek who had gained political 
experience in the detailed negotiations of the Round Table. 'The 
Solidarity elite enjoyed significant approval amongst society as the 
he1'oes of the st1'1]ggle against comm1]nism (see 'T'able 3.11). 
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Source: 'Poles' opinions - Summer 19901 published in S. Gebetl1.ner 
and K. Jasiewicz, Dlaczego Tak Glosowano PAN Warsaw 1993 
p33). 
Months after the introduction of the Balcerowicz reforms public 
confidence in the leaders of the Solidarity movement and in the 
elite of the 'Solidarity government 1 (Mazowiecki, Walesa, Geremek, 
8t8lmachovllBki, TJ8towska, Kuron, Balc8rOwic7.) was appar8nt 
(d8spit8 mixed political fort-nnes in the intervening years some of 
th8S8 individ-nals r8main extr8mely popular in Poland)'i8. Tn 
comparison the old commllnist elite (cTarl17.elski, Kwasniewski) 
was compromised in the eyes of Polish society and the leaders of 
nascent Right-wing political forces (Bartos7.c7.e, Korvvin-Mikke) 
were simply not vet recofUlised as flRures of national sifUlificance. 
- - "'" - - -
For a more detailed political biographies of some of these figures 
see Appendix ll. 
In summary, Solidarity's symbolic importance, institutional 
support, organisational penetration at grass-roots and leadership 
crodibility placod it in a dominant political position in 1990. The 
fragmented., weakly developed party political spectrum could not 
compete with Solidarity's pOlitical strength and poplJlar support'i'9_ 
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For the iintelligentsia in power I the Solidarity movement 
represented the best opportunity to carry out its elitist version of 
state led democratic transition. The ISolidarity ethosl espoused by 
the Mazo-wiecki goverrllnent and its supporters stressed the 
movement1s roots as a collective, national community. 'The 
political unity of Solidarity, rather than its diverse social 
constituents, vvas stressedl.lo. This mirrored the intelligentsiais view 
of itself as a national emanation and its desire to continue to 
address society as a sin.gle, politically homogeneous entity. The 
assw.'Tlption was that just as all I good Polesl had united in 
Solidarity behind the intelligentsia1s articulation of 
anti-communist feeling so they would remain together behind the 
version of the reform process espoused by the lintelligentsia in 
pO\J'lerl. 
This was the Icivil societyl envisioned by the intelligentsia: a 
society willir~ to accept the rule of its most enlightened citizens 
as they moved the country towards democracy. Observers noted 
hO\/v the general elitism of the J11azowiecki administration, which 
excluded non intelligentsia reform programmes, was altering the 
essence of the Solidarity movement from social activism to 
etatismiJ1• 
This vision of Solidarity as a representative of the collective 
identity of Polish society and its unity behind the intelligentSia 
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took a spocliic, practical form. The }v'Iazovliecki goverlli"'1lent and its 
supporters in the intelligent.sia sought to harness its ernotional 
and institutional force by transforming it into a social movement 
or an American style I super partyl. Adam Michnik regu.larly 
argued that Solidarity as a Trade Union was siInply not enough in 
transition tlines and that it ought to act as a pOlitical supporter 
of the new goverlli"'1lent in its struggle to institute a democratic, 
'"1 "+- 52 C1Vl SOClebY " 
The case of the American system VJas cited as an example of the 
party politics favoured by the }J[azowiecki government1s 
intel1ectl.la1 Sl.lpport. Senator Andr7.~j Celinski (WarsavIT 
intellectl.Jal and ex KOB memher) en'ilisaged t.he development of 
an A..."'1lerican-style two party system in the form of Solidarity and 
a reformed remnant of t.ne Comml.Jnist. Part.y5<s. Asked if ne saw 
the A..."'1lerican model as appropriate to Polish circumstances, 
Zbigniew Bujak, a prominent member of Solidarity1s intelligentsia 
What the social movement and mass party models have in 
common is that they eschew exclusive identliication with one 
social group or class 01' one geographical region. Instead they 
tend tOlivards coalitions of interests and representation of a 
nlli"'1lber of social groups and regional interests through reference 
to very general and rnoralistic categories. Thus such an 
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organisation suited the 'totalist', 'nationwide' perspective of the 
intelligentsia. We have already noted the attraction of Western 
political intellectuals to the 'new social model' as a means of 
reasserting their identityBl3. At thi point it is interesting to note 
that in 1990 the equivalents of the 'intelligentsia in power' in 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia exhibited similar attitudes to th 
political sphere. Organisations such as the Alliance of Free 
Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic Forum in Hungary and 
the Public Against Violence in Czechoslovakia lacked significant 
social constituencies and wre dominated by intellectuals. However 
each was infused with the tendency to address the nation as a 
whole, to reject the eflicacy of pressi:ng political issues and conduct 
discourses on a lofty, moral plane. As we shall see, the 
acrimonious disintegration of these groups was mirrored in the 
fragmentation of Solidarity. 
Solidarity's national and local structures were central to the 
intelligentsia's plans to create a 'catch-all l party or social 
movement. With the disintegration of the communist caucus in 
parliament, 8olidarity's Parliamentary Cl1Jh (OKP) neld tne 
initiative in the legislature and it was to act as the intellectual 
head of the movement. All members of the OKP entered 
Parliament after the June 1989 elections, when they stood under 
the Solidarity list personally sanctioned by Lech IJValesa and his 
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intellectual advisers. The O.KP had a high intelligentsia 
representationfJ6 • 
At local level Solidarity1s citizens I committees also had an 
important part to play. These committees were formed after an 
appeal by the National Citizens! Committee to the public to help 
run the campaign for the June 1989 elections. Typically citizensl 
committee members were veteran Solidarity activists and local 
notables (lravvn from the intelligentsia miliel.]8'r. 801idarity's 
overwhelmin.g victory in the June 1989 elections demonstrated 
the political effectiveness of the committees and in the local 
elections of }J.I.ay 1990 the citizens I committees again demonstrated 
their ability to rally support for the Solidarity cause. As the 
grass-roots of the movement, these territorial organisations would 
provide the key to those intelligentsia elements who wanted to 
transform Solidarity into a nation-wide, pro-Mazowiecki social 
movement. 
The main author of the intelligentsials plan was Henryk Wujec. 
Wujec was secretary of the IICitizens l Committee of Solidarityll or 
IICitizensl Committee by Lech Walesa ll (KO fJfJ ), the now largely 
defunct group of intellectuals appOinted by Walesa to advise 
Solidarityls labour leaders in the Round Table process. Wujec 
wanted to formalise links between this national body and its 
territorial equivalents. He envisaged a federal structure involving 
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representatives from each province and a secretariat headed by 
the pro-Mazowiecki leader of the Warsaw citizens I committee, 
Zbigniew BujakoD. In effect this would institutionalise the 
intelligentsia1s leadership of a national, civic organisation. It would 
support the reform prograrmne introduced by the government of 
the Ibest and brightest I and act as a central component of the 
intelligentsia-led development of democracy by flat. 
The intelligentsia1s elitist vision of political transition was also 
rel1ected in its favoured option for electoral law. Solidarity1s 
intellectual leadership, whicll dorninated its parliarnentary 
representatio~ advocated a straight majority or Ifirst past the 
post system l • This was based on the electoral formula of the June 
1989 elections which had served Solidarity1s interests so well. The 
option would have denied access to the Sejm for emerging parties 
which at that time had not mustered widespread support. It 
would have guaranteed parliamentary dominance to those MPs 
elected in June 1989 under the aegis of Solidarity. Thus, while the 
weak condition of state institutions and the party system were 
reasons for the concentration of state power under Mazowiecki 
the elitist, etatist ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia 
played a significant part. Determination to concentrate power in 
intelligentsia hands through the instrument of Solidarity was 
evident. 
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Once again., before exam.in.ing the short-term consequences of the 
Mazowiecki government's approach to political reform one must 
acknowledge its long term achievements. Critics point to the high 
turnover rate of administrations since the Mazowiecki period as 
evidence of the weakness and instability of Polish democracy. 
However, despite several char~es in govermnerrt, the -basic rules 
of democratic politics have been followed. The imminent prospect 
of Poland's involvement in the process of European integration 
pays testament to the current stability of the political scene. 
Given the social explosion inherited by the Mazowiecki 
government in 1989 the achievement of the Mazowiecki 
government in paving the way for this democratisation process is 
Significant. 
In the short-term, the consequences of the elitist approach of the 
'intelligentsia in power l to political reform were negative. While in 
times of revolution society could be mobilised in a unified way 
through reference to national universal or moral criteria, the 
establishment of a democratic, civil society requires the 
recognition of social plurality and diversity. As we have seen, deep 
political and socio-econornic cleavages were ever-preserit in 
inter-war and communist POland. Differences within the 
intelligentsia and between the rnilieu and other sections in Polish 
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society were apparent even duri:n.g Polish society's period of 
greatest unity in the 11=)70s and 11=)80s90. 
In 1990 the emergent party political scene suggested the depth of 
social cleavages and introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan 
deepened thern in the short-terrn at least. The atternpt by the 
'intelligentsia in power' to stille the expression of these differences 
was contrary to the development of a modern, democratic civil 
society and illustrative of the milieu's elitist, idealistic vision of 
Polish democracy. What was worse, the attempt by the 
Mazowiecki government to stifle the development of political 
parties, in the context of radical socio-economic flux led to the rise 
of populist, anti-intellectual forces in Mazowiecki's Poland and the 
disintegration of Solidarity. Intellectuals disillusioned with the 
pace and direction of Mazowiecki's reforms and the role allocated 
to them in the new circumstances began to form a populist 
critique of the Jintelligentsia in powerJ. eJaroslaw and Lech 
Kaczynski, Gdansk-based intellectuals who were hostile to the 
political domination of the Warsaw-based Lay Left emerged to lead 
an anti-Mazowiecy,J. campaign. 
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(ill) The Rise of Populism and the Disintegration of Solidarity 
In chapter one populisrn w-as presented as a backlash to the 
intellectual-led processes of modernisation. Usually mobilised -by 
alienated intellectuals they contrast the characteristics of 
progress (urbanisation, secularisation, economic liberalisation, 
parliamentary democracy etc.) with a nostalgic evocation of past 
c;Hrt.aint.ie8 (11811ally ha8ed on c;on8ervat.ive r11ra1 vall1e8 81](;h a8 
conservat.ism, re-ligi011s piet.y, et.hnicit.y etc.). Rach brand of 
populism is characterised through opposition to the forces leading 
the process of modernisation in a given society. Thus in Poland 
populism tended to include anti-intellectual and anti-Semitic 
e 1 em en t.SSll . 
In 1990 the conservatism and traditionalism of Polish and East 
European populism could not be compared with conservative 
political forces in Western Europe. In the West those seeking to 
include and defend moral and cultural values did so within the 
framework of modernity. Traditional categories of religion and 
nationhood were suppl8Inented by the Inodern. liberal econonlic 
ideals of individual initiative, free enterprise and limited 
government. In Eastern Europe the modernised strain of 
conservatism did not take root. The values of populism were 
largely frozen in the 1940s with the political repression which 
accompaIlied the advent of commurnst rule. Thus in 1990 Polish 
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populists harked back to the pre-communist period. Communism 
was regarded as an imposed, alien system which had stifled the 
expression of true Polish values. It is important to note that using 
pre-WWII history as a template for transition Poland ignored the 
rnassive socio-economic changes w-hich occurred under 
communism: the end of rural overpopulation, the growth of the 
urban, industrial work-force and the spread of industrial working 
methods. Conceptions of citizenship, democracy and capitalism 
have undergone profound changes in general since 1945 and Poles 
a.re conscious of these o eve-I opments92. 
In the context of the transition period Polish populism thus 
stressed the importance of identiiy-mg and protecting Polandls 
traditional identity as revealed by the interests of the majority of 
Poles. All vestiges of the I alieni communist interlude had to be 
removed immediately. This included a call for fresh parliamentary 
and presidential elections. The new state had to be shaped with 
the traditional vision of the Polish community in mind. The new 
Constitution had to enshrine the values of a traditionally Catholic 
society. Politically, populists looked for a presidential rather than 
parliamentary system of government9 ;:). This reflected the populist 
desire for I direct I contact between political leaders and the people. 
A powerful Sejm was seen as an unrepresentative, unnecessary 
impediment, especially in it IS 'contractual' condition following the 
Round Table a~reernent between the cornrnunists and Solidarity. 
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The 'Janus' quality of economic populism was also apparent. The 
need for modernisation and economic improvement was clear to 
all. This obviously involved rationalisation and tIle introduction 
of some free-IIlarket or nco-liberal ideals. However Poles had to be 
protected from the worst consequences of economic transition. 
The state was expected to intervene to this end. The political and 
economic motives of foreign interests were viewed with suspicion. 
Western models were unrealistic guides for transition Poland. 
They had taken decades to evolve and could not be transplanted 
in toto to Poland. Instead. Poland's own resources and traditions 
were to be nurtured. Polish firms had to be protected from the 
forces of international capitalism which would strip them of what 
assets they had. Accord.ing to populists the father of the 
Balcerowic7. Plan was the h11rea11CN.l.cy of the TMF (a-Iheit with the 
A.ssistance of professors with good Polish names) and the mother 
was the Lay left which was intent on preservi.ng the old regime's 
economic privileges (e.g. thr011gh tolerating the practice of 
'nomenklat1Jra privatisation'). Between t:hem the government and 
the West had deepened the nation's economic plight94. 
The complete collapse of communist power, dominance of the 
government and Parliament by Solidarity's intellectual elite 
which refused to support the development of political pluralism, 
and the growing awareness of the social and cultural costs of 
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transition spurred the emergence of populism Opposition to the 
Mazowiecki government unified under a radical, populist banner 
by taking pOlitical advantage of its exclusion from central state 
instit utions. 
The Mazowiecki Government's strategy was interpreted by 
populists as an attempt by a narrow, disinterested and 'not quite 
Polish' elite to consolidate power and introduce reform for its own 
benefit. Central to this argument was the perception of the Round 
'fable (at whi~h non-intertigentsia elements exerted peripheral 
infl1]en~e only) as the O1]t~ome of a se~ret bargain betvveen 
related ~omml1nist and Eiolidarity intellect1]al elites9tl. 
The 'Magdalen}{a' talks consisted of preliminary discussions held 
between Government, Solidarity and Church representatives to 
prepare the way for the wider Round Table tall{s. rrhe presence of 
radical elements within both communist and Solidarity camps 
meant. t.hat. t.hese t.alks had to be ~arried 01]t. in se~re~T6. 
The suspicion and anger of the emergent, populist Right were 
aroused by the secrecy surrounding these meetings and the social 
and political bacl~O'J'ound of the participants. 
Critics of the 'Magdalenka' pointed to the social and ideological 
background of the Solidarity representation which, they claimed., 
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more closely r~sernbled its cornrnunist couIlterparts than the 
SOlidarity movement on whose behalf it was supposed to act. 
Though labour leaders Walesa, Gil and Frasyniuk were present, 
the Solidarity-opposition representation at Ma~dalenka -was 
largely drawn from the intelligentsia. WelllITlown members of 
Warsaw's Lay Left intellectual elite such as Geremek, Kuron and 
Michnik. were prominent at the talks and they had also been 
associated with the party and the communist system in the past. 
During the discussions the government showed it was aware of 
the close comparisons being drawn between the status and 
pOlitical outlook of both sides and the difficulties this could cause 
within the Solidarity camp. Indeed it was prepared to use the 
threat of intra-Solidarity strife on this theme to its advantage. At 
one point in the talks the Solidarity side, traditionally hostile to 
its comm·unist tT'aile 1]nion T'iva.1, dema.nded tha.t t-he OP7.7.9'i' he 
banned from the Round Table. Government representative 
Andrzej Gdula replied, IIIT we close the possibility of the OPZZls 
participation at the Round Table, the accusation will be repeated 
that the ~overIllnent elite has reached an understanding with the 
Solidarity elite behind the backs of the working class ll8a • 
SubsequentlY delegates from the OPZZ were invited to the Round 
Table. At the talks the OPZZ took the opportunity to cite itself as 
the true representative of the work.ing class, which had been 
abandoned by the Solidarity elite. In his openir).p; speech at the 
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Round table OPZZ leader Alfred Miodowicz warned that IIWe must 
not delegate our thinking to the privileged few fl9D • 
It shoUld be noted that the Jewish origins of prominent Solidarity 
negotiators such as Michnil-\: and Kuron at the I Magdalenl-\:a I suited 
Polish populism1s traditional stereotype of an I outsider I or lenemy 
of the people llOO. Moreover the fact that both communist and 
Solidarity elites hailed largely from a Warsaw background fuelled 
traditional Warsaw/provinces resentments. 'Tne S11spicions of tnose 
groups denied access to the Magdalenka and Round Table were 
heightened by the subsequent success of these meetings as a 
nursery for the political elite of Poland. In the Spring of 1989 the 
f1Citizens l Committee by Lech Walesall published a book called 
II"Whols Whorl containing pictures, biographies and declarations of 
the people who made up the lopposition-8olidarity side I at the 
Round Table talks. In June 1990 its successor was published and 
some journalists suggested that it should be entitled liWho Became 
Whom?1I101. 
Of the 241(' opposition-Solidarity participants at the Round Table 
talks 28 became lVIPs and 35 Senators: One in four became 
members of the OKl? Besides the Premier one coUld find seven 
Ministers derived from the Round Table team: J. Ambroziak A. 
Balazs, A. Hall J. Kuron, A. Paszynski, H. Samsonowicz and W. 
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Trzeciakow-sY,i. rl'he ROUIld Table also prov-lded 14 Secretaries and 
Under-secretaries of State. 
More than 10 people from the ROUIld Table took up influential 
positions in the rnass rnedia. 'Yhis group included D. Hikus and J. 
Moskwa who took charge of IIRzeczpospolita", A. Michnik and H. 
Luczywo who became editors of i1Gazeta Wyborcza" and M. 
llowiecki who became head of the Association of Polish Journalists 
(8DP). 'The I'ecT'lJitment of Poland's elite fI'om the ROl1nd 'Tahle 
continued well into the transition. In 1992 an article in Tygodnik 
PowszechIl,..Y highlighted how the ROUIld Table had proven to be a 
"royal road" to the highest political positions: "So far (in the first 
half of 19921 that representation has had drawn from its ranks a 
President of the Republic, two Premiers, 13 Ministers, 5 secretaries 
of State, a spol{:esman for citizens' rights, a high Chief Justice, a 
head of the State's Electoral Commission, two heads of the Chief 
BoaI'd of 81JpeI'vision and d07.ens of f11t1JI'e paI'liamentaI'ians"102. 
Given these factors it was easy to interpret the Magdalenka 
process as constituting some form of 'deal' between the 
intellectual leaders of Solidarity and the intelligentsia-based elite 
of the PZPR. Even the government sociologist J adwiga Staniszkis 
complained about the new eute's exclusivenesslO!S. One of the most 
vociferous critics of the 'Magdalenka' was Jaroslaw Kaczynski104, a 
fOUIlder of the Centre Alliance (PClOS). Throughout 1990 he 
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claimed that secret lL.T).derstandir}gs had been made at Magdalenka, 
even though his t-win brother Lech, who had attended the 
discussions, denied this assertion. By 1994 he had conceded that 
no deals had been formally struck but maintained that a secret 
agenda had been present. According to him the communists had 
used the Magdalenka to guarantee their own survival, safe in the 
knowledge that their financial interests would be looked after and 
that their (mrrent elite (e.g. KwaRniewRki) waR Y011ng eno-ugh to 
revive its political fortunes in the future. Kaczynski even claimed 
that Kwasniewski and Adam Michnik had their own little Round 
Table in AUooust 1989 where Michnik had told the communist that 
there had to be a Iparty of the brightest ', in which a place would 
be funnd for him 106. 
The accuracy of such anecdotes is open to question but one should 
not underestimate the potency of this anti-intelligentsia, populist 
interpretation of the Magdalenka and Round Table processes. 
Four years later anti-communists continued to view the 
Magdalenka F.l.B a pla(;e where "open (;omml1niRtR (KiR7.(;7.ak, 
t'Jarl.J7.elRki, Ciosek) rec:whed an l.Jnderstanding 1/ITith their own 
order to hold on to power, rob Poland, and cheat true Poles and 
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By deIl}'1n.g significant strands of the intelligentsia access to the 
arena where the future shape of Poland was being decided, even 
after the collapse of communist power, the Lay Left made a virtue 
of their political opponentsi non-institutional character and gave 
them a potent, populist cause. Consequently parties which 
emerged on the pOlitical scene in the early transition period 
contained elements of the radical populist agenda outlined here. 
In the state of economic austerity and political uncertainty of 
early transition Poland the emergence of various radical, populist 
Right-Wing organisations outside the main arena of political power 
was potentially destabilising for the Mazowiecki government. 
These parties clearly regarded the intelligentsia cadre of the new 
elite as unrepresentative of and unsympathetic toward the 
interests of Polish societylOIJ. Anti-intelligentsia, anti-capitalist, 
anti-Semitic, anti-urban sentiments, when given political form 
obviously undermined the authority of the Mazowiecki 
government and threatened political instability. 
More seriously for the future of the Mazowiecki government, 
populist, anti-intellectual currents were observable within the 
Solidarity movement itself. Despite its resources and the 
intelligentsiais emphasis on unity, the Solidarity movement1s 
ability to foster consensus was severely hampered by the 
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emergence of deep internal crisis at the start of the transition. 
Under COIIlIIlUIllsm the movernent had been seen by the 
opposition as the guardian of Polish civil society and its 
democratic aspirations. Consequently the debate over what civil 
society and democracy amounted to in transition Poland was 
inextricab1y 1inked to 801idarity's own identity 109. 
Solidarity's internal differences, amongst its intelligentsia cadre 
and between its different social constituents, had been evident 
from the movement IS inception and they had continued to 
iniluence the movement's activities throughout the 1980S11O. 
However Solidarity's primary function as an anti--communist force 
t ;J ·t 111 g-l1aran ,eeu un1 ,y . 
'I'he conditions of post-communist Poland were not conducive to 
this type of unity. The common, communist foe was in disarray, 
the rigours of the Balcerowicz Plan were mak.ing themselves felt 
and the battle in Polish society for a say in the transition process 
was beginnin.g. Despite the assumptions of the SOlidarity-based 
intelligentsia the nux of the early transition period was bound to 
overwhelm the fixed formula of Solidarity's anti-communist 
past1l2. 
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The struggle which ensued was fought on personal and 
institutional terms and the Bolidarity' movements advantages in 
terms of the prestige of its leaders and its institutional bases were 
severelyaffected1l3. 
In December 1989 the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan was 
marked by a Solidarity conference, designed to demonstrate the 
movement's unity and bolster goverrnnent support from all 
sections of Polish society. However, before the 'Forum on the 
Solidarity Ethos' commenced, observers noted the competing elites 
within the movement. The journalist Piotr Wierbicki wrote an 
influential article on intra-Solidarity politics. He identified three 
groups within the movement, the 'FamilY', the 'Retinue' and the 
'Court' which can be related to the competing agendas just 
0l.1tlin8d 8aT'li8T'114. 
Within Solidarity the intelligentsia strand was espoused by 'The 
Family': (t118 clos8-knit., 8X KOR int.8118ct.l.lals of t.118 WaT'saw-has8d 
'TJay TJ8ft') and '1'118 R8tinl.18' (t.118 pT'ovincial, lfh8T'al-Cat1101ic 
intelligentsia-based iSrouP concentrated around Prime JVIinister 
Mazowiecki). As we have seen, durirlg the late communist period 
differences between these strands had been overcome. The 'Lay 
Left' abandoned its commitment to Marxian economics and 
adopted the neo·liberal approach of the provincial milieu. The 
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secular Warsaw group had also been attracted to the moderate, 
tolerant Catholicism of Mazowiecki's group. 
The cadre of the Mazowiecki administration and the new 
parliarnent was dominated by this alliance. Alexander Hall 
(moderate nationalist and Minister of Oontact with Political 
Parties), Leszek Balcerowicz and Tadeusz Skryjczyk (neo-liberals 
and Ministers of Finance and Tndustry respectively) and Andr7.eJ 
Stelmachowski (Christian democrat and Speaker in the Senate) 
were all members of the lVIazowiecy,i circle. Jacek Kuron 
(Minister of TJah01rp and memher of SeJm Commissions for 
Administration and Foreign Affairs), Bronislaw Geremek 
(Chairman of the Sejm Commissions on Foreign Affairs and the 
Constitution and Chairman of the OKP and Adam Michnik 
(Memher of Sejm Commissions on C1Jlt1]re and Mass Media, 
Foreign Affairs and the Constit1]tion) were the most prominent 
members of the 'Lay Left'. In IlTygodnik Solidarnosc" Jadwiga 
Staniszkis argued that the JVlazowiecki government contained the 
infhwnce of hoth 'The Famfly' and 'The Retin11e"lltJ. 
Wierbicki himself subscribed to the populist vision of Polish 
democracy. His book of 1985 IIThoughts of an Old-fashioned Pole" 
acclaimed Dmowski's brand of Polish nationalism (the title echoes 
Dmowski's seminal work "Thoughts of an Up-to-date Pole") and 
advocated the elevation of Lech Walesa to a semi-dictatorial rolellO . 
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~Alierbicki's populism could be related to one of the groups he 
identified \/vrithin Solidarit:{ 11'1 late 1989 'The Court'. He 
associatod this group 1tlith Lech \"1 aiesa and his follo1tvrers. 
Although the outlook of this group VIas initially lL.-rrJ.ted to the 
political ambitions of its chief, 1l'lalesa's importance as s:y7JIlbol and 
leader of the vlorkir~ class and his attacllment to conservative 
elements in the Catholic Church placed his camp ill tho populist 
tradition. r~ehe main press organ of this group ,lras the Solidarit~r 
been edited b:r ]\lLazovvriecld until his appointment as Premier. rrhe 
editorial staff VIas subsequently changed by Walesa himself. He 
filled it vIith mar.J."..V of his OVln supporters, such as the 
Gdansk-based intellectual Jarosla,/\T KaCZ}T.L8ki VJho felt excluded 
from the closetr-lL.-rUt VI arSa1tfJ milieu vlhich \lYJ&S ir.illuential in the 
l\1azo1.rJiecki ad.l'TIinistration. 
As the neVI governm.ent's tenure proceeded II Tygo dnik. Solidarnosc" 
developed a populist .. anti-intellectual critique of its approach to 
the transition. 'The neVI alli-rnir..istration and its supporters -rI\TOTl-O 'VVV..L V 
criticised as bcir.J5 elitist, lackL.~ trust in society 1s COITu"'TIon ser~o, 
ha .... v-ri.u~ an undemocratic relationship vIith the majority of society. 
1/vojciech Sadurski noted the emergence of the populist vision in 
the nevITspaperll'r, Throughuut 1990 it presentecl the populist 
prograrr.unG as an alternative to the policies of the 1v1azo,tJiecki 
goverr.u.lient. Articles VIere marked \i"lith the demfu"'l.d for an 
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immediate reckon.ing with ex-communists, the rejection of the 
logic of the Round Table agreement and the call for completely 
free presidential and parliamentary elections as a means of 
bringing all Polish society into the transition processlld . 
As far as the Solidarity movement itself was concerned, the 
populist line of the ICourtl emphasised its role as a defender of the 
workers! interests. The perception of the Mazowiecki 
administration as a ISolidarity government I increased the danger 
of the movement!s structures and symbolism being subjugated to 
the political line of the new elite. Thus a significant part of Polish 
society, the SOlidarity-oriented worl{ers, would have their 
independent input into the transition process severely curtailed. 
This was occurring at a time when Balcerowicz!s reforms of the 
economy were causing particular suffering amongst the workers; 
when workers! interests ought to be asserted most forcefully. 
Tensions between these groups within Solidarity eventually led to 
open conflicts which pulled the movement!s structures apart. 
406 
Conflict Over OKP 
The conflict between elitist and populist forces within Solidarity 
was reflected in the movement is Parliamentary representation. 
Solidarity's intellectual elite had set great store in preserving 
pro-reform unity within the OKP with the hope that it would 
become a lead:in.g component of a SOlidarity-based social 
movE'}mE'}nt1l9. HowE'}vE'}T' tE'}nRionR WE'}T'E'} appaT'E'}nt in thE'} hooy fT'om 
the outset. rrhough the Presidium of the OKP was dominated by 
tnE'} social E'}litE'} of t"hE'} VlaT'saw-hasE'}o intE'}rIigE'}ntsia (inch]oing Sl.]Cn 
figures as Geremek Henryk Wujec, Hanna Suchocka and Andrzej 
8tE'}lmachoV"vski) its mE'}mhE'}T'R1iip waR po1itically hE'}tE'}rogE'}nE'}01]R Tt 
included prominent leaders of different groups and interests. New 
political parties had emerged just prior to the cJ une 1989 election, 
including some whose members had been active under the 
a1.1RpicE'}R of 801ioarity from thE'} Ol.ltSE'}t120. Tt also consiRtE'}O of pE'}oplE'} 
who had little or nothing to do with the Solidarity movement 
during opposition times but now recognised the opportunity to 
~ain a seat in Parliarnent. 
As conflicts intensified the populists saw the Sejm as a vital 
foothold in a political arena which was otherwise dominated by a 
Warsaw coterie of intellectuals. The attitude of NiP Jan 
Lopuszanski exemplifies the emergence of political opposition to 
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the pro-UIJity OKP leadership. P.J.though elected under the auspices 
of the Solidarity movement, he was a member of the 
(;hristian-National Union (Z(;hN) which espoused a Right-wing 
nat,ional/clerical programme. Wit.h ot.her ZChN MP's St.efan 
Niesiolowski and Marek Jurek12\ Lopuszanski formed a party 
lobby. Although unable to formally represent their party in 
Parliarnent because they were not elected as its rnernbers, they 
expressed the ZChN's line in debates and voting, often in 
opposition to the OKP m8jority (c.f. abortion and religimJs 
ed1JCation iss11es). T.0p11S7.anski stated that, althmlgh not acting in 
the name of the party, he wmJld represent it in elections"122, He 
also pressed for a formal split of the OKP into separate party 
organisations free from the OKP whip. 
Before examining the emergence of organisations within the OKP 
an important distinction ought to be made between OKP 'groups' 
and 'circles' (in Polish 'kolo'). 'T'he 'gT'011p' had "80 lobbying 
character"123 , Tts d1Jty was to raise problems at t'he OKP for1Jm 
which, in the view of its members, had been forgotten about in 
the club or to which the Presidium had devoted too little space. 
On the other hand, 'circles' were explicitly polit,ic2:1 l2lh, Membership 
of groups and circles did not have a separate character within the 
framework of the OKP. One could belong to the 'Group for the 
Defence of Workers' Interests' which voiced its interests in the 
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context of OKP policy and be a member of a political 'circle' such 
as PC which pursued an independent line. In the second half of 
1990 the increased importance of pOlitical differences meant that 
membership of a given OKP 'group' yielded to membership of a 
political 'circle' and the signifIcance of the 'group' diminished. 
Although groups were not formally disbanded, their duties and 
functions were taken over by circles (see Diagram 3.12)' 
When it came to identify-rng groups and circles in the OKP 
T,op1Js7.fl.nski provides fl. 11set111 introd1]c;tion 12tJ. 1'111'3 first 111'3 
identifies is the main intelligentsia strand which continued to 
espouse the unity of the 'Solidarity ethos'. This group comprised 
around seventy to seventy-five members. led by the intellectual 
luminaries of the Lay Left. 
The next group was the IIso-called Group for the Defence of 
Workers' Interestsil • It was a trade union body which took its lead 
from the socialist strand of leftist philosophy. It was founded on 
8th December 1989 with around twenty members including Jan 
J ozef Lipski, chairman of the Polish Socialist Party. Although 
initially it did not stress its independence from the OKP, its 
clashes with the Mazowiecki government over the workers' 
suffering under the rigours of economic reform (c.f. indexation 
and privatisation debates) contributed to disunity. Generally 
speaking, the lobby took upon itself to represent in Parliament 
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the interests of employees, to warn of the social dangers of 
Minister Balcerowicz's reform and to advocate some corrections of 
the Plan 126. 
Linked to this group was a more informal tendency described by 
Lopuszanski as the lIworkers' self-management group". This was 
formed to lobby for 'worker-owned' version of privatisation. The 
group was led by MPs Andrzej Mill{.owski and J erzy DyneI'. Its 
alliance with the Group for the Defence of W orkers' Interests 
during the privatisation dehate was formidahle127. 
The largest formal group within the OKP was the Farming Section 
which was formed in July 1989 with 52 members. It drafted a 
programme of agricultural policies to use as a platform in 
parliament. Initially the J:t'arrning Section was relatively 
acquiescent and supportive of OK!? unity. Its party base was 
weak. The Solidarity peasant organisations were obedient to the 
Mazowiecki government, communist organisations were 
attempting to rid themselves of a compromised past, and new or 
reactivated rnovements still establishing thernselves. However tll.8 
conflict which arose between the iintelligentsia in powel'l and the 
peasantry accelerated the politicisation of the peasantry and this 
was reflected in the OKP by the emergence of various circles. The 
-PST. 'Solida:pjt.v' p.irp.le formen 2.8/A/8A. t.he -PSJ. p.irp.le formed 
-- ._-- .- ------ - -- --'"'" --- --- -- ----~-. -- .- -, -, - -} --_.- - - - ---- ---- ----------
29/9/89 vviJ.h eight. Inem.bers under t.he lea,clersbJp of Roman 
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Bartoszcze and the circle NSZZ HI 'Solidarity' was established 
6/11/90. rr'11e complet.e separat.ion of t.he Bart.oszcze's PSL circle 
from the OKP in early 1990 was seen as particularly significant12il . 
On 5th April 1990 a group calling itself the Democratic Christians 
emerged in the OKP. It had 44 lVlPs including Michal Chalonski 
and Paw·el Laczkowski. It espoused a Illoderat;e1.y liberal econornic 
programme. Although it stressed its support for OKP unity it was 
the first OKP group to forbid it'd members to join other OKP 
organisations. As such the appearance of this new group split 
existing str11ctures within the OKp129. 
Lopuszanski's own group, linked to the radically CathOliC ZChN 
formed a circle in 26th September 1990 and the lVlP described the 
motivation behind this move in terms of opposing the tactics of 
the Lay Left which was controlling the OKP leadership. He 
explained that the actions of his circle reflected a "coherent policy 
and a fiercely independent, Right-wing line1;5o. Tn the same article 
Lopuszanski vows that he and his colleagues would never allow 
an alliance between the liReds and the Pinks" i.e. between the 
former comm11nists and the social democrats of the T,ay Left l ;)]. 
The ZChN circle was among the more vehement opponents of the 
Lay Left's appeal to OKP unity but a survey carried out in Spring 
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1990 illustrated the general conilict within the OKP betvreen the 
desire for unity and rapidly intensifying consciousness of political 
differences. On the one hand 91 % of the OKP membership 
supported Mazowiecki and 80% advocated continued co-operation 
wi~h the wider Solidarity IIlOVeIllent. However, at the SaIne tune, 
awareness of political rivalries was illustrated by the 57% who 
vVffPe against writing a common OKP manifestoM2. 
Indeed, at a meeting of the caucus on 28th February 1990 several 
Sejm deputies and Senators presented the idea of transforming 
the OKP into a federation of different political options or 
associations133. The emergence of groups and circles and 
subsequent diSintegration of OKP unity in the period 1989-90 is 
presented in Diagram 3.12. 
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Diagram 3.12: Disintegration of the OKP in 1990 
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Conflict Over the Citizens' Com.lliittees 
Another sign of inter-elite Solidarity strife vvas the Vl alesa 
faction's move to block the intelligentsia's plans to transform the 
local citizens' cOIllillittees into a pro-lv1azovviecki social 
movement 1:04. V..ralesa removed the pro-IvIazovviecki intellectual 
~J\lujec from the national Committee and replaced him vvith t;he 
U..LJion activist ~dislavv NaJder. NaJder called a meetir..g of local 
citizens' cOITilllittee representatives on the day before the vote on 
the intelligentsia's option. At the first meeting Walesa criticised 
what he saTvv as a "new, Solidarity-imposed InonopolyU and 
proposed a looser alliance of cOIlliliittees without a permanent 
executive. The cOInmittees, still clingiL"'"1g to the non-ideological 
ethos of the past and ,/Vary of the Warsavv elite's plans for 
centralisation supported Wale sa. In the lor;.g-term this decision 
marginalised the committees. 
As vv-e have seen.. the Solidarity ethos to vv-hich they clung vv-as in 
the process of collapse. IJl..oreover, the prominent part played by 
tho committees on tho local scone came to an end vvith tho 
emergence of democratic politics at this level follovv:ing the local 
elections of Iv'[ay 1990 i :)!;. 
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Formation of Centre Alliance and ROAD 
The disL."ltegration of the Solidari~y movement Vvithin and 
vvithout the Sejm Vias formalised by the found.ing of the Centre 
Alliance (PC) by twirl. brothers Jaroslavv and Lech Kaczynski. 
Throughout the Winter of 1989-90 Jaroslavi Kacz:Yilski sought to 
organise the all of the OY~ forces opposing the creation of a 
unified pro· government force into some form of loose coalition. 
Tb.ose largely right of centre political groups identified previously 
as ur.Jlappy vrith their peripheral role in tJ:w transition process 
elite Vias exercisir..t6 exclusive pOvv'er in a siLllilar manner to and 
on behalf of the old regL.ue v'\Jas frequentty cited in this process. 
rl1he pace and direction of' 8conOIIlic reform ,AJerC seen as 6Tv"i.denc6 
Though generally PJ.ghtist in orientation it amounted to an 
anti-governlIwnt pOlitical coalition; loosely bindL.J.g a variet.y of 
groups rather tr.Lan attcrnpt1.r.lg to represent a particular interest 
group or specifiC ideology. L"l this it can be seen as ~ypical of the 
political intellectual's preferred form of orgarJisation. The obvious 
difference betvveen the n11ing intellectual elite and PC Vias that 
Kaczynski v"Vas mobilisir..g society behind an ideolo!tr v"Vhich looked 
back to a past, pre-cOIn.l.llurJis~ utopia rather than a future, 
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post-COIT.I.Inli..L~st one. Kaczynski and other leaders of the group 
made it clear that they vvould accept representatives of all 
orientatiorJ..8 so long as thc:{ 'v'Vore COITJJT . .J.ttod to a pragmatic 
approach to issues. It therefore appeared to exist merely to mount 
a challenge to the political dOITili~ation of the 'Lay Left i. 
It included a number of independent organisations such as 
Solidarityis peasant orgarJisatior.l., PSL Solidarity, Vvhich had been 
frustrated its lack of representation in government. It also 
included a group v"vitllin the Crllistian DOIIlocratic Labour part={ 
headed by VJlad:srslavv Sila-NmtvickL the Liberal Democratic 
Cor.l6~OSS and much of the DGTIlocratic J?art:{. B:{ April 1990 801110 
associated -v"vith the orgar.J.sation. lvian:{ local citizer.L3 COIT.illlittsGs' 
activists joined its ranks after the disbandir~ of these structures. 
Centre Alliance became the main supporter of 
presidential (~andidaeyJ:-)'i. 
The Lay Left and lv1.azovviecki camps responded to the Centre 
Allianco b=f forming the Citizensl lJIo""v-ernent for Democratic Action 
(ROAD1~-\n). Its membership included prominent lHernbers of the 
Lay Left such as Geremek, lvficril.J.k and Kuron and 
pro-:!:v'Iazovviecki government representatives of Solidarityls 
regional and territorial structures. As vvith PC. affiliation to the 
1v1azovviecki ailiT.JrJistration rather than specific political 
orientations vvas thc or~arJising principlc. ROAD soonbecamc 
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closely involved in lJI:azo"vlecki's candidacy for the office of 
president and the organisation's policy platform is best eXillT.Jned 
in the context of the carnpaignIrm. 
Observers slliil.!.ilarised the conf].ict betvvecn the tvvo 
post-Solidar-it.y organisaJ.ions alOlJg the intelllgentsia,jr'est of soe1ety, 
liberal ciernoeraey /})oplJlisll1 ctaalities esta,blisheci above141l, On the 
one hand }lOAD represented the interests of the irrGelligentsia 
vvhich, froIIl its stror~hold.s in GO\Terrilnent and parliament, ,l\TaS 
set on dictatir..g an evolutionary reform process. Tow'ards this pole 
On the other hand the PC represented the lUght viThich felt 
I1larginalised froTIl CGntres of political pOviTor and espoused a more 
'populist' approach to the reform. Its constituency vvas vvhat 
appealed to social forces \iv-hich ,tv-ere 1J.T'.J:lapp.y vvtth the reform 
process and ViTas IIfocused more on the mood of the masses ... the 
vvorkers in barlkrupt enterprises, ofIice-1l'vrorkers truoatened \tvith 
lay-offs, l11aybe the YOlliJ.g for vIThom there is no vITorkll14fo. Zygmunt 
BauroKo dese]-'jJ)es the elJte/Tfta.ss pola.rJSa.t.JOll ()eelJJ-'~etclg to_ 
Solidarity at the tillle: IILl.tellectuals ( vIThether in or out of 
ll1inisterial office) are fast returnliJ.g to their usual complaints 
against witless and mindless Imasses l unable to see what is good 
for them, while the Imasses l are back to their habitual half-wary. 
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half-derisive vievv of 'those Inen in briefcases in the capital' who 
do not know and would not care an.,..vway what real life is truly 
like II 144. 
The gradual disintegration of the OKP and the proliferation of 
political clubs in the parliament were reflected in the battle over 
electoral legislation. The Sejm's Constitutional Commission formed 
a sub committee in c.June 1990 charged with forgto.g a new 
electoral law. rrhe two options debatt."d within the -conrrnittoo 
reflected the populist and elitist attitudes to the politics of the 
transition. The first proposed a highly proportional system that 
would give parliamentary seats to parties with less than 0.2% of 
the national vote. It was supported by ex-cornmunists and the 
P~.PH.Is- former satellite- organisations:i:n the Sejm who faced the 
prospect of decline to a small party or exclusion from parliament 
ai'ter the ne:xt-electionsW>. 
lrrtttally the OK!? advocated a straight majority system based on 
the 1989 electoral law. This option would have blocked access to 
the Sejm for all small parties and guaranteed the continued 
dOminance of a uni:tled O.K..P. It thus appealed to those who saw 
the OK!? as a body of apolitical experts charged with the task of 
guidi.ng Polish society through the transition from communism. 
This option was immediately rejected by the ex-communist camp 
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which was still numerically dominant in the SeJm. The OKP 
gradually shifted its sl1_pport. t.o a. mtxed proport.tona.l/rna~iorH.y 
vot:in.g system but this time its proposals were not only rejected 
by the ex-communists. The disintegration of the OKP was reflected 
in the opposition of sevGral right-of-cGntrG mGmbGrs who rejGcted 
t '"' 1 ,-'I ,",.' 1· 146 die eauerSlllps lne_ 
EVGntually the intellectual leadership of OKP became reconciled to 
thG fragmGntation of thG organisation and it threw its vveight 
behind a proportional system; hop:in.g to win a popular mandate 
through the ROAD organisation. Thus, grow:in.g political 
fragmentation in the Sejm and the weakness of all the old and 
new political parties produced a consensus guaranteei:ng that all 
existi:ng parties would have a chance to win seats in the new 
legislatl1re14'r. 'The grac11Jal c1rift towarc1 a proportional electoral 
system contributed to the proliferation of small parties and the 
fragmentation of thG political system. 
In conclusion., the 'intelligentsia in power' failed to institute 
Solidarity as an organised base of support because of the 
contradictory desire to introduce a consensual civil society in an 
elitist way. Including Polish society in the dGmocratisation process, 
through, for instance, giving emergent political parties more 
formal representation in the Sojm' or givJng the tradG union sidG 
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of Solidarity, symbolised by Lech 1JIlalesa a more prominent role, 
could have led to a more gradual expression and reconciliation of 
political cleavages. However, the elitist approach of the 
'intelligentsia in power l could not countenance this and politics 
remained an elite-level process. The POlish intelliP:entsia has 
always had diverse ideolomcal strands. In the inter-war and 
communist periods, the parties which emer~ed were made up 
largely of small groups of intellectuals who fought vicious, 
personal struggles amongst themselves with the goal of w:inn.ing 
state power. :b}ven in the period of unity in the late communist 
period deep ideological cleava~es were apparent in the 
anti-communist intelligentsia. Now in 1990 the political scene was 
characterised by an acrimonious battle of intellectual elites for 
8tB,te poweT'143. SolidaT'ity thT'onghont the 19808 co"nld not be 
regarded as a 'social movement' or mass organisation. It consisted 
of an intelligentsia-based leadership assumirlg the role of 
articulatirlg the negative attitude of POlish society to the state. 
Likewise its two, main successor parties, HOAD and PC though 
claiming a nation-wide base of support, were dominated by 
compet~ intellectual elites. 
The political scene in early transition Poland was far from stable 
and representative. Parties had as yet failed to claim anythin.g 
like mass support. ~ven in terms of their self-reported 
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membership, the seven Imajorl parties remained elite organisations 
with narrow social bases. Table 3.13 presents the size of party 
membership on the eve of the election in 1991 when the 
electorate was composed of 21(,516,166 persons. 
Table 3.13 -: Members and parliamentarians of seven largest 
parties 1991 
(Party Members Seats in the Sejm 
t~ 15,000 62 IUU 
'SORP-SLD 60,000 59* 
iKPN 21,000 51 
fSL 1 O{\ (\{\{\ l.OV,VVV I;;{\ JV 
EChN 6,000 49 
IKe 40,000 42 
r..LD 2,500 37 
*SLD. as a coali~ion of SciRP and trade unions. did not register its 
own members. Membership of SdRP does not represent the whole 
organised poten~ial of SLD. 
source: lnformator 0 partiach politycznych w Polsce Polska 
Agen~ja TnfoT'macyjna, WaT'saw 1991). 
As can be seen from the Table, only one party - Polish Peasant 
PaT'ty (PST,) - c1aimeo membeT'ship on the 1eve1 congT'11ent with 
the size of the electorate. There was no correlation betv'\Teen the 
size of the membership and the electoral support of these 
organisations. Parties electoral popularity was based on other 
assets such as charisma of leaders, support from other institutions 
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such as the Catholic Church etc .. Parties vvere not structured 
according to the competi:o.g interests of Polish society but by the 
prestige of their leaders or the influence of other social 
institutions. Parties based on the latter criteria are obviously 
more fragile and prone to fragmentation. The consequences of this 
for the development and consolidation of liberal democracy are 
This is in contrast to the Western model of parties which compete 
within a consensual framework on behalf of established social 
constituencies and ideolO!1;ical pro!1;ramrnes. Thus the Polish 
intelligentsia's attempts to 'over-unify' civil society behind its 
transition progranune contributed to the development of an 
unrepresentative, elitist political culture and this threatened to 
I demobilse I civil society and stifle the development of 
lBO representative democracy < • 
In addition., the failure of the Mazowiecki government to institute 
Solidarity as a base of political support threatened its tenure. 'rhe 
collapse of the movement was followed by calls for immediate 
elections. As we have seen., the intelligentsia had always been a 
relatively narrow social milieu in Poland. In 1990 it was vital for 
the 'L."ltelligentsia in power l to overcome the traditional divisions 
between the intelligentsia and other social groups if it was to 
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enjoy electoral success and continue to lead the reform process. In 
any case, if the Polish intelligentsia wanted to progress towards a 
Western-style democracy then the formation of a consensual 
political culture was necessary. The 'intelligentsia in power' could 
point to the late communist period as a time when such a unified 
vision was achieved. However, Chapter 4 will argue that 
anti-communism masked the compet~, mutually hostile visions 
of Poland's future held by different social groups. Instead of 
integrating these visions the Mazowiecki government as a 
representative of the intelligentsia was caught up in the clash of 
these visions. The etatism and elitism of the milieu made it as 
intolerant as other social forces in society, despite the fact that it 
embarked on a process of democratisation. The failure of the 
Mazowiecki government to overcome its difIerences with the 
workers, peasantry and Catholic Church is explained through the 
intolerant rivalry of these visions. Analysis of the Presidential 
campaign of 1990 when Mazowiecki and his government resigned 
after coming a humiliating third behind Lech Walesa and Stan 
'ryrninski, confirm the continued alienation of the Polish 
intelligentsia from the rest of Polish society and the consequences 
for the 'intelligentsia in power'. 
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